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Preface and Acknowledgements
I first learned about the process of European integration at the age of 16, while 
preparing for a year of study abroad in the United States. The topic immediately 
captured my imagination. I was fascinated by a political process by which former 
arch- enemies who had fought three devastating wars within less than a century 
were turning destructive animosity into well- ordered and mutually beneficial 
cooperation. By the mid- 1990s, western Europe was cherished as a true security 
community in which war had become unthinkable and where citizens across its 
member states had internalized dependable expectations of peace. I belonged to 
the first generation that grew up with the privilege of being able to travel freely 
inside (western) Europe, and I eventually became accustomed to dealing with 
euros rather than Deutschmarks. In these ways, I could be considered a poster 
child of the unprecedented opportunities that Europe offered my generation.
At university, where I was enrolled in European Studies, I soon learned that 
Europe was by no means unique in its quest for regional economic integration, 
even if it might have taken that endeavour further than other regions in the world. 
In reading the academic literature, I realized that scholars and policy- makers 
across the world shared my fascination for the process of European integration, 
and that other regions were taking similar steps in an attempt to secure peace and 
provide opportunities for human development. This gave rise to a new research 
question that has occupied me, on and off, for more than fifteen years now: has 
the European experience with regional integration influenced similar quests for 
close economic integration in other parts of the world? How could we know? And 
would institutionalized forms of regional cooperation have flourished to the same 
extent around the world had Western Europe taken a different path in the imme-
diate post- Second World War era? This book presents my answer to these long- 
standing questions.
While it has taken much longer to write this book than I had planned, I con-
sider myself to be a ‘beneficiary’ of the COVID- 19 pandemic. With most of my 
peers and students locked down, and many occupied with homeschooling or 
other wise taking care of their kids, I’ve been immensely fortunate to be married 
to a woman who understands the vagaries of academic writing and who knew I 
meant it when I said ‘now or never’ at the beginning of the lockdown. Undistracted 
by colleagues and students, I squatted, if you will, my new Leuphana office and 
managed to bring a half- finished manuscript to completion within a record time 
of six weeks. What’s more, the efficacy of that final stretch made up for the many 
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years of anxiety and guilt on my part for failing to make any significant headway 
with the book.
I am deeply indebted to a number of persons and institutions who have helped 
me along the way. I extend thanks, in particular, to my long- term mentors, co- 
authors, and friends Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks. Kalypso 
supervised my doctoral dissertation at Oxford, and Liesbet and Gary originally 
hired me as a post- doctoral fellow in an ERC project at the Free University of 
Amsterdam. I developed the theoretical approach taken in this book and studied 
the mechanisms of EU influence while working on my dissertation. Later, when 
doing subsequent work with Liesbet and Gary, I gained access to a treasure trove 
of data to test my arguments in a larger frame, and was led to think systematically 
about the scope of my arguments. Kalypso, Liesbet, and Gary are hugely creative 
thinkers, and while they are all well versed in the technical details of their re spect-
ive research areas, they share an interest in the bigger picture as well as an impres-
sive ability to integrate diverse strands of research in the pursuit of an original 
argument—aspects of successful scholarship that I too aspire to. It has been a 
tremendous pleasure to work closely with these model scholars over many years. 
I would also like to extend thanks to Walter Mattli and Philippe Schmitter, who 
examined my doctoral dissertation and who have amicably accompanied my aca-
demic development over the years. Moreover, their own important contributions 
to the study of regional organizations have inspired my work.
I am indebted to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, directors of the Research 
College ‘The Transformative Power of Europe’ at Freie Universität Berlin, who 
not only provided a stimulating intellectual environment and financial support, 
but also invited me to contribute early work on the topic to a special issue of West 
European Politics. Further, Joe Jupille, Director of the Colorado European Union 
Centre of Excellence at the University of Colorado at Boulder, granted me a 
European Union fellowship to write up my dissertation in 2011, and has been 
willing to continue engaging with my work since. Carlos Closa, for his part, 
invited me to spend a year as a Max Weber Fellow at the European University 
Institute in 2015/16, which gave me the time and intellectual inspiration to draft 
various chapters of this book. I am also indebted to Diana Tussie, Director of the 
Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Buenos Aires; Yeo Lay 
Hwee, Director of the European Union Centre in Singapore; and Elizabeth 
Sidiropoulos, Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs 
(SAIIA) in Johannesburg, all of whom kindly hosted me at their institutions dur-
ing early field research and helped me in the organization of interviews.
I would also like to thank the numerous diplomats, bureaucrats, and politi-
cians whom I interviewed over the past decade and who have provided me with 
indispensable first- hand insights into institutional negotiations in various 
regional organizations, including in ASEAN, Mercosur, and SADC. Many of 
these conversations are off the record, but they have aided tremendously in the 
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development of the arguments advanced in this book. I am also grateful to the 
numerous colleagues who have engaged with my work and commented on papers 
and chapters over the years, including three reviewers at Oxford University Press. 
Given the incompleteness of my notes, these colleagues will, unfortunately, remain 
unnamed here. Over the years, I also have benefited greatly from discussions with 
Karen Alter, Tanja Börzel, Alexandr Burilkov, Carlos Closa, Francesco Duina, 
Phillip Genschel, Julia Gray, Yoram Haftel, Kai Hebel, Marina Henke, Andy Hurrell, 
Anja Jetschke, Joe Jupille, Peter Katzenstein, Walter Mattli, Andrew Moravcsik, 
Thomas Risse, Frank Schimmelfennig, Philippe Schmitter, Jonas Tallberg, Lora 
Viola, and Michael Zürn. Finally, a big thank you is due to Dominic Byatt at OUP, 
whose patience while I delivered the manuscript I have stretched to the limits. 
I would also like to thank Cathleen Poehler for proofreading the manuscript.
Over the years, I have been fortunate to be able to draw on the support of many 
diligent research assistants who have helped me in assembling data, transcribing 
interviews, collecting literature, and checking the manuscript: Nivine El- Aawar, 
Lennard Alke, Andressa Timm Bauer, Johanna Marie Behr, Jan Dorsten, Nina 
Glatzer, Janika Kemmerer, Campbell MacGillivray, David Guevara, Lina Hayek, 
Pia Nöthlichs, Stephan Pietzner, Alexandr Portes, Annika Reinke, Stefanie Rueß, 
Tilman Rüsch, Elena Sandmann and Antonia Schlude. During the time of work-
ing on this project, I have received major financial support from a number of 
institutions, for which I am grateful. I thank the Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft, 
St Antony’s College Oxford, Oxford University’s Department of Politics and 
International Relations, the Research College ‘The Transformative Power of 
Europe’ at the Free University of Berlin, the European Union Centre at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder, the British Economic and Social Research 
Council, the Daimler and Benz Foundation, the European University Institute in 
Florence, and the Leibniz Association. Moreover, the Leibniz Association’s Open 
Access Monograph Publishing Fund, the German Institute for Global and Area 
Studies and the Leuphana University Lüneburg helped me in financing the Open 
Access publication of this book.
The most personal of thanks go to my family. They have been supportive and 
inspirational in countless ways, and the book would not have come to fruition 
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1
Introduction
Regional Institution Building and Diffusion
On 20 November 2007, the ten heads of state of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a charter in a solemn celebration in Singapore. 
Signed 40 years after the organization’s founding, this document sets out to create 
a Southeast Asian community by endowing ASEAN with a solid legal foundation 
and structured institutional framework. Bearing similarities to that of the 
European Union (EU), the charter established a tiered decision- making structure, 
with a summit of heads of state and several ministerial councils responsible for 
specific areas of cooperation. It is also underpinned by sectoral ministerial bodies 
and committees of senior officials who provide something akin to Europe’s comi-
tology system, and is flanked by a committee of permanent representatives in 
Jakarta, ASEAN’s ‘capital’. Finally, the charter strengthens the ASEAN secretariat 
by assigning it a role in the implementation of decisions, and confers legal per-
sonality on the association. This institutional evolution is remarkable for an 
organization that has long prided itself in pursuing a distinct form of regional 
cooperation dominated by informality and limited institutionalization. Not sur-
prisingly, observers have likened the charter to a slimmed- down version of the 
(failed) European constitutional treaty (Börzel and Risse 2009: 13).
Similar transformations in the design of regional institutions—the bodies that 
compose the permanent structure of a regional organization—can be found in 
other parts of the world. On 11 July 2000, African heads of state and government 
signed the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) in Lomé, Togo. The act 
significantly strengthens the main framework for institutionalized cooperation in 
the continent by replacing the Organisation of African Unity, which was more 
intergovernmental in character. This transition marked a significant evolution 
towards more independent regional institutions, which are formally much 
stronger than those in ASEAN and resemble those of the EU. The new organiza-
tion established a commission with a codified right to initiate legislation and to 
bring infringement cases to a new African Court of Justice, which was subse-
quently integrated into the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It also 
created a Pan- African Parliament as well as an Economic, Social and Cultural 
Council with consultative powers. Not surprisingly, observers note the ‘quasi- 
identical institutional structures of the AU and the EU’ (Staeger 2015: 992).
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In this book, I argue that these two episodes reflect a broader pattern. Since the 
early 1990s, many regional organizations (ROs) have undergone significant trans-
formation towards stronger regional institutions. In so doing, they have moved 
their degree of institutionalization closer to that of the EU, which remains the 
most strongly institutionalized regional organization in the world. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that scholars have noted an increasing similarity of diverse 
institutional developments in a variety of different ROs with the EU. This raises 
several important questions. Does the EU play a discernible role in driving pro-
cesses of institution building in ROs, or can such processes be understood fully 
on the basis of intraregional and global factors? If so, how does the EU’s influence 
operate, and under what conditions is it likely to make a difference? This book 
addresses these questions by developing a diffusion account of the influence of 
the EU that explicates its pathways and specifies the scope condition for their 
operation. It demonstrates that EU influence systematically shapes processes of 
regional institution building elsewhere, but that such influence varies across dif-
ferent types of RO.
The theoretical framework upon which these arguments rest breaks new 
ground in the study of diffusion by embedding diffusion’s central notion of inter-
dependent decision- making in a framework of intergovernmental negotiations. 
I posit that diffusion between international organizations (IOs) in general, and 
between ROs in particular, differs from diffusion between national polities due to 
the central role of intergovernmental negotiations. It is the former type of diffu-
sion, however, that has constituted the empirical terrain in political science and 
international relations in which arguments about diffusion have been developed 
and tested. Decision- making in IOs is more decentralized than it is within the 
hierarchically structured context of domestic decision- making. Therefore, in 
order to understand diffusion between ROs, we need to comprehend the relation-
ship between decentralized negotiations among sovereign governments within 
ROs and interdependent decision- making between them.
I argue that the impact of diffusion operates through its influence on the 
institutional preferences and strategies of governments, which in turn deter-
mine the outcome of international negotiations. I propose a model of diffusion 
between ROs that shows how—compared to a situation of independent 
decision- making—institutional innovations may affect institutional outcomes 
elsewhere. Given that such diffusion effects are likely to be heterogeneous 
across governments’ institutional preferences and strategies, outcomes tend 
towards various degrees of institutional adaptation of the original innovation 
rather than its wholesale transfer. In general, I seek to move research on diffu-
sion away from dominant styles of theorizing in terms of broad structural 
arguments about  convergence and similarity and towards a more actor- 
oriented understanding that (1) emphasizes the purposive choices of govern-
ments within the constraints imposed and the strategic opportunities offered 
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by interdependent decision- making, and (2) acknowledges the resulting diversity 
in institutional outcomes. This approach shares with recent institutionalist 
work in international relations the conviction that agency and political conflict 
are key ingredients in understanding processes of institutional evolution 
(Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013; Johnson 2014; Rixen and Viola 2016).1
The remainder of this introduction outlines the theoretical puzzle in more 
detail, summarizes the main argument of the book, describes its methodological 
approach, and sketches its theoretical implications.
The puzzle: institution building in regional organizations
The past 25 years have seen a profound institutional transformation of inter nation al 
cooperation. Research has documented a widespread move towards more institu-
tionalization, including the emergence of stronger dispute settlement institutions 
and more independent bureaucracies, the appearance of international parliamentary 
institutions, the growth of pooling decision- making competences, and enhanced 
access for transnational actors (Allee and Elsig  2016; Alter  2014; Haftel  2013; 
Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019; Lenz, Burilkov, and Viola 2019; Schimmelfennig et 
al. 2020; Tallberg et al. 2013). These institutional developments are significant in that 
they challenge the ‘classical’ model of IOs as consensual and strictly intergovernmen-
tal bargaining forums. A growing research programme has conceptualized these 
institutional changes as the movement of IOs that were once strictly state- dominated 
towards actors which exert inter nation al authority (Barnett and Finnemore  2004; 
Cooper et al. 2008; Hooghe et al. 2017; Lake 2010; Marks 2012; Zürn 2018).
These institutional developments are particularly marked among ROs. As the 
example of ASEAN shows, ROs that have historically stayed ‘truthful’ to the state- 
dominated model of organization have embarked upon a process of greater insti-
tutionalization that involves modest forms of delegating authority to independent 
third- party agents. The AU example attests to the more general observation that 
organizations which already had some institutionalization have been willing to 
take it further. Some ROs have created powerful regional institutions, including 
supranational courts and general secretariats. A few even feature parliamentary 
bodies with legislative competences. Overall, there is a broad trend for member 
states around the world to endow ROs with increasing formal authority (Lenz et al. 
2015), and the EU has been at the forefront of this development. The EU was the 
first RO following the Second World War to create supranational, rather than 
strictly intergovernmental, regional institutions in order to guide an ambitious 
process of regional economic integration. Over time, the EU has strengthened 
1 This is a more long- standing concern of the historical institutionalism developed in comparative 
politics (see Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Peters, Pierre, and Kind 2005; Thelen 2004).
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4 Interorganizational Diffusion
existing institutions further, emerging as the most heavily institutionalized RO in 
the world today. This book explores whether there is a causal relationship between 
these two institutional developments.
Figure  1.1 displays the evolution of institutionalization in selected ROs 
between 1950 and 2017, and the mean evolution in the sample as a whole (repre-
sented by the thick black line). Institutionalization, the measurement of which is 
introduced in detail in Chapter  4, gauges the existence and competences in 
agenda setting, final decision- making, and dispute settlement of four sets of 
regional institutions: general secretariats, parliamentary bodies, judicial bodies, 
and other non- state bodies (e.g. labour and business councils or bodies composed 
of subnational actors). The figure shows that ROs vary widely in their levels of 
institutionalization, but that most share a similar institutional trajectory insofar 
as levels of institutionalization have increased over time. Today, the EU remains 
significantly the most strongly institutionalized RO; however, other ROs have 
shown similarly dynamic institutional trajectories and thereby have reached, or 
approach, the level of institutionalization displayed by the EU during its founding 
period, such as the Andean Community (CAN) or the Council of Europe (CoE). 
Others have been able to narrow the gap in institutionalization by evolving at a 
faster rate than the EU, such as the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC)2 or ASEAN. As indicated by the thick black line in Figure 1.1, the mean 
2 SADC has seen a decline in institutionalization in recent years due to the disbanding of the 


































Figure 1.1 Institutionalization in selected regional organizations, 1950–2017
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level of institutionalization has grown continuously since the 1950s, with a par-
ticularly marked rise since the 1990s. This overall trajectory is noteworthy in view 
of the fact that newly created ROs tend to display lower levels of institutionaliza-
tion than existing ones.
This upward trend in institutionalization also becomes visible in patterns of 
institutional reform. Figure 1.2 displays the number and direction of reforms that 
have led to changing levels of institutionalization in the entire sample of 36 ROs 
including the EU, which is introduced in detail in Chapter 4.3 Figure 1.2 shows 
that ROs tend to build institutions over time. Unlike in many global organiza-
tions, institutional reform is a recurrent feature of ROs. An average RO under-
takes a major institutional reform every 18 years, a rate that has increased over 
time—with the exception of the most recent years. The average RO had 0.55 
reforms per decade from the 1950s to the 1980s, and more than twice as many 
(1.2 reforms) per decade in the post- Cold War era. Even though the ultimate dec-
ade is not yet ‘complete’, the data also confirm the intuition that ROs, and IOs 
more broadly, have struggled to maintain existing levels of institutionalization, 
with little growth. Relative stagnation notwithstanding, Figure 1.2 demonstrates 
that institutional change has almost uniformly strengthened institutions 
throughout the period of observation. Backtracking in institutional authority is 









































Figure 1.2 Number of institutional reforms in 36 ROs by decade, 1950–2017
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confined to isolated instances in a few ROs, and not a single RO in the sample has 
a lower level of institutionalization in 2017 than it did when it was created.
These institutional changes have led to a change in the distribution of ROs with 
‘extreme’ levels of institutionalization. Figure  1.3 shows the percentage of ROs 
that display disproportionately high (‘over- institutionalized’ ROs) and low levels 
of institutionalization (‘under- institutionalized’ ROs) between 1950 and 2017 as 
measured by a one standard deviation from the mean, with the year 1990 taken 
as the baseline. It indicates that ROs with disproportionately low levels of institu-
tionalization have become rare, whereas the number of ROs with high levels of 
institutionalization has grown continuously. It was around the turn of the mil-
lennium that the number of ‘over- institutionalized’ ROs overtook those that are 
‘under- institutionalized’. The times have changed in terms of regional institu-
tionalization. In sum, we observe a pattern of institutional diversity embedded in 
a clear overarching trend that is the result of a process of regional institution 
building that extends over time.
These institutional developments are remarkable because IOs ‘are notoriously 
resistant to reform and redirection’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 2). International 
institutional change involves a high number of veto points because it is subject to 
unanimity requirements and generally requires domestic ratification. Moreover, 
institutional reform typically has varying distributional implications for different 






















Figure 1.3 Regional organizations with ‘extreme’ levels of institutionalization, 
1950–2017
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agreement. Furthermore, once institutions are in place, they tend to be self- 
reinforcing by structuring expectations, generating sunk and adaptation costs, 
and prompting positive feedback effects, all of which serve to stabilize the status 
quo (Pierson 2004). As a result, even in international politics there is a ‘striking 
stability and staying power of the institutional status quo’ (Jupille, Mattli, and 
Snidal  2013: 5). Finally, delegating power to independent regional institutions 
cuts to the heart of national sovereignty. It mitigates state control over the process 
and outcomes of regional cooperation, which runs counter to the widespread 
assumption that states ‘are jealous guardians of political autonomy and institu-
tional prerogatives’ (Tallberg et al. 2013: 7). The process of building regional insti-
tutions with an increasing degree of independence from member states presents a 
formidable puzzle to researchers in political science and international relations.
There is also, however, a more specific puzzle here, which refers to the trend 
among some ROs to catch up with the EU’s level of institutionalization. A signifi-
cant number of ROs in the sample have institutionalized more rapidly than the 
EU has, leading to an element of convergence in the levels of institutionalization 
among these fast- institutionalizing ROs and the EU.4 This is puzzling insofar as 
most accounts of European integration insist on the process’s uniqueness and 
peculiarity. Historians and political scientists alike have emphasized the unique 
historical circumstances in which European integration emerged after the Second 
World War (see e.g. Parsons  2003)—circumstances that render the European 
experience unlikely to be replicated. As Haas (1961: 389) noted 60 years ago, 
‘other regions with strongly varying environmental factors are unlikely to imitate 
successfully the European example.’ Scholars of regional organization outside 
Europe reiterate this analytical insight from ‘the other side’, as it were, emphasiz-
ing the diversity of regional cooperation processes as a result of distinct historical, 
cultural, and material circumstances, and lamenting the implicit dominance of 
the EU as a benchmark. Acharya formulates this line of criticism succinctly: ‘a 
non- EU- centric perspective on comparative regionalism must take into account 
the distinctiveness of different regions and their institutional designs, patterns, 
and “styles” of cooperation’ (Acharya 2016: 110; see also Acharya and Johnston 
2007a; Hurrell 1995a; Katzenstein 1997; Murray 2010; Söderbaum and Shaw 2003; 
Söderbaum and Sbragia  2011). Yet it is not only in view of the conventional 
understanding of international institutional change and widespread claims about 
the distinctiveness of European integration that the institutional developments 
described in regional organization are puzzling.
4 Convergence should not be understood as genuine similarity in specific institutional designs, but 
instead as institutional developments in a broadly similar direction but with different magnitudes.
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These institutional developments also pose a theoretical anomaly in relation 
to dominant theories of regionalism, and of international cooperation more 
broadly. These theories would deny any causal relationship between the EU’s 
institutional evolution and institutional developments in other ROs, because 
they focus on drivers located within the respective organization. In this view, 
institutions primarily reflect the processes and structures of a region that operate 
from the ‘inside out’. Dominant functional theories of cooperation—such as 
neo- functionalism (Haas 1958; 1961), (liberal) intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 
1998), and neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson, and 
Snidal 2001; Zürn 1992)—view ROs primarily as a response to c onflicts or prob-
lems of collective action resulting from economic or security- related inter-
depend ence within an organization. Constructivist or transactionalist 
approaches, on the other hand, emphasize the role of communication and col-
lect ive identities (Acharya 2001; Adler and Barnett  1998; Deutsch  1957; 
Katzenstein 2005). They posit that organizations develop in response to chan-
ging social processes and structures. Taken together, these benchmark studies 
argue that institution building is driven by factors endogenous to the region. 
They imply that, to the extent that tendencies towards increasing similarity are 
in fact visible, they reflect independent reactions to similar structural conditions 
inside these regions.
Another set of explanations of regionalism is more attuned to ‘outside in’ 
influences, emphasizing global change that impacts ROs from the outside; but 
these approaches would also deny any specific influence of the EU. Theories of 
‘new regionalism’, in particular, highlight the emergence and evolution of ROs in 
response to the increasing intensity of globalization (Söderbaum and Shaw 2003; 
see also Hurrell  1995a; Mansfield  1998). From this perspective, ROs serve as 
stepping stones that help policy- makers to insert national economies into the 
global economy, and also as protective shields against the vagaries of globaliza-
tion. Much of the literature on ‘open regionalism’ centres on this connection (for 
an overview, see Bergsten 1997). Similarly, scholars who have stressed the influ-
ence of global hegemony, or the effects of the anarchic system itself, have sug-
gested an influence on ROs that operates from the ‘outside in’ (Crone  1993; 
Hancock  2009; Grieco  1995; Grieco  1997; Rosato  2011). While the specific 
mechanisms advanced in this literature differ, the basic idea is that processes of 
regional institution building respond systematically to shifts in the global 
(or  regional) configuration of power. Even though they are more sensitive to 
‘outside in’ factors, these studies focus on global factors in explanation and 
therefore also treat ROs as atomistic entities that develop largely independently 
of each other. As a review of two key texts on the subject perceptively notes: 
‘Neither volume tells us much about interregional flows [. . .] or about emulation 
and learning, including the demonstration effects of one type of regionalism on 
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another’ (Acharya 2007: 637). I argue that such interregional flows matter, and 
this book sets out to demonstrate when and how they do so, with a specific focus 
on the EU.
The argument: interorganizational influence and institutional 
diffusion from the European Union
Building on the diffusion literature, the main argument of this book is that the 
European Union systematically shapes the process of creating and changing 
regional institutions in other parts of the world. This influence operates through 
two distinct pathways—active and passive EU influence—and is conditioned by 
the nature of the contract upon which ROs are based. Thus, the book maintains 
that interorganizational dynamics between the EU and other ROs are crucial for 
understanding regional institution building, thereby challenging existing argu-
ments in comparative regionalism and international institutional design, which 
suggest that the process of institution building can be adequately explained by 
focusing on intraregional and global causal factors. I elaborate these arguments 
in turn.
The first argument I advance is that the existence of the EU makes an identifi-
able and substantive difference to the institutionalization of ROs in other parts of 
the world. When the Community (1) directly supports institution building else-
where and (2) changes its own institutions, policy- makers in other parts of the 
world also create stronger regional institutions at home. Despite recent crises, the 
EU remains the most prominent and successful pioneer in the area of regional 
economic cooperation in the post- Second World War era, and as such it has 
successfully worked towards the adoption of stronger institutions elsewhere, both 
passively and actively. Passively, policy- makers in Europe have over time built 
unprecedented supranational institutions—a commission with far- reaching 
rights in terms of structuring decision- making among member- state govern-
ments; a directly elected parliament that (co-)legislates; a European Court of 
Justice with features akin to powerful national courts; as well as a series of ad vis-
ory bodies that institutionalize participation in decision- making by important 
social groups. These institutions then serve as reference points in institutional 
negotiations in other parts of the world when policy- makers seek to address novel 
cooperation problems, nudging institutionalization upward. Actively, the EU 
negotiates interregional trade deals and cooperation agreements, lends financial 
and technical assistance, and engages in regular political dialogue with counter-
parts in other ROs—a support for regional institution building that has also 
enhanced the institutionalization of ROs elsewhere. Thus, counterfactually, insti-
tutions in ROs around the world would be weaker if the EU did not exist: more 
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ROs would look like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the 
European Free Trade Area, and fewer like the Andean Community, SADC, and 
the African Union.
My second argument is that the EU’s active and passive influence on regional 
institution building elsewhere operates through its effect on the institutional pref-
erences and strategies of national governments who negotiate international 
agreements. Formal international institutions emerge and change through 
international treaties which governments of member states negotiate amongst 
themselves and generally adopt by unanimity. Institutional preferences inform 
the strategies that they seek to advance in these intergovernmental negotiations, 
and the final outcome generally reflects a compromise between bargaining posi-
tions. The EU actively shapes preferences and/or strategies by providing material 
incentives and socializing policy- makers into adopting bargaining positions that 
involve the adoption of EU- type institutions; the EU passively affects preferences 
and/or strategies by generating new information about the effectiveness of spe-
cific institutional choices (learning) and legitimating certain institutional forms 
(emulation). I propose that the EU may differentially shape the institutional pref-
erences or strategies of member- state governments in international negotiations, 
which implies that EU influence is likely to lead to stronger regional institutions 
elsewhere but will rarely result in the wholesale adoption of EU- type institutions 
in other ROs. This argument about the pathways of EU influence connects the 
concern of diffusion scholars regarding interdependent decision- making with the 
problematic of much International Relations scholarship: namely, how sovereign 
governments with heterogeneous preferences negotiate international order.
Thirdly, I propose that the nature of a particular RO’s contract bounds the 
operation of active and passive EU influence and thereby delimits its causal role. 
The contracts upon which ROs rest vary in the extent to which they contain 
open- ended commitments. Some ROs are rooted in open- ended contracts, in 
which the purpose of cooperation and the actors who contribute to cooperation 
are deliberately left vague, while other ROs are based on fixed contracts—that is, 
contracts that clearly specify an organization’s purpose and assign the role of 
achieving it exclusively to national governments. This variation in the contractual 
nature of ROs, I posit, conditions EU influence for two reasons. First, open- ended 
contracts entail an endogenous capacity for institutional change because such 
contracts require regular adaptation to evolving commitments. As a result, 
opportunities for EU influence multiply. Second, the supply of EU- type institu-
tional proposals is both more frequent and more credible in ROs based on open- 
ended contracts because these facilitate the construction of analogies between the 
RO in question and the Community. EU influence, I posit, is detectable primarily 
in those ROs that, like the EU, aim to build a regional community; outside of this 
group, it is limited.
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These propositions challenge existing arguments on the design of IOs not only 
empirically but also conceptually and theoretically, because they depart from the 
often- implicit assumption that IOs can adequately be understood as atomistic 
entities that are affected primarily by causal factors located at the unit and system 
levels of analysis. My ontological starting point is that IOs are relational entities, 
and therefore relevant causal force is transmitted through the direct and indirect 
interactions between them. In line with diffusion arguments, the key theoretical 
proposition I advance is that decision- making is regularly interdependent 
between IOs. Scholars neglect what I term the ‘interorganizational’ level of 
 ana lysis at their peril.
Research approach: mixing methods
The arguments advanced in this book concern both ‘the exploration of general 
relationships and explanations and the specific explanation of individual cases 
and groups of cases’ (Lieberman 2005: 436), and these research goals are best 
served by a mixed- methods design. Although such designs are widely advo-
cated in the social sciences, they are rarely practised in research on regional 
organization. This book thus treads new methodological ground in the study of 
comparative regionalism by bringing to bear a variety of methods and data 
on the question of EU influence on other ROs. It seeks to exploit the ‘benefits 
of distinct complementarities’ by nesting quantitative and qualitative analyses of 
different kinds in an attempt to enhance the validity of the causal inferences 
drawn in this book (Lieberman 2005: 436; see also Beach and Pedersen 2016; 
Brady and Collier  2010). Specifically, it uses three complementary research 
methods:
 1. a large- N quantitative analysis of an original dataset on RO design that 
seeks to establish the general conditions under which EU influence is likely 
to shape regional institution building;
 2. two detailed process- tracing exercises within typical, inferentially 
 powerful, and substantively important cases that aim to demonstrate the 
pathways by which active and passive EU influence affect regional insti-
tution building;
 3. a paired comparison of two ROs with different outcomes that aims to 
 demonstrate how contractual open- endedness bounds the effect of EU 
influence.
These methods aim to provide both external and internal validity to the book’s 
arguments, as I discuss below.
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Quantitative statistical analysis
A quantitative statistical analysis is essential for demonstrating the argument that 
EU diffusion systematically shapes processes of regional institution building but 
that the EU’s impact varies across different types of RO. By drawing on a large 
number of important ROs and controlling for potential confounding factors, such 
an analysis estimates the average effect of EU influence on institutionalization in 
the RO population and its interaction with specific RO characteristics. In add-
ition, it requires systematic measurement of EU influence, and I present new 
measures for the conditions that may drive EU influence such as financial sup-
port, interregional agreements, structured interaction, and its own institutional 
evolution. The analysis identifies patterns of association between these conditions 
and regional institution building across a large number of cases while controlling 
for other relevant variables.
The quantitative analysis draws on an original dataset that builds on the 
Measure of International Authority (MIA) developed by Hooghe et al. (2017), 
which is detailed in Chapter  4 below. The dataset contains information on the 
institutional design of 35 ROs and the EU itself in the period from 1950 (or the 
date of an organization’s inception) to 2017. The sample encompasses major and 
well- known ROs, such as ASEAN, SADC, or Mercosur, alongside lesser- known 
organizations, such as the Arab Maghreb Union or the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States. It focuses on ROs that ‘have standing in international politics’ 
(Hooghe et al. 2017: 16) and thereby encompasses the large majority of regional 
organizations that scholars interested in the topic have actually studied in small-
 N settings. These are also the ROs that states care about and invest in. Hence, it 
provides a tough test of EU influence. At the same time, the sample is broadly 
comprehensive in its coverage of states and continents, covering ROs from across 
the world.
Process- tracing within cases
Within- case analysis—that is, the intensive study of a single case over time—is 
essential in showing that EU influence operates through its impact on the institu-
tional preferences and strategies of governments, which define their negotiating 
positions in international negotiations over institutional change. This causal pro-
cess, shared by the two pathways of EU influence, is unmeasured in the large- N 
statistical analysis, and so additional evidence is required to demonstrate how, 
specifically, the various measures of EU influence shape the outcome of interest. 
Within- case analysis allows me to ‘trace the spread of policies and ideas through 
historical reconstruction of decision making at the actor level’ (Starke 2013: 572). 
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Such analysis strengthens causal inference by illuminating the causal process that 
underpins statistical correlations and thereby enhances internal validity.
The within- case analysis employed here relies primarily on what Beach and 
Pedersen (2016) term ‘theory- testing process- tracing’. This type of process- tracing 
pursues the goal of evaluating ‘whether evidence shows that the hypothesized 
causal mechanism linking X and Y was present and that it functioned as theorized’ 
(Beach and Pedersen 2016: 11; Gerring 2007a: 172‒85; Bennett and Checkel 2014). 
I achieve this by (1) theoretically specifying the mechanism in terms of inter-
locking parts in which actors engage in specific activities that transmit causal 
force from one part to the next, (2) drawing out a range of observable implica-
tions of the mechanism across three key dimensions (sequence, process, and 
outcome), and (3) determining whether these are detectable empirically by 
employing a wide range of original data. This data derives from three sets of 
sources: (1) several dozen interviews with policy- makers, EU representatives, and 
policy experts that were conducted in nine different countries during eight 
months of field research in South America (Mercosur), Southern Africa (SADC), 
and Southeast Asia (ASEAN) in 2009, 2015, and 2016; (2) a variety of primary 
sources, such as meeting records, diplomatic cables, expert assessments, and 
expert studies, some of which are not publicly available; and (3) secondary litera-
ture in four different languages.
Given that random selection is generally not feasible for case studies, the estab-
lished principles of representativeness (typical cases) and causal leverage are 
accompanied by considerations of substantive importance in choosing organiza-
tions for within- case analysis (Goertz and Mahoney 2012: ch. 14; Gerring 2008: 
645; Seawright and Gerring 2008: 295‒6). Typical cases ‘enable cross- case infer-
ences from the studied case to causally similar cases’ (Beach and Pedersen 2018: 
839), thereby generating some external validity of within- case analysis, which is 
mainly directed at internal validity. From cases on or near the regression line, 
I choose those that provide basic causal leverage because they display high values 
on the explanatory (X) and outcome (Y) variables of interest, and where the scope 
condition is present (Beach and Pedersen 2016: 146‒52; Falleti and Lynch 2009).5 
Within this group, I furthermore look for cases that approximate what Gerring 
(2007b) calls a ‘pathway case’. These are cases that are not only likely cases from 
the perspective of the independent variables of interest but are at the same time 
unlikely—if not least likely—cases from the perspective of major alternative 
explanations. As such cases mitigate the problem of overdetermination that 
often characterizes case study research, they offer particularly penetrating insights 
into causal mechanisms. Finally, choosing cases that are of major substantive 
5 This selection criterion is compatible with the ‘possibility principle’ formulated by Mahoney and 
Goertz (2004).
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 relevance to scholars interested in the topic not only has the pragmatic advantage 
that a sizeable secondary literature exists on these organizations (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2012: 184‒5) but also shows that EU influence may operate in the most 
important ROs in the world.
Instead of studying organizations ‘as a whole’, I select individual episodes of 
institutional change for within- case analysis, for methodological, theoretical, 
and pragmatic reasons. Theoretically, the stipulated causal process centres on 
governments’ institutional preferences and strategies, which they typically define 
across specific institutions or institutional proposals rather than institutionaliza-
tion per se. Methodologically, individual institutional episodes allow for more 
valid causal inference because the relevant actors, the constraints on their actions, 
and their interaction can be more precisely specified (King, Keohane, and 
Verba  1994: 35‒8). Moreover, potential alternative explanations can be better 
specified at the level of individual institutions, affording the opportunity for 
tighter theoretical control. Given that the quality of within- case analysis depends, 
in part, on the level of detail that the analyst can muster on the decision- making 
process, it makes also pragmatic sense to focus on a better- delineated episode. 
Taken together, following these selection criteria maximizes the likelihood that 
within- case analysis of the pathways of EU influence provides both internal and 
external validity.
Cross- case paired comparison
Finally, the claim that EU influence is conditioned by the contractual nature of 
other ROs requires not only a quantitative statistical analysis to demonstrate its 
general validity but also a systematic cross- case comparison to reinforce the 
causal nature of the association and to demonstrate the validity of the underlying 
causal mechanism.
The logic of paired comparisons is akin to the most similar systems design, and 
draws on matching techniques increasingly familiar from statistical analysis 
(Gerring 2007a: 136‒8). The idea is to find cases which differ sharply on the out-
come variable, and which assume similar values on as many independent vari-
ables of interest as possible, in order to be able to eliminate their causal influence 
by design. An effective application of the method, according to Tarrow (2010), 
involves a ‘dual- process tracing’ approach. The first process involves pairing two 
cases on their dependent and independent variables in an attempt to eliminate as 
many of them by design. In the second process, the researcher traces the influ-
ence of the non- matched independent variable of interest on the dependent vari-
able, to demonstrate its causal effect in accounting for the variation in outcome 
between the two cases. It thus combines elements of both the correlational and 
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process- tracing logics, which means that paired comparisons can generate both 
external and internal validity (Slater and Ziblatt 2013).
The logic of paired comparisons can be usefully combined with the crucial- 
case method, initially advocated by Harry Eckstein (1975). Crucial cases are 
those that go against established expectations, thereby providing ‘what is, ar gu-
ably, the strongest sort of evidence possible in a nonexperimental, single- case 
 setting’ (Gerring 2007b: 232). We obtain particular causal leverage on a theory 
when we combine a least- likely crucial case to confirm a theory with a most- 
likely case for prominent alternative explanations that we disconfirm. To the 
extent that we can match these two cases on critical independent variables, and 
thereby isolate the influence of our causal factor of interest, in line with the logic 
of paired comparisons, we have a powerful research design. In this case, not only 
do we provide evidence in favour of our preferred theory ‘against all odds’, we 
also demonstrate that its main competitor(s) do not work, even though they 
should. If the matching is done well, ‘the causal effect of X1 on Y can be isolated 
from other potentially confounding factors’, and this ‘pathway case’ is particu-
larly useful ‘in circumstances in which cross- case covariational patterns are well 
studied and in which the mechanism linking X1 and Y remains dim’ (Gerring 
2007b: 238, 239). The paired comparison is based on a variety of primary (docu-
ments, interviews) and secondary evidence, and also employs counterfactual 
reasoning.
Theoretical implications of the argument
The arguments advanced in this book yield important theoretical implications. 
I highlight three here, and develop these and others more fully in the conclusion.
The first implication is that existing theories of regional organization are 
incomplete because they emphasize causal factors at the intraregional and global 
levels of analysis, and neglect interorganizational influences (see Jetschke and 
Lenz 2013). In so doing, these theories conceive of ROs as atomistic entities that 
develop independently of each other, whereby this book substantiates the claim 
that their interaction is an important source of variation in regional organization. 
This neglect of interdependent decision- making is one reason why integration 
theories developed in the European context are not likely to be applicable to other 
parts of the world. Neo- functionalists abandoned their attempt to develop a gen-
eral theory of regional integration in the 1970s, while liberal intergovernmental-
ism has barely been applied outside Europe. It is well known in diffusion research 
that explanations for institutional innovations differ fundamentally from ex plan-
ations for subsequent institutional adoption (Rogers 2003; Finnemore 1993)—
an insight that suggests that regional organization in Europe, as a successful 
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organizational pioneer, requires a different explanation than do organizations that 
emerge and develop thereafter. While an exclusive focus on endogenous condi-
tions makes sense in the EU, it would be ill- guided when seeking to explain 
regional cooperation in other parts of the world.
The second implication concerns the role of context in international institu-
tional design. The dominant rational- design literature interprets international 
institutions as responding to functional demands emerging from the specific 
cooperation problems that states encounter. It shares with a large body of 
 literature on regionalism a focus on internal, especially functional, causal factors. 
My argument bolsters recent work that criticizes this approach for neglecting 
the contextual nature of institutional design: institutional design does not 
occur in a ‘bargaining vacuum’; it is affected by the institutional or organiza-
tional context in which a design decision is being negotiated (Copelovitch and 
Putnam 2014; Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013; Johnson 2013). It suggests that 
the institutional activities of other, related organizations are a key aspect of this 
context. Yet, unlike some of this work, this book conceives of context not 
mainly in structural but in relational terms as a web of asymmetric interactions 
between organizations.
A third implication of this book’s analysis concerns diffusion in international 
relations. My argument supports the basic claim of this literature that decision- 
making is regularly interdependent between organizations, and hence that insti-
tutional and policy choices cannot be adequately understood by treating these 
organizations in isolation (for an overview, see Gilardi 2012). However, the over-
whelming focus of this body of research concerns diffusion between national 
polities, and displays a style of theorizing and analysis that emphasizes broad 
structural arguments about convergence and increasing similarity in outcomes 
but largely fails to analyse actors and the dynamics of their interactions. The pre-
sent study suggests that analysing diffusion between IOs provides fertile ground 
for developing a more actor- oriented understanding of diffusion because, unlike 
diffusion between the hierarchically organized units that have dominated the lit-
erature, IOs are decentralized settings in which outcomes are the result of bar-
gaining between sovereign governments. This book proposes a heuristic model 
that shows how institutional innovations in some organizations affect institu-
tional outcomes in other organizations through their influence on governments’ 
institutional preferences and strategies, which in turn shape international inter-
governmental negotiations. A core implication of the model is that convergence, 
emphasized by the existing literature on diffusion, is a rare outcome of diffusion 
between IOs, because institutional change is the result of an institutional com-
prom ise between the heterogenous interests of sovereign governments. The study 
seeks to marry key insights of diffusion scholars with the important International 
Relations concern about the dynamics of decentralized bargaining among hetero-
geneous actors.
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Structure of the book
Following this introduction, the remainder of this book consists of two main 
parts that encompass six substantive chapters. Part I, comprising Chapters  2 
and 3, develops the theoretical framework, and Part II, Chapters 4–7, evaluates 
the framework empirically.
The theoretical framework is developed in two steps. Chapter 2 specifies the 
gap in the theoretical literature by summarizing seven decades of empirical and 
theoretical debate about regional organization. I identify a paradox: whereas the 
empirically oriented literature has amassed a significant yet often unsystematic 
amount of evidence to suggest that the EU has significantly influenced the pro-
cess of regional institution building in different parts of the world, suggesting that 
it merits more systematic and theoretically guided analysis, the theoretical litera-
ture largely neglects this influence. Pitching its explanations overwhelmingly at 
the unit (intraregional) and systemic (global) levels of analysis, the literature 
offers little insight into interorganizational dynamics. The chapter closes by sum-
marizing the theoretical bias in the existing theoretical literature on regional 
organization by drawing on the levels- of- analysis metaphor, and introduces the 
concept of diffusion as a useful analytical tool to theorize the interorganizational 
influence of the EU on processes of regional institution building elsewhere.
Chapter 3 presents the core of the theoretical framework that guides the subse-
quent empirical analysis. It develops a heuristic model to analyse processes of dif-
fusion between ROs, and identifies the pathways and scope condition of EU 
influence. The chapter hypothesizes that the EU’s structured interaction with 
other ROs, as well as its own institutional development, is systematically related 
to the process of regional institution building elsewhere, and further suggests that 
the nature of an RO’s contract conditions such influence. It closes with the devel-
opment of testable implications of the argument and a discussion of alternative 
explanations.
The subsequent four chapters test this theoretical framework empirically. 
Chapter  4 presents a multivariate statistical analysis of three core hypotheses 
drawing on the dataset described above. Chapters  5 and  6 examine the causal 
processes that underlie, respectively, active and passive EU influence. Episodes of 
institutional change analysed in these chapters include the creation of the SADC 
Tribunal in 2005 and the formation of Mercosur’s Permanent Review Tribunal in 
2003. Chapter 7 probes the stipulated scope condition of EU influence—contractual 
open- endedness—through some correlational analysis and a paired comparison 
of the parliamentary dimension in ASEAN and NAFTA.
Finally, the conclusion (Part III) summarizes the overall evidence for the book’s 
main arguments and considers its main theoretical implications for the literatures 
on regional organization, international institutional design, and diffusion, as well 
as outlining some promising avenues for future research.
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Revisiting Regional Institution Building
Levels of Analysis and the European Union Factor
A gap seems to exist between present theory of international regional 
integration and political reality. The theory explains [. . .] regional 
integration almost exclusively on the basis of processes and factors 
internal to the region under consideration. When theory considers 
phenomena outside the region, they usually appear as residual cat­
egor ies which are left insufficiently examined and about which we 
know little.
Kaiser (1968: 84–5, emphasis original)
This chapter revisits, and largely (re)confirms, a paradox in the literature on 
regional organization that Karl Kaiser first identified half a century ago: while the 
descriptive literature is replete with references to the European Community/
European Union (EU) as a causal influence on regional institution building in 
other parts of the world, the theoretical literature largely neglects this influence 
because it pitches its causal explanations at alternative levels of analysis. I argue 
that the ‘EU factor’ operates at the interorganizational level of analysis, whereas 
dominant theoretical accounts tend to focus either on the regional or subregional 
level, on the one side, or, more recently, the global level of analysis on the other. In 
so doing, these dominant accounts, I propose, largely neglect the relational influ­
ence that operates between regional organizations (ROs). This state of affairs 
means that despite its presumed empirical relevance, we still have surprisingly 
little theoretical knowledge about the EU as a causal factor in understanding 
regional institution building.
The levels of analysis metaphor is helpful in identifying the explanatory bias in 
existing theories of regional organization. It provides a conceptual tool to organ­
ize theoretical arguments according to common analytic features. Each level of 
analysis encompasses a diverse set of theories and arguments that is ‘defined 
according to where one locates the nexus of important causes’ (Waltz 1959: 12; 
more generally, see Singer 1961; Onuf 1995; Hollis and Smith 1990: ch. 1). The 
metaphor thus captures a key analytic choice facing any individual scholar: which 
level of analysis is the most promising in explaining a phenomenon? Because this 
analytic choice is inescapable, any single theory is necessarily incomplete in that 
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it neglects other levels of analysis (Yurdusev  1993: 83). Yet, at the level of a 
research field as a whole, the trade­ offs are less severe. A mature field of research 
will feature theoretical perspectives derived from different levels of analysis. This 
is the virtue of theoretical pluralism: the theoretical and empirical blind spots of a 
research field are likely to be smaller when the same phenomenon is analysed 
from different analytic perspectives. In contrast, such blind spots abound in 
research fields in which certain levels of analysis are neglected or otherwise 
overlooked.
In this chapter, I suggest that the study of regional organization is a research 
field in which the theoretical focus has been on both the unit and the systemic 
levels of analysis while nevertheless largely neglecting the interorganizational 
level of analysis. This bias, I propose, renders existing explanations of RO design 
seriously incomplete. The chapter proceeds in three main parts. The next two 
parts each review seven decades of empirical and theoretical literature on ROs, 
drawing on the conventional distinction of the field into a first and a second wave. 
The third part employs the levels of analysis metaphor to summarize the explana­
tory bias inherent in the research field, and introduces the concept of diffusion as 
a useful tool to theorize the interorganizational influence of the EU on processes 
of regional institution building elsewhere. This theorization is undertaken in the 
next chapter.
First wave of regional organization (1950–1980s)
The European integration process was a novel phenomenon in international 
 pol it ics when it started in the early 1950s. While intergovernmental cooperation 
has a long history, the fact that independent nation states delegated and pooled 
significant aspects of their sovereignty in supranational institutions to advance 
the gradual integration of their economies—without wanting to federalize—was 
unique. Given the early success of the European strategy to pursue visionary ends 
by pragmatic means, it soon served as an inspiration for region­ builders else­
where. EC­ style common markets began to mushroom around the world, and the 
European Commission started to support these efforts. European policy­ makers 
themselves and their counterparts elsewhere often saw the EC as the primus inter 
pares of regional (economic) organizations.
Regional organization after the Second World War
As a reaction to the wounds of the Second World War, the architects of the post­
war international system were keen to civilize world politics by organizing it 
globally rather than regionally. Regional organization was thought to be at odds 
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with ideas about collective security and global government, most clearly manifested 
in the creation of the United Nations (Mitrany 1965: 126–7). Nevertheless, the 
states ‘that had already made heavy political investments’ in ROs, especially in 
Latin America and the Arab world, secured their recognition in the UN Charter 
(Claude 1968: 5–6). As regional security predicaments remained severe in many 
parts of the world and global institutions were unable to perform their functions 
effectively in view of increasing superpower rivalry, ROs blossomed in the 1960s 
and 1970s.
Even though regional organizations existed long before the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), its creation in 1951 and its speedy transformation into 
the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 marked a watershed in inter­
national cooperation. Exploiting favourable structural conditions and drawing on 
a rich intellectual history of sketches for European unification, six West European 
governments institutionalized supranational control over crucial war resources 
and created a common market for their distribution in the Paris Treaty of 1951. 
The institutional architecture—consisting of the ECSC’s ‘High Authority’ with 
far­ reaching competences to direct market interventions, a court, and a parlia­
mentary assembly with executive control functions—‘was, at the time, unmatched 
in ambition’ (Rittberger 2001: 674). After the failure of more ambitious plans 
like the European Defence Community, the political ambitions and institutional 
set­ up of the ECSC found their way into the EEC, the forerunner to today’s EU.1 
The Treaty of Rome formulated the objective of creating a common market and a 
common external tariff, directed by a set of supranational institutions that were 
unprecedented in international relations. These included the European Commission, 
with its sole right to propose legislation; the European Court of Justice, which 
ruled over the interpretation of the treaties and whose judgments were binding 
on member states; and a Parliamentary Assembly with consultative powers. The 
EC’s political ambition and institutional architecture was without precedent in 
international politics.
This pioneering European experiment in supranational cooperation soon 
 ‘triggered regional integration in other parts of the world’ (Etzioni 1963: 515). As 
policy­ makers in the global South struggled to stabilize their often newly inde­
pendent countries and to promote economic and social development, the EC 
served as an ambiguous referent. It induced fears of being excluded from the 
European market, served for some as a ‘countermodel’ to be avoided, and sparked 
admiration among many others. Diverse attempts at emulating Europe’s success 
followed. Consider some examples of casual claims regarding the influence of the 
1 The ECSC, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community 
were merged and subjected to a common set of institutions in the 1967 Merger Treaty. It was only 
from this point onwards that it was referred to as the European Community, or the EC, although 
I shall use the acronym when referring to the earlier period as well.
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EC on regional organization elsewhere. Nye argued in 1965 that the ‘European 
Economic Community (EEC) has had a strong impact [. . .] on statesmen from 
other areas of the world’ (Nye 1965b: 870). Kaiser’s critique of regional or gan iza­
tion theory, cited above, was motivated by the observation of ‘the impact of EEC 
[sic!] on underdeveloped areas’ as an ‘example of the demonstration effect’ 
(Kaiser 1968: 96). Asante (1982) noted that ‘the developing countries generally 
saw developments in Western Europe as a model and inspiration’ (p. 307), imply­
ing that it affected their own institutional choices. And Avery (1973) similarly 
argued: ‘it is patently obvious that the example of European integration served as 
the major stimulus for similar endeavours in other regions and still remains the 
model for most integration efforts’ (p. 550). Others also posited a causal relevance 
of the EC ‘model’, but emphasized the problems associated with the transfer of 
European models to other parts of the world. Langhammer and Hiemenz, for 
example, lament what they term a ‘fallacy of transposition’:
The historically unique example of the integration process in the EEC between 
1957 and 1968 when the first two stages of integration were implemented simul­
taneously served as a model. Governments of developing countries misunder­
stood this process as a case of limited cooperation without surrendering national 
sovereignty and tried to copy the example in their countries.
(Langhammer and Hiemenz 1990: 2)
Similar assessments can be found in many parts of the world. In Latin America, 
the president of the council of the Uruguayan government angrily noted in the 
late 1950s: ‘the formation of a Common Market in Europe [. . .] constitutes 
almost a state of war against Latin American exports. We therefore have to 
respond to one integration with another; [. . .] to inter­ European cooperation 
with Latin American cooperation’ (cited in Balassa 1965: 16). In this example, 
the EU is seen as a threat that prompts a process of counterorganization. Most 
scholars agreed that economic integration in Latin America was ‘precipitated by 
the astounding increase in economic cooperation and prosperity in Europe’ 
(Feder  1961: 433; Haas  1961: 382), and frequently noted that Latin American 
elites were ‘influenced by the attempts at regional integration in Europe’ 
(Mace 1988: 408; see also Kaiser 1968: 96; Wionczek 1965: 48; Robertson 1968: 
353). Taking stock of regional organization in Central America, Nye remarks 
drily that the European Economic Community ‘was of some importance to 
Central America, both as an example of mature states pooling sovereignty and as 
a detailed paradigm for study by SIECA [Secretariat of Economic Integration in 
Central America]’ (Nye 1967: 51; see also Dell 1966). The members of the Latin 
American Free Trade Association, founded in 1960, similarly ‘[drew] upon the 
example of Western Europe’ (Wionczek  1970: 52) in their attempt to create a 
common market.
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Disappointed by a lack of progress of the Latin American Free Trade 
Association, five Andean countries created the Andean Common Market in 1969, 
with many features similar to those in the EC: gradual and automatic across­ the­ 
board tariff reductions; a series of harmonized policies (e.g. agricultural policy, 
industrial policy) based on common and binding rules called resolutions; major­
ity decision­ making in an intergovernmental commission; and a supranational 
Junta, which ‘resembles the Commission of the European Economic Community’ 
(Avery and Cochrane 1973: 203). Many commentators at the time noted that the 
‘legal institutional model most frequently seized upon by the Cartagena drafts­
men was that of the European Communities’ (Horton  1982: 43; see also 
Axline  1979). When policy­ makers in the Andean region supplemented this 
institutional structure in 1979 with an Andean Court of Justice, ‘modeled after 
the successful European Court of Justice’ (Keener 1987: 71; see also Padilla 1979: 
93), and in the 1980s with an Andean Parliament, the similarities became even 
more marked.
In Africa, ambitions for pan­ African integration through the Organisation of 
African Unity, founded in 1963, dominated regional organization for the first 
decade or so. Once high­ flying hopes vanished, the 1970s and 1980s saw the 
emergence of a flurry of sub­ regional, economically oriented integration projects 
such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the East 
African Community (EAC), which reflected an ‘admiration for the operation of 
the EEC and its potential power’ (Asante  1982: 307). Many of them emulated 
institutional choices in the EC. The EAC pursued ‘plans for a common market on 
the lines of the EEC’ (Freedland 1973: 311), while ECOWAS signed an ‘elaborate 
[founding] treaty, modelled on that of Rome’ (Robson 1985: 610). These assess­
ments are not confined to academic observers, with policy­ makers themselves 
holding similar views. One readily admitted: ‘ECOWAS is intentionally emulat­
ing the European Economic Community, as the most successful regional eco­
nomic community so far in operation’ (cited in Asante 1982: 309); and former 
Nigerian president Olesegun Obasanjo remarked poetically that ECOWAS tries 
to ‘rekindle our flickering African flame [of regional organization] from the 
European torch’ (cited in Lister 1997: 160). However, few of these regional or gan­
iza tions were successful or even active for longer than the initial years, due in part 
to the ‘poor fit between the imported [European] model of regional integration 
and the circumstances in which it was applied’ (Mayall 1995: 181; Langhammer 
and Hiemenz 1990).
In Asia, several proposals for regional economic organization emerged in the 
years following the creation of the EC, even though subregional institutions were 
less popular than in Latin America and Africa and their institutional set­ up 
tended to be leaner. Shortly after the EC’s inception, Malaysia proposed a 
Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty based on ‘the example of 
Western European regional organisations’ (Jorgensen­ Dahl 1982: 20) that failed 
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 01/05/21, SPi
26 Interorganizational Diffusion
to take off. A similar fate befell the Association of Southeast Asia, an alliance 
between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand in 1961, and MAPHILINDO in 
1963 (Leifer  1989: 19). ASEAN’s founding with the Bangkok Declaration of 
August 1967 constituted a renewed attempt to foster unity amidst the fear of 
intraregional conflict propelled by Communist expansion in neighbouring states 
and domestically. ASEAN pursued an informal style of integration that upheld 
the principles of consultation and consensus, non­ interference, and weak in sti tu­
tion al iza tion, and created some weak regional institutions only after the Bali 
Summit in 1976: a small secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, and a High Council for 
dispute resolution, followed by a parliamentary assembly in 1977 (see Chapter 7). 
Even though the institutional and substantive similarities with the EC were 
limit ed, ‘a lot of people, particularly outsiders, saw in Asean a mirror image of the 
EEC—an economic community’ (Mahathir bin Mohamad 1987: 1–2). Even in 
Asia, with its distinct style of regional cooperation, references to and claims about 
EC influence were surprisingly widespread.
In sum, much writing by area studies specialists during the first wave of regional 
organization regularly makes claims about the influence of the EC, be it as a threat, 
an inspiration, or an example/model to be emulated. These concepts might have 
formed promising starting points for scrutinizing EC influence more systematically, 
but none of them were ever conceptually developed or properly tested. Instead, 
accounts heavily relied on the impressionistic insights of the individual scholar.
The European Community’s support for regional institution building
The EC’s support for regional organization has its roots in relations with Africa. 
In 1963, the EC negotiated an association agreement with its former colonies in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) as a group. The main objective of this 
agreement, and eventually of others, was—as a high­ level official of the European 
Commission noted at the time—to ‘consciously support a common front by the 
ACP states’ and to act as a ‘catalyst for African unification’ (Krohn 1975: 70, 81, 
my translation). The Yaoundé Agreement marked the start of an early form of 
interregionalism—one in which the EC engaged a group of countries on the basis 
of a jointly negotiated agreement.
Several instruments were developed in the context of relations with Africa that 
continue to form the backbone of the EC’s support for regional organizations 
today. First, early interregional agreements provided for an elaborate institutional 
framework that was ‘patterned on that of the European Community’ (Grilli 1993: 
20) and thereby familiarized region­ builders with EC institutional arrangements.2 
2 The first Yaoundé Agreement consisted of an Association Council, an Association Committee, a 
secretariat, a Court of Arbitration, and a Parliamentary Conference, each of which had functions 
somewhat similar to those of the respective institutions in the EC (Cosgrove­ Twitchett 1978: 110).
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Second, the EC provided an early form of technical assistance by training civil 
servants from associate countries in EC institutions (Rempe 2009). Third, the EC 
lent financial assistance by funding projects that involved several countries in a 
geographic region. The regional allocation rose from about 11 per cent in the first 
Yaoundé Agreement to 14.5 per cent in the Third Lomé Convention with ACP 
states, which lasted until 1990.3 Besides the ACP group, the EC also engaged with 
existing ROs in Africa. In 1968, it concluded a cooperation agreement with the 
EAC and in the late 1970s, officials from the European Commission acted as the 
‘midwife’ to the creation of the Southern African Development Cooperation 
Conference (SADCC) (Anglin 1983: 685; Mandaza and Tostensen 1994: 12: 84). 
Throughout the 1980s, the EC supported the organization financially, allocating 
more than ECU 200 million to regional programmes under the Lomé II and III 
Conventions (European Commission 1990: 12) (see also Chapter 5).
Support for regional organizations started later but was developed in more 
innovative ways in relations with the non­ associated developing countries in Asia 
and Latin America. With the inception of the EC Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) in 1971, the EC introduced a cumulation of ‘rules of origin’ 
clause, which allowed ROs such as the Andean Pact and ASEAN to enjoy access 
to the EC market if a product originated in various countries of that region. At 
the institutional level, the European Parliament began to hold biannual interpar­
liamentary dialogues with the Parlatino (a continental parliament in Latin 
America) in 1974; and a year later, the European Commission and the member 
states established regular meetings with the Council of the Latin American 
Economic System. In seeking closer contacts with the EC, ASEAN established its 
first representation abroad in Brussels in 1972 (European Commission 1981: 3), 
culminating in the first ever ministerial meeting with an RO in 1978 and the 
signing of an EC–ASEAN Cooperation Agreement in 1980 (European 
Commission  1981: 3–4, 8; see also Drummond  1982: 311–12). The EC’s early 
repertoire for the promotion of regional organization was completed by the 
inception of a broad­ based group­ to­ group dialogue with the Central American 
countries in 1984 (for an overview, see Roy 1992).
Financial support for regional institutions and projects through the EC’s devel­
opment policy was extended to Latin America and Asia in 1976. The Andean Pact 
Junta, the organization’s executive body, was the main beneficiary of financial 
resources in Latin America, receiving about ECU 1.1 million in institutional sup­
port between 1980 and 1982 and ECU 14 million from 1977 to 1982 for regional 
projects (European Commission  1983: 11). Unlike in Africa, the EC also sup­
ported genuine regional policies (rather than just regional projects) such as the 
Andean Pact’s industrial strategy or the ASEAN Timber Technology Centre 
(European Commission  1988a: 103; 1988b: 10). Table  2.1 displays the EC’s 
3 Calculations are based on European Commission (1984: 9; 1986: 23; 1992b: 17).
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increasing development aid allocations to regional projects and organizations in 
Latin America and Southeast Asia.4 Even though these allocations remained 
modest in absolute terms, they nevertheless were important contributions in spe­
cific areas and, maybe more importantly, served to grant recognition to regional 
organizations as legitimate partners in international politics. Financial flows also 
were followed by personal contacts between the two sides, and served to transfer 
integration know­ how.
Theorizing regional institution building during the first wave
Early theorizing on regional organization was ambitious, and pursued the ul tim­
ate aim of developing an encompassing theory of regional integration. After 
building various such theories in the European context, many theoretically 
minded scholars moved to the study of other integration processes to apply and 
refine them. In the process, however, the suggestive evidence on EC influence that 
their empirically minded peers, and these scholars themselves, had assembled 
was largely ignored, or at least remained untheorized and failed to be sys tem at ic­
al ly tested.
Owing to the intellectual hegemony of behaviourism in (American) social sci­
ence at the time, early theorists of integration focused primarily on the unit level 
of analysis (Rosamond 2000: 54). Transactionalism—developed by Karl Deutsch 
and his collaborators—examined the integrationist consequences of increasing 
economic, social, and political transactions within a region in the emergence of 
4 The differences in the allocation of funding in the two regions largely reflect the existence and 
strength of existing regional groupings.
Table 2.1. EC development aid allocations to Latin America (LA) and Southeast Asia 
(SEA) (in million ECU)
Period Total commitment Commitment to regional 
organizations
Share of regional/total 
commitments (%)
LA SEA LA SEA LA SEA
1976–80
(average)
76.3 11.5 22.1 0.2 29.0 1.8
1981–5
(average)
263.2 39.6 73.1 2.9 27.8 7.4
1986–9*
(average)
220.2 35.2 131.1 6.2 60.0 17.6
* Because of a lack of data, this period only includes the years 1986 and 1987 for Southeast Asia.
Sources: European Commission (1981: 11; 1988b: 11; 1989).
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security communities (Deutsch 1957). Neo­ functionalism, the most important of 
these early theories, saw the process of regional integration as a series of spillovers 
between functionally connected policy fields, triggering a self­ sustaining process 
towards deeper regional integration and eventual political unification. Functional 
spillovers, moreover, were directed and continuously nourished by supranational 
institutions, and were further reinforced by the political mobilization and or gan­
iza tion of interest groups at the regional level (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; see also 
Balassa  1961), thereby creating the inherently expansive logic that Ernst Haas 
himself would soon be agonizing about (Haas 1970).5
When the same theorists and their students started applying these theories 
beyond the European context, the field of ‘comparative regionalism’ gradually 
emerged (see Pentland  1973: ch. 5). They soon realized, however, that despite 
functional spillover and increasing social interactions integration processes did 
not develop in as linear a fashion as they had in Europe until the mid­ 1960s. This 
led theorists to examine the context conditions necessary for successful integra­
tion, which they used to account for stagnating or even retrenching integration 
dynamics (Schmitter  1970b). These conditions revolved almost exclusively 
around states and dynamics internal to the respective integration processes: 
structural background factors such as the size and degree of symmetry between 
the involved countries; process conditions such as decision­ making style or the 
adaptability of involved actors; institutional dynamics associated with the role 
and influence of regional institutions; and/or the perceptions and ideology of 
regional policy­ makers (Haas  1961; Haas and Schmitter  1964; Nye  1965a: 1; 
Okolo 1985; Schmitter 1970a).6 Thus, empirical anomalies that accumulated over 
time did not prompt these scholars to depart from the unit or even sub­ unit level 
of analysis.
Focused, as they were, on domestic and process­ oriented factors, these  scholars 
of neo­ functionalism largely neglected external factors in theorizing the dynam­
ics of regional integration. To the extent that they did, such theorization remained 
conceptually underdeveloped and was never systematically applied empirically. 
Philippe Schmitter, for example, proposed an ‘externalization hypothesis’, which 
sought to capture the feedback effects of outside actors’ reactions for the integra­
tion process itself (Schmitter  1969: 165; 1970a: 840; see also Pinder  1968: 37; 
Etzioni 1965: 70–71). It was certainly plausible to argue that integration also had 
external effects, and to posit that these effects were not confined merely to the 
5 In the meantime, early intergovernmentalists such as Stanley Hoffman also critizised neo­ 
functionalism for underestimating the continued influence of nation states in the integration process 
(Hoffmann 1966). This critique, however, did not amount to an alternative theory of regional integra­
tion and did not depart from neo­ functionalism in its exclusive focus on internal dynamics.
6 Early economic theories of regional organization, on the other hand, focused primarily on its 
effects and conditions for success rather than its emergence and evolution (Viner 1950; Griffin and 
French­ Davis 1965).
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material ones of market integration—what Schmitter termed ‘envy’. However, 
their exact mechanisms and the conditions under which they are likely to be rele­
vant were never clearly elaborated. This critique of neo­ functionalism existed at 
the time. In his Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts, 
Hansen (1969: 249–50) notes:
We shall argue below that the Haas–Schmitter model suffers from a serious the­
or et ic al inadequacy in its dealing with regional integration schemes in less 
developed areas: it does not attempt to isolate and measure those exogenous fac­
tors in the international environment that affect the integration process.7
Joseph Nye was probably the most prominent scholar calling for a sustained 
examination of ‘external catalysts’ in regional integration processes, although he 
himself fell short of doing so systematically (Nye 1965b: 882–4). Nye drew some 
useful conceptual distinctions that continue to resonate to this day—passive vs 
active external factors (Nye 1968)—and emphasized the role of perceptions of the 
external environment and the concrete involvement of external actors (see 
Nye  1970: 811–12, 819–20). While all of these promised to be useful starting 
points, Nye never moved beyond mere superficial empirical application, and his 
model eventually became so complex that no single factor was considered in 
much depth.
A few scholars heeded Nye’s call and did indeed focus mainly on an analysis of 
external factors in general and the cross­ cutting influence between regional 
groupings in particular, thus moving towards the interorganizational and sys­
temic levels of analysis. Karl Kaiser (1968), for example, developed a series of 
hypotheses about the interaction of three different types of regional subsystems—
transnational society, intergovernmental, and comprehensive—focusing mainly 
on the effects of external threat and the role of the superpowers in initiating and 
consolidating or derailing regional integration efforts. William Avery coined the 
term ‘extra­ regional echoing’ to capture processes of imitation of innovative inte­
grative behaviour by other actors, hypothesizing that ‘integration methods, styles, 
ideas, devices, and such—particularly those of an innovative nature—have some 
impact and influence beyond the boundaries of the region within which they 
originate’ (Avery 1973: 550). Both analyses offered promising starting points for a 
more sustained consideration of EU influence, but progress never went beyond 
an initial formulation of a limited set of hypotheses which were never empirically 
tested and/or subsequently refined. Before theoretical progress on this front could 
be made to ignite a broader research programme, scholars were overtaken by the 
‘decline’ of regional organization in the late 1970s, and lost interest.
7 For a similar critique of the ‘apparent insularity’ (p. 472) of neo­ functionalist theorizing about 
integration and their neglect of extra­ regional powers, in particular, see Cantori and Spiegel (1973).
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Second wave of regional organization (1990–today)
The end of the Cold War marked a watershed in international politics, sparking a 
‘new wave of regionalism’ (Mansfield and Milner 1999). The reasons for this wave 
are manifold, and include the lessening of security constraints associated with the 
bipolar structure of international politics, increasing interdependence (the term 
‘globalization’ rose to prominence during this period), as well as fundamental 
changes in development thinking and policies (for good overviews, see 
Fawcett 1995; Mansfield 1998; Hurrell 1995a). During this wave, regional or gan­
iza tion diversified in form. More flexible bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral 
arrangements that often took the form of ‘new generation’ free trade agreements 
(see e.g. Roy, Marchetti, and Lim  2007) increasingly supplemented new and 
revamped ‘old­ style’ ROs. This time around, economic cooperation was seen as 
part and parcel of wider liberalization measures, generally covering a broader 
range of issues (such as services and investment) and entailing more binding 
commitments.
Regional organization after the Cold War
Motivated by concerns about the declining competitiveness of European econ­
omies during the final decade of the Cold War, the EC significantly deepened 
economic integration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It facilitated decision­ 
making with the move towards majoritarian decision­ making in the 1986 Single 
European Act, and expanded its authority into the realms of economic and mon­
etary policy, foreign and security policy as well as justice and home affairs with 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, transforming itself into the EU (see Green Cowles 
1995; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). The significant deepening of European inte­
gration within less than a decade reiterated the Community’s status as a ‘pioneer­
ing form of transnational governance’ (Giddens 2000: 98), where ‘the process of 
unbundling territoriality has gone further than anywhere else’ (Ruggie  1993: 
171–2). After many years of ‘Eurosclerosis’ and the more broadly declining 
at tract ive ness of ROs, the EC’s transformation signalled a ‘resurgence of regional­
ism in world politics’ (Hurrell  1995a: 331). Prominent scholars even predicted 
that the revamped EU would showcase the direction that other regions would 
steer towards in the future. Andrew Moravcsik (2001), for example, saw the EU as 
‘a possible harbinger of future global political structures’ (p. 122), and Anthony 
Giddens (2000) anticipated that the EU’s efforts forged ‘a way that could, and very 
likely will, be followed in other regions as well’ (p. 98). Have these expectations 
been borne out?
Europe’s new­ found enthusiasm for integration, and the attendant institutional 
changes on which it rests, did indeed not go unnoticed in other parts of the world. 
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As a result, casual references to the EU’s influence on regional organization else­
where quickly re­ emerged. The imagery used to capture such influence is similar 
to that employed during the previous period of scholarly work. There is the idea 
that the EU serves as an inspiration for other regions, as in Andreas von Staden’s 
(2016) proposition that ‘the institutional designs of many regional integration 
organizations have been inspired by the European model’ (p. 28). There is the 
notion that the EU, as an economically potent and close­ knit club, can trigger 
regional organization elsewhere by generating negative externalities, as in Walter 
Mattli’s (1999) powerful analysis. Finally, there is the notion of the EU as a model 
that is to be avoided, as in the example of Mercosur’s early institutionalization, 
which rested on ‘the will of avoiding the cost of [a] European style institutional 
arrangement’ (Dabène 2009: 94). In any case, casual mentions of EU influence in 
the literature witnessed a resurgence during this period. Two examples are 
Warner and Anatol’s (2014) assertion that ‘many regional integration projects 
around the world have been strongly influenced by the European model’ (p. 193) 
and Kühnhardt’s (2010) claim that ‘the EU model is in the process of spreading 
globally’ (p. 394). While, again, many are sceptical of the EU’s alleged influence 
on regional cooperation and integration in other parts of the world, its empirical 
relevance seems to be widely acknowledged. As Gibb forcefully argues in relation 
to Africa,
African regionalism has been pursued, both theoretically and empirically, in 
terms of a neoliberal, free market and Westphalian state model built upon the 
experiences, values and norms of European integration. [. . .] However, despite 
superficial similarities, the relevance and appropriateness of the European inte­
grative model to southern Africa is limited and structurally inappropriate. 
Indeed, the comparison is misconceived to the point of being fraudulent.
(Gibb 2009: 717)
The literature advances claims about the influence of the EU with regard to all 
major world regions. For a long time, North America appeared to be immune to 
regional organization due to the firm commitment of the United States to multi­
lateralism; but this changed with the end of the Cold War. The United States not 
only abandoned its reluctant stance but began to actively promote regional or gan­
iza tion, including through the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement of 
1988, the 1994 NAFTA and, beyond North America, Asia­ Pacific Economic 
Cooperation and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (for overviews, see 
Hurrell  1995c; Haggard  1997). Observers quickly found evidence of EU influ­
ence. Cable (1994) comments, for example: ‘But the experience of successful—
wider and deeper—integration in Europe has undoubtedly been a key influence, 
whether European integration is seen as a threat to the United States or as a 
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positive role model’ (p. 2). Mattli (1999) similarly argues that ‘integration in 
North America in the late 1980s was largely triggered [. . .] by the effects of inte­
gration in Europe’ (p. 185). And Abbott (1992) interprets NAFTA as a ‘mutation 
of the EC model’ (p. 917), with similar integrationist ambitions but a different 
institutional framework.
Further afield, the influence of the EU appears to be more far­ reaching. In 
Latin America in the 1990s, ‘the European Union (EU) had become both a model 
and a partner for a new wave of regional organizations that included, prom in­
ent ly, the Andean Community (CAN according to its Spanish acronym) and the 
Common Market of the South (Mercosur)’ (Malamud 2018: 47). Specifically, the 
1986 Economic Cooperation and Integration Program, the precursor to Mercosur, 
was ‘based on the experience of the European Coal and Steel Community’ 
(Botto 2009: 176), and Mercosur’s 1991 Treaty of Asunción pursued an ambitious 
economic integration agenda that sought ‘to duplicate the European economic 
regimes’ (Mukhametdinov  2007: 226; see also Lenz  2018). Mercosur’s institu­
tional framework has increased in similarity with the EU over time (see also 
Chapter 6). For example, in 2004 policy­ makers created a ‘European style struc­
tural fund’ (Dabène 2009: 187) and in 2007 a Mercosur Parliament for which ‘the 
influence of the European Union [. . .] was relevant’ (Dri 2010: 53).
The revamping of existing ROs in the late 1980s and 1990s, such as the 
Andean Pact and the Central American Integration System, has also led ob ser­
vers to note the influence of the EU. The Andean Pact, transformed into the 
Andean Community in 1996, has attracted a lot of commentary regarding the 
influence of EU institutional models. As Saldías (2007) notes, ‘The newly founded 
Andean Community emulated the polity design of the European Community. 
Supranationality was reinforced, and community organs were established with a 
striking resemblance to their European counterparts’ (p. 3). The Andean Court, 
in particular, is widely recognized as having ‘explicitly [modelled] its design on 
the ECJ [European Court of Justice]’ (Alter and Helfer 2010: 564; see also Alter, 
Helfer, and Saldías 2012). Similar claims exist for Central America. For example, 
O’Keefe (2001) contends that ‘the emergence of the European Union and the 
formation of other regional trading blocs [. . .] encouraged the presidents of 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador to meet during 
the early 1990’s with a view towards reviving the concept of an integrated Central 
America’ (p. 246).
In Africa, regional economic integration has witnessed renewed efforts at both 
the continental and subregional levels to overcome the constraints of small eco­
nomic markets. Even though the revival of regional organization was more than 
simply building on what already existed, as Bach (2016) notes, it ‘went along with 
a transformative agenda that was strongly inspired by the EU’ (p. 8). In Africa, 
emulation of the EU may have gone furthest, as Bourenane notes: ‘IGOs 
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[international governmental organizations] all over Africa, and ECOWAS in par­
ticular, have attempted to imitate the European experience by creating bodies 
structurally similar to those of the European Union’ (Bourenane 1997: 59). The 
continental framework for integration has evolved considerably since the end of 
the Cold War. Under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity, African 
states adopted the Abuja Treaty in 1991, which aims to create an African 
Economic Community by 2025 and ‘draws much of its inspiration from the 
highly institutionalized character of the European experience’ (Bach 1997: 82). In 
2000, African heads of state strengthened the main framework for institutional­
ized cooperation on the continent by replacing the Organisation of African Unity 
with the African Union. This transition marked a significant evolution towards 
more powerful regional institutions, resembling those of the EU. The creation of a 
Commission with a codified right to initiate legislation and to bring infringement 
cases to a new African Court of Justice or Pan­ African Parliament led many 
observers to comment on the apparent ‘organisational mirroring’ occurring 
between the two bodies (Haastrup 2013: 789; see also Babarinde 2007; Packer and 
Rukare 2002).
Below the continental level, there are various subregional ROs, many analyses 
of which contain regular mentions of EU influence. Such claims are maybe most 
far­ reaching for the West African Economic and Monetary Union, which is 
described as standing ‘among African regional organizations—and possibly 
among regional organizations more in general—as the organization that has most 
faithfully and explicitly drawn inspiration from the EU’ (Piccolino 2020: 179–80). 
Yet this organization is not the only one for which arguments about EU influence 
are readily available. A study of Central African ROs, for example, suggests that 
‘regionalisation trends on a global scale —including the European Union model—
continue to play an important role’ (Stevens, Hoebeke, and Vlassenroot  2008: 
167). Similarly, some propose that with the revised treaty of 1993, ECOWAS’s 
policy­ makers ‘adopted the institutional arrangement of the EU in many respects’ 
(Akinrinsola  2004: 501). Apart from specific empirical claims about EU influ­
ence on regional institution building in Africa, scholars also note—at times in 
surprise, at times in confirmation, and other times in regret—the influence of 
the EU model on African policy­ makers’ imagination. In a comprehensive over­
view of African regional organization, Hartmann (2016) states: ‘Even those who 
argue from a pan­ Africanist line of thinking and stress collective self­ reliance 
essentially propose modes of African regionalism, which take the European 
Union (EU) as the main inspiration and think integration along these lines is 
feasible’ (p. 272).
Asia is a region with few ROs to this day, not least due to the historic rivalries 
between China and Japan and specific state–society relations in the region 
(Calder and Ye  2004; Katzenstein  1997; Hemmer and Katzenstein  2002). 
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Nevertheless, ASEAN swiftly deepened regional integration after the end of the 
Cold War, partly in response to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty that has 
been described as ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’ (Ba 2009: 156). In 1992, 
governments signed a Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic 
Co­ operation—an arrangement that some have described as being ‘directly mod­
elled on the EU’ (Öjendal 2001: 157). In the late 1990s, following a controversial 
reconsideration of the non­ interference principle, member states established an 
EU­ inspired ASEAN troika to address urgent concerns for regional peace and 
stability (Haacke 1999). The Bali Concord II of 2003 foresaw the creation of an 
ASEAN Community consisting of three pillars, reminiscent of the pillar model in 
the Maastricht Treaty, which led some commentators to speak of the or gan iza­
tion’s ambition to pursue ‘EU­ style regional integration’:8 a security community, 
an economic community, and a social­ cultural community. The latest chapter, 
also noted at the outset of this book, is the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 
2007. It gives the organization a formal legal basis and bears some similarity with 
the EU, for example in establishing an ‘EU­ style’ Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (Jetschke and Murray  2012: abstract). It also establishes a new 
dispute settlement body that is tasked to adjudicate trade disputes and ‘is mod­
elled from the EU and the World Trade Organization (WTO)’ (Yoshimatsu 2006: 
125). Whereas some observers interpret the Charter as ‘the latest reminder of 
how consistently the EU has been perceived as a model for ASEAN’s institutional 
development’ (Murray and Moxon­ Browne 2013: 522), others qualify the influ­
ence and posit that ‘the EU does exert some influence over ASEAN, but merely as 
a point of reference, not as a model power’ (Wong 2012: 670, emphasis original).
Besides widespread claims of EU influence in specific world regions, observers 
increasingly mention the effects of the EU model in relation to generic institu­
tional forms. For example, Karen Alter has done detailed work on institutional 
‘copies’ of the European Court of Justice (Alter 2012; Alter and Helfer 2010; Alter, 
Helfer, and Saldías  2012). Others have noted the influence of the European 
Parliament on regional parliaments around the world (Dri 2010; Navarro 2010; 
Luciano  2020; Rüland and Bechle  2014). According to Grigorescu (2015), the 
European Parliament has evolved ‘into the most powerful and visible [interna­
tional parliamentary assembly] and, implicitly, into a model for other parliamen­
tary IGO [international governmental organization] bodies’ (p. 247). And Erthal 
(2012) suggests in relation to Latin American regional parliamentary institutions 
that ‘the inspiration provided by the European model cannot be underestimated’ 
(p. 156). Last but not least, the impact of the EU’s model of economic integration, 
which is characterized by a staged evolution towards a common market, customs 
8 ‘ASEAN pursues EU­ style regional integration’, International Herald Tribune, 12 Jan. 2007.
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union, and beyond, has attracted scholarly attention. Draper notes, for example: 
‘At the institutional level, African regional economic communities (RECs) tend to 
mimic European Union forms, particularly in their predilection for customs 
unions’ (Draper 2012: 68; see also Duina 2006; Lenz 2018).
In sum, the aforementioned scholars and many others would probably agree 
with Higgott’s claim that ‘it is clear that policy learning and the politics of emula­
tion (or in many cases the politics of avoidance) [from the EU] are major features 
of current deliberations about regionalism in other parts of the world’ 
(Higgott 2007: 77). Yet theoretical treatments of regional organization, as I will 
show below, have largely failed to theorize, and test the implications of, this 
empirically well­ grounded observation. Specifically, various important questions 
remain unanswered. What exactly is meant by the widespread reference to ‘EU­ 
type’ institutions? Indeed, how deep do institutional similarities go? And might 
similar institutions, in fact, only be similar adaptations to comparable functional 
problems? In other words, does correlation indeed indicate causation? These are 
some of the questions addressed in this study.
Interregionalism and the European Union’s contemporary  
support for regional institution building
The end of the Cold War changed the opportunities and constraints for the EU 
as an international actor, and developing its rather ad hoc support for regional 
organization into a full­ fledged policy had various advantages. It provided an 
uncontroversial objective within the Community that did not threaten to lead 
to major turf wars between EU institutions; it promised to facilitate coherence 
in external relations by incorporating major policy instruments into an ‘inte­
grated approach’ (European Commission 1992a); and the EU enjoyed a com­
parative advantage in this area vis­ à­ vis the United States and other international 
actors (European Commission 1994: 16; see also Grugel 2004). Since then, the 
Community’s promotion of regional organization has become an integral part 
of its foreign policy agenda and has reinforced the development of a new pat­
tern of relations in international politics: interregionalism. Today, the EU is ‘the 
region with the deepest engagement in global interregional relations and has 
the most diverse involvement of regional actors and institutional strategies’ 
(Söderbaum 2016: 179).
The EU’s interregional relations generally consist of three elements and take 
the form of a cooperation or association agreement.9 First, the EU cooperates 
9 For useful overviews, see Alecu de Flers (2005), Pietrangeli (2009), and Baert, Scaramagli, and 
Söderbaum (2014); for a more extensive discussion of motivations and strategic interests, see Hardacre 
(2009). The most recent summary of interregionalism, including beyond the EU, is by Ribeiro 
Hoffmann (2016).
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with other ROs on economic matters that may eventually lead to the conclusion 
of an interregional free trade agreement (see Young  2015; Young and Peterson 
2006). Such trade agreements aim to hasten intraregional economic integration—
a strategy that the European Commission (2002) terms ‘South–South–North 
integration’. Second, the EU lends financial and technical assistance to enhance 
other regions’ capacity for integration. This serves not only to help others meet 
the EU’s demands in interregional trade deals, but also to transfer integration 
know­ how and experience through seminars, workshops, and con sult an cies. 
Third, the EU engages in political dialogue, which serves as a forum to discuss issues 
of mutual interest. It constitutes a means for transferring know ledge and experience 
in this field and facilitates region building by prompting the counterpart region to 
act as a group. A recent assessment counts 13 interregional arrangements between 
the EU and other regional organizations, plus 18 instances of transregionalism, 
where the EU deals with individual countries or groups of countries and which also 
often aim to support regional cooperation through engagement with a region’s key 
players (Ribeiro Hoffmann 2016: 613). Such interregional relations are a main 
conduit for ‘exporting’ the EU’s institutions to other organizations. Interview data 
from EU policy­ makers repeatedly confirm that EU actors are ‘eager to export 
their institutional models to other parts of the world’ (Doctor 2007: 291; see also 
Buzdugan 2012: 931; Söderbaum 2016: 149–50). With regard to ASEAN, Jetschke 
and Murray cite a European Commission official:
We have always tried to see if we could somehow influence their process of eco­
nomic integration on the basis of our own experience [. . .] I also perceive very 
much from the other side a lot of interest about how we have been building up 
our single market, what kind of institutions we have had to develop.
(Jetschke and Murray 2012: 179)
This ambition plays out differently in different regions. EU interregional relations 
are most developed with Latin America, and it is in this context that claims about 
active EU influence are most widespread. In an early piece on the topic, 
Grabendorff (1992) demonstrates that contacts between members of the 
European Parliament and their counterparts in Central America were pivotal in 
the institutional development of the Central American Parliament. Dabène 
argues, more broadly, that the Andean Community and Central America in the 
2000s represent instances of coercive isomorphism ‘when the European Union 
tries to export its model and subordinates the signing of agreements to institu­
tional change’ (Dabène 2009: 88–9). The EU’s active influence on Mercosur, the 
Community’s main interlocutor on the continent since its inception in 1991, may 
be the best­ documented. There is evidence to suggest, for example, that the EU 
used the signature of the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement in 
1995 as a lever to pressure Mercosur into adopting international legal personality 
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independent of its member states (Peña and Torrent  2005: 25; see also 
Bouzas 2002: 144). This agreement paved the way for the negotiation of a com­
prehensive trade agreement between the two regions, which was concluded in 
August 2019. Again, detailed studies show that Mercosur’s adoption of a common 
customs code and the abolition of double taxation directly results from these 
interregional negotiations (Doctor 2015: 674; see also Grugel 2007).
In Africa, attempts by the EU to support regional integration through interre­
gional relations have been the most controversial, especially due to negotiations 
over Economic Partnership Agreements. With these agreements, the EU moved 
from a ‘continental’ approach that encompassed its former colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific under a single institutional umbrella and on the basis 
of a preference­ based system to a more ‘tailor­ made’ strategy that engaged indi­
vidual subregions and entailed reciprocal trade liberalization. Initially intended 
to strengthen regional integration in the continent by rationalizing overlapping 
memberships and serving as a credible commitment for economic integration, 
these negotiations had an adverse effect. As Hartmann (2016) summarizes, ‘It is 
certain that the EPAs strengthened neither the idea nor the practice of regional 
cooperation on the continent, but might have even weakened some ROs’ (p. 279; 
see also Asche and Engel 2008; Muntschik  2013; Robles  2008; Stevens  2006). 
Nevertheless, case studies indicate that the EU has actively shaped African 
regional institutions. Buzgadan (2012) shows, for instance, how negotiations over 
Economic Partnership Agreements have hampered SADC’s ambitions to form a 
customs union.
In Asia, ASEAN continues to be the Community’s main interlocutor, but the 
Asia–Europe meeting, initiated in 1996, serves as the broader institutional frame 
for cooperation between Asia and the EU. After disagreement over the status of 
human rights in an enhanced cooperation agreement in the 1990s, interregional 
relations between ASEAN and the EU have deepened since the early years of the 
new millennium. In 2003, the EU launched the ASEAN–EU Programme for 
Regional Integration Support (APRIS)—a multi­ million, multiannual support 
programme for economic integration—to underpin EU–ASEAN dialogue in the 
form of the Trans­ Regional EU ASEAN Trade Initiative and the Regional EU 
ASEAN Dialogue Instrument. In 2007, both sides agreed on an ambitious work 
programme, which aims to pave the way for closer cooperation in the future (for 
an overview, see Jetschke  2013). Attempts to sign an interregional trade deal 
have been abandoned in favour of a bilateral approach with individual ASEAN 
members. Despite this EU activism, few studies seek to assess its impact. Lenz 
(2012b: 186) argues, for example, that the adoption of the ASEAN Cosmetics 
Directive in 2009 ‘originated in the APRIS Programme written by European 
technical experts and was passed on to officials from the Secretariat who then 
introduced it into the regular decision­ making process’. As before, the plausibil­
ity of causal claims regarding the EU’s influence through interregional relations 
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has been established in selected instances, but it is generally not embedded in a 
broader analysis of the EU’s influence upon the basis of a coherent theoretical 
framework.
Contemporary theorizing of regional institution building
How does the contemporary theoretical literature reflect the substantial empirical 
evidence on the influence of the EU on processes of regional institution 
building?10 The literature on regional organization has exploded since the early 
1990s, and this overview therefore must remain sketchy. Nevertheless, I suggest 
that while there is an emerging literature on the diffusion of EU institutional 
models to other regional organizations, on which this study builds, the large bulk 
of the literature continues to ignore the evidence on EU influence, or fails to con­
ceptualize and theorize it. In fact, with the exception of diffusion studies, there is 
a predominant sense—well expressed by Söderbaum—that the ‘regional phenom­
enon is now being transformed from a mainly European project and model dur­
ing the first wave of regionalism towards a more global and diverse phenomenon’ 
(Söderbaum 2004: 16–17). As a result, EU diffusion tends to be seen as increas­
ingly irrelevant theoretically.
Most theoretical accounts locate the main drivers of institution building within 
each region, and thereby focus on endogenous processes and structures. Let us 
consider functional, interest­ based, institutional, and constructivist approaches. 
Functional approaches to cooperation—such as neo­ functionalism and neo­
liberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001)—
view regional institutions primarily as a response to conflicts and problems of 
collective action resulting from economic or security­ related interdependence 
within a region. This explains, for example, the delegation of competences to the 
supranational institutions of the EU (Pollack  2003) and the more intergovern­
mental nature of institutions in ASEAN (Yoshimatsu 2006) and Mercosur (Bouzas 
and Soltz  2001). In this vein, Arnold and Rittberger (2013) interpret dispute 
settle ment in Mercosur as a commitment device whose functionality increases 
with growing dependence on other member states’ domestic economy.
Interest­ based accounts—often associated with political economy approaches 
and liberal theories of international relations—interpret regional institutions as 
the result of bargaining dynamics driven by the interests of powerful actors within 
a region. Intergovernmental theories of European integration, for example, high­
light the central role of core member­ state governments that build regional insti­
tutions to protect their geopolitical interests or the economic concerns of their 
10 This section partially draws on Lenz and Marks (2016).
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constituencies (Moravcsik 1998). In other regions, scholars similarly emphasize 
the distribution of interests and power among member states to account for dif­
ferences in regional institutionalization (Grieco  1997; Gruber 2000; Pedersen 
2002; Schirm  2002). Hancock (2009), for example, emphasizes the ‘plutocratic’ 
interests of the economic hegemon in building regional institutions on top of its 
own national institutions. More liberally minded scholars specifically emphasize 
the differential influence of domestic coalitions to explain the emergence and 
form of regional institutions (Chase 2003; Milner 1995; Nesadurai 2003; Solingen 
2005). Etel Solingen’s work, for instance, contrasts the domestic and international 
strategies of internationalist and statist­ nationalist coalitions to argue that the 
nature of regional orders is a function of the relative strength of these two social 
groups (Solingen 1998: 2).
Institution­ based theories emphasize the role of national or regional institu­
tions in constraining the pursuit of state interests at the regional level. Prominent 
work on European integration has highlighted the role of supranational institu­
tions in propelling regional dynamics that member states did not anticipate and 
subsequently find difficult to rectify (Burley and Mattli  1993; Pierson  1996; 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). In one of the few institutionalist accounts 
beyond Europe, Duina (2016) attributes variation in the institutions associated 
with economic integration to national legal systems that are deeply rooted in his­
tory (see also Duina and Buxbaum  2008; Malamud  2005). Relatedly, Hawkins 
(2008) proposes that institutionalization can feed on itself once societal actors are 
granted access to regional decision­ making. As institutional arguments are less 
popular beyond Europe due to the relative weakness of regional institutions, 
scholars have examined the role of domestic institutions such as veto players or 
democracy in affecting the design of regional trade agreements (Mansfield, Milner, 
and Rosendorff 2002; Mansfield and Milner 2012).
Finally, constructivist work focuses on the role of ideas, cultural traditions, or 
identities—a literature that is most developed in the European and Asian contexts. 
Scholars attribute both the EU’s uniquely strong degree of regional in sti tu tion al­
iza tion and the informal, consensual, and weakly institutionalized forms of 
regional organization in Asia to particular ideas about regionalism (for Europe, 
see Parsons 2003; Jachtenfuchs 2002; for Asia, see Acharya 1997, 2004; Duina 2006; 
Ba 2009; Johnston 2003; Jetschke and Katada 2016; beyond Asia and Europe, see 
Spektor 2010). Beyond these flagship cases for constructivist arguments on regional 
institutions, Adler and Barnett (1998) show how shared national iden tities can 
facilitate movement towards security communities around the world, in which 
recourse to violence to solve international conflicts has become unthinkable (see 
also Tussie 2009). In one of the few quantitative studies on the design of regional 
and global organizations, Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks (2019) argue that a large part 
of the variation in the delegation and pooling of authority reflects the extent of 
normative commonality—or community—among member states.
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Despite the epistemological, ontological, and theoretical diversity within this 
group of scholars, these theoretical accounts of regional organization share the 
focus on endogenous factors. This body of literature has developed forceful 
 arguments—based on well­ delineated mechanisms and the conditions under 
which they are likely to operate—about the intraregional conditions that shape 
processes of regional institution building. On account of their analytic focus, 
however, these studies are bound to neglect EU influence as a relevant causal 
 factor. Buzdugan, among others, diagnoses an ‘inward focus’ of much of the 
 literature and detects a ‘historical lack of theoretical and empirical attention to 
the role of international actors in the dynamics of regionalism in IR and IPE’ 
(Buzdugan 2012: 918, 920). And Söderbaum (2016: 148) flatly declares the role of 
external actors in region­ building to be an ‘overlooked aspect of regionalism’. This 
resonates with assessments of the theoretical literature during the first wave 
of  regional organization. Can we claim that not much has changed since then? 
I think it has, although weaknesses do remain.
Today, there is a sizeable literature from an ‘outside­ in’ perspective on regional 
institution building. One part considers the role of the United States and other 
hegemons in regional organization, and thereby draws on systemic thinking 
about the highly uneven distribution of power in the international system. For 
example, scholars explore how the United States’ choice of relations with other 
countries shapes their propensity to form ROs, and the institutional forms these 
take. In this vein, Crone (1993: 505) argues that the ‘extreme hegemony’ exercised 
by the United States prevented strong regional institutions from emerging in East 
Asia during the Cold War (see also Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Beeson 2006). 
Katzenstein (2005) makes a similar argument about the role of the United States 
in the creation of regional orders in Europe and Asia, leading to different institu­
tional models that underpin them. The EU’s hegemonic influence on regional 
organization is a dominant theme in the literature on enlargement and the direct 
neighbourhood, including how the EU employs conditionality to shape other 
countries’ regional strategies (Bechev  2006; see also Buzdugan  2012). In Asian 
regional organization, the hegemonic role of China receives increasing scholarly 
attention (Segal 1996; Beeson 2008).
These ‘outside­ in’ accounts capture an important form of external influence, 
and they tend to involve systematic conceptual and theoretical treatments of the 
mechanisms by which hegemony operates and produces its effects. They also tend 
to imply a relevant scope condition, namely the material asymmetry between the 
hegemon and target actors. When external hegemons are powerful, the con­
straints on regional decision­ makers are tight; once hegemony weakens, new 
institutional and policy choices open up, and target actors’ strategies become 
more important in explaining institutional outcomes (see Mansfield  1998; 
Riggirozzi and Tussie  2012; Grugel, Riggirozzi, and Thirkell­ White  2008; 
Muhr  2011). However, the analytic focus of these studies rests on the United 
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States, the EU, or China because these are hegemonic actors. Put differently, what 
distinguishes these actors from each other are their strategies and objectives—the 
EU may pursue multilateral and the United States unilateral strategies (Hettne 
and Ponjaert  2014), or they may put differential emphasis on notions such as 
partnership or social and economic inclusion (Grugel 2004)—and not the nature 
of these actors themselves. It is for this reason that these studies do not offer 
strong insights on interorganizational influences. The ontological focus, as it 
were, rests elsewhere.
Another part of this ‘outside­ in’ literature focuses less on specific international 
actors as on systemic economic and security processes that shape regional institu­
tion building. A dominant theme, especially in the economic and political economy 
literature on regional organization, is globalization. Building (economic) regional 
institutions, these accounts suggest, is the rational response of political actors to 
structural changes in the world economy and the associated incentives emanating 
from increasing economic and financial interdependence. More specifically, institu­
tion building at the regional level allows policy­ makers to exploit the opportunities 
associated with economies of scale, efficiency improvements, or increased foreign 
direct investment (Büthe and Milner 2008; Grugel and Hout 1998; Lawrence 1996). 
Whereas this literature tends to focus on systemic economic influences on states and 
regions, other scholars attend to external se cur ity threats. According to Rosato 
(2011), for example, variation in regional institution building is a function of the 
strength of external security threats.
This ‘outside­ in’ perspective is also adopted by more heterodox approaches that 
centre on the influence of globalization on regional organization. They tend to 
emphasize the political processes that underpin structural economic changes, 
often highlighting the regionally diverse, even contradictory responses to global 
economic pressures (Hurrell  1995b: 38–45; Marchand, Boas, and Shaw  1999). 
The New Regionalism literature seeks to build a new theory of the multifaceted 
reactions induced by these structural changes (Grant and Söderbaum  2003; 
Hettne 1999: 2; Mittelmann 1996; Schulz, Söderbaum, and Öjendal 2001). This 
approach, as Söderbaum (2016) summarizes, posits that ‘globalization is a strong 
and, in some of its dimensions, irreversible force, with deep implications for 
regionalism’ (p. 151). Critical approaches similarly examine the extent to which 
decision­ makers, and their links to powerful societal interests, construct formal 
ROs to accommodate economic globalization. Gamble and Payne, for example, 
argue that ‘regionalist projects emerge as a means to help achieve the globalist 
project in a world where is no longer a single state with the authority and capacity 
to impose its leadership’ (Gamble and Payne 1996: 252–53; see also Coleman and 
Underhill 1998).
Again, this literature considers ‘outside­ in’ influences on regional institution 
building and has tremendously improved our understanding of how the broader 
global environment, in which ROs are embedded, affects their emergence and 
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form. We now have a good sense both of the mechanisms by which this influence 
works and of the conditions under which it is likely to result. However, this litera­
ture tends to emphasize systemic influences in a generic sense, and thereby 
neglects the types of influence that operate between ROs. More specifically, while 
the significant literature on EU interregionalism holds promise in this respect, it 
largely fails to examine the effects of interregionalism on the design of the re spect­
ive ROs involved. To date, it has not moved beyond the generic assertion that 
‘interregionalism can affect regionalism’ (Doidge 2007: 245; see also Hänggi 2003). 
Instead, it focuses on conceptualizing different forms of interregionalism (Aggarwal 
and Fogarty  2004; Hänggi, Roloff, and Rüland  2005; Söderbaum, Stålgren, and 
Langenhove 2005), and explores the contribution that interregionalism can make 
to processes of global governance (Rüland 2010; Rüland 2008).
The most sophisticated attempt to capture interorganizational influences is an 
emerging literature on diffusion between ROs, on which this study builds. This 
research programme essentially emerged with a special issue published in West 
European Politics in 2012. The lead essay conceptualizes diffusion as interdepend­
ent decision­ making, and outlines a typology of mechanisms by which institu­
tional models diffuse from one RO, primarily the EU, to other ROs. Since then, 
the diffusion agenda has developed into a popular research programme (for an 
overview, see Duina and Lenz 2016). Based primarily on case studies, this litera­
ture has accumulated convincing empirical evidence that EU diffusion indeed 
affects the institutional design of other ROs in some cases. As the aforementioned 
special issue confidently concludes, the impact of EU diffusion is ‘certainly not 
spurious’ (Börzel and Risse  2012b: 194). Nevertheless, the external validity of 
these claims remains uncertain at present. Moreover, while we have an emerging 
sense of the mechanisms that underlie EU influence, our knowledge about the 
conditions under which it is likely to matter is limited. Finally, these studies have 
tended to conceive of outcomes as the adoption of EU institutional models, with 
little discussion of variation in outcomes (but see Jetschke 2017).
Much of this literature aims to show primarily that EU diffusion matters, at the 
expense of foregoing the explicit contrasting of the influence of diffusion with 
that of other factors, such that existing results on the significance of EU diffusion 
compared to other factors are mixed. Whereas some claim that ‘there is little 
doubt that the proactive role played by EU institutions to support regionalism 
has led to a “diffusion” of norms and institutional models’ (Fioramonti and 
Mattheis 2016: 674), others are more sceptical. A growing literature on localiza­
tion, for example, suggests—albeit implicitly—that the ‘real’ action is happening 
when local actors appropriate foreign models for their own purposes rather 
than in the diffusion process itself (Acharya  2004; Rüland  2014; Rüland and 
Bechle 2014). In these analyses, the analytic focus shifts from the interor gan iza­
tional level to domestic politics, which implies that the interorganizational level is 
of decidedly secondary relevance. Studies that explicitly compare the influence of 
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relevant factors at different levels of analysis tend to confirm this finding. 
Summarizing a series of studies on the design of ROs in different world regions, 
Acharya and Johnson find that ‘the role of external powers has not been im port­
ant in [. . .] shaping institutional design’ (Acharya and Johnston  2007b: 259). 
Fawcett and Gandois (2010: 624), on the other hand, in their analysis of regional 
organization in Africa and the Middle East, conclude that ‘external influence 
quickly emerges as a prominent factor’, but confine its effect largely to the found­
ing period of an organization. This raises the possibility that existing diffusion 
studies overemphasize the relative importance of diffusion—and require better 
controls.
In sum, existing theory on regional organization is seriously incomplete 
because it overwhelmingly constructs explanations that emphasize as key causes 
the properties of ROs and their constituent member states or the outside­ in pres­
sures flowing from the international system. A literature on the diffusion of 
regional organization that holds promise in mitigating this deficient theoretical 
state of affairs is gradually emerging. The next section clarifies the theoretical bias 
inherent in the literature on RO design by framing it in terms of the level of ana­
lysis metaphor, and argues that a better understanding of the influence of EU on 
regional institution building requires a different ontological starting point: from 
an atomistic towards a relational conception of ROs.
Explanatory bias in the study of regional institution building
Existing studies of regional institution building can be grouped into three levels of 
analysis: (1) regional, (2) interorganizational, and (3) global. This threefold 
 categorization expands the classical distinction of Waltz (1979) and others 
(Singer 1961) between the ‘unit’ level of analysis—the RO in our case—and the 
‘systemic’ level of analysis—meaning the international system as a whole—by 
including the interorganizational level of analysis—i.e. the interaction between 
ROs.11 Thus, I conceive the levels of analysis metaphor not in ontological terms, as 
referring to the units of analysis, but in epistemological terms–i.e. as capturing ‘the 
types of variables that explain a particular unit’s behavior’ (Moul 1973, cited in 
Buzan 1995: 203). Work on regional organization, summarized above, overwhelm­
ingly pitches its explanations at the regional and global levels of analysis while 
neglecting the interorganizational level of analysis. Below, I discuss these three 
analytic perspectives on the sources of explanations with reference to this litera­
ture, summarized in Table 2.2, and advance diffusion as an analytic concept that 
operates at the interorganizational level of analysis and serves as a useful starting 
point for developing a theory of the EU’s influence on regional institution building.
11 The interorganizational level is akin to what Buzan terms a ‘process’ level of analysis, which 
 captures ‘the dynamics of interactions among units’ (Buzan 1995: 203).
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The first level of analysis—the regional level—emphasizes attributes of ROs 
and its constituent member states as key causes of regional institution building. It 
analyses phenomena from the perspective of properties of the unit of analysis 
itself, and thereby provides ‘inside­ out’ explanations of regional institution build­
ing. Studies at this level of analysis share the premise that the most relevant causes 
are related to processes that occur intraregionally as well as causal influence flow­
ing vertically within the units themselves: from states to ROs or among different 
aspects of ROs themselves. Variation in the nature and extent of regional institu­
tion building is explained by differing attributes of these organizations and their 
member states, while institutional similarity reflects similar structural properties 
of the respective units. Among the influential studies sharing this premise is the 
rational design project, with its focus on organizational characteristics such as the 
number of member states and the underlying cooperation problem (Koremenos 
2016; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001), studies of Asian regional organiza­
tion on the identity­ based roots of institutions (Acharya  1997), and political­ 
economy studies of European integration (Lindberg  1963; Schirm  2002). Most 
full­ fledged theories of regional organization, such as neo­ functionalism, liberal 
intergovernmentalism, post­ functionalism, and transactionalism share a focus 
on the unit (and sub­ unit) level of analysis. To this, one may add studies that 
emphasize domestic politics in regional organization and some variants of inter­
national political economy approaches (for a good overview, see Solingen and 
Malnight 2016).
Table 2.2. Levels of analysis in the study of regional institution building
Regional Interorganizational Global
Denomination Unit (and sub­ unit) Sub­ systemic; 
inter­ unit
Systemic
Type of explanation Inside­ out Outside­ in Outside­ in






Attributes of the 
international  
system
Causal direction Vertical Horizontal Vertical




















Source: author’s own depiction.
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A key implication of the regional level of analysis is that it treats different ROs 
as independent observations and, as a result, that processes of regional institution 
building develop independently of one another. The regional level thereby entails 
an atomistic ontology in which ROs are treated as self­ contained entities whose 
institutional designs reflect intraregional structures. As Jetschke and Lenz (2013: 
628) put it, there is ‘the conventional conceptual assumption that ROs are atomis­
tic entities that take decisions largely in isolation from each other’. For example, if 
Asian and European ROs are said to differ from one another in terms of their 
degree of institutionalization, this is due to the fact that they are made up of dif­
ferent types of states, with distinct histories and ideational roots (Katzenstein 
1996). This perspective tends to emphasize variation across or gan iza tions and its 
member states, as close study of individual units generally reveals differences 
between them. As Singer (1961) notes, unit­ level analysis highlights ‘significant 
differentiation among our actors in the international system’ (pp. 82–3). From the 
perspective of the regional level of analysis, ROs tend to diverge in their institu­
tion building processes and outcomes. The analytic picture that emerges, broadly 
speaking, is one of institutional diversity.
The second level of analysis—the global level—highlights systemic pressures 
emanating from the international system as key drivers of regional institution 
building. It analyses political phenomena from the perspective of the properties 
of the system as a whole, and thus offers an outside­ in explanation of regional 
institution building. Studies at this level of analysis share the premise that the 
embeddedness of an RO within a broader organizational environment—the 
system—is causally relevant to explaining its institutional design. Thus, the most 
relevant causes are located extraregionally, and causal influence flows vertically 
from the international system towards ROs. By implication, the key expectation 
is  that ROs build similar institutions because they are subject to similar global 
pressures and—less frequently—their institutions differ to the extent that systemic 
influences vary across regions.12 Among the influential studies sharing this 
 analytic perspective are works on the impact of globalization on the proliferation 
of regional trade agreements after the end of the Cold War (Mansfield  1998; 
Mansfield and Milner  2012) and studies highlighting the influence of global 
hegemons on regional institution building (Katzenstein 2005). The New Regionalism 
theory emphasizes the influence of globalization on regional co oper ation. Similarly, 
realist­ inspired analyses of regional institution building and world­ polity ex plan­
ations in sociology tend to share these analytic features.
The global level of analysis shares with the regional level of analysis the implica­
tion that it treats different ROs as independent observations and, as a result, that 
12 Maybe most truthful to systemic theorizing, this may be because global hegemons pursue differ­
ent strategies in different regions. More often, however, variance is introduced by combining systemic 
and unit­ level theorizing (see below).
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processes of regional institution building develop independently of one another. 
Even though ROs are affected by similar global structures, they do not interact 
with each other. Instead, trajectories of regional institutional building reflect direct 
yet independent reactions to systemic pressures. By implication, the global level of 
analysis also espouses an atomistic ontology in which ROs are treated as self­ 
contained entities whose institutional structures ‘internalize’ pressures emanating 
from the international system. Studies at this level of analysis tend to emphasize 
the homogenizing tendencies of the international system across differentially con­
stituted ROs. As Singer (1961) puts it in general terms, systemic theorizing tends 
to ‘postulate a high degree of uniformity [. . .]. By defi n ition, we allow little room 
for divergence in the behavior of our parts when we focus upon the whole’ (p. 81). 
From this analytic perspective, ROs tend to display similarity, if not homogeneity, 
in the processes and outcomes of institution building.13
The third level of analysis, which this study focuses on, is the interor gan iza tional 
one. This level emphasizes the interaction between ROs and thus takes ser ious ly 
their relations. As the introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Inter- Organizational 
Relations flatly states, ‘Inter­ organizational relations, as its subject name suggests, 
is concerned with relationships between and among organizations’ (Cropper et al. 
2008: 5). In this book, I am interested in (to use the language of interorganizational 
analysis) the dyadic and interactive relationship between the EU and other 
regional organizations (on this terminology, see Cropper et al.  2008: 11–16). 
While ROs may have a variety of relationships with other organizations which 
impact their processes of institution building (multiplicitous relations), my the or­
et ic al focus rests on their relations with the EU—a choice I justify in the next 
chapter. In some of the empirical chapters I recognize, however, that relationships 
with other organizations may also have shaped outcomes. Moreover, the second 
analytic focus is on interactive relationships—i.e. the direct and indirect interactions 
between these organizations. Non­ interactive relationships, i.e. relationships 
between ROs that share particular attributes, play a key role in theorizing the 
scope condition of my argument about the EU interorganizational influence.
The interorganizational level of analysis is located between the other two levels, 
and therefore shares certain features with both of them. On the one hand, the 
interorganizational level shares with the global level the explanation of regional 
institution building as shaped by causal factors external to the RO in question; 
these factors operate from the outside in. More generally, causal effects flow from 
a unit’s external environment. Yet rather than conceiving of the external environ­
ment as the entire international system, the interorganizational level emphasizes 
the specific relations between ROs. In this sense, the interorganizational level of 
13 In some of these accounts, variance is introduced by combining systemic and unit­ oriented 
analysis. Much of the literature on globalization and domestic politics shares this analytic focus (for 
an overview, see Solingen and Malnight 2016).
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analysis is sub­ systemic in that it operates below the international system as a 
whole. On the other hand, it shares with the regional level the focus on specific 
ROs (and their relations to other ROs) as a key causal factor. Expressed in more 
general terms, causal effects flow from the units of analysis rather than a diffuse 
system; but it is the relations between them and not their endogenous properties 
that exert causal effects. In this sense, the interorganizational level of analysis is 
inter­ unit or, in Buzan’s (1995) terminology, focused on ‘process’.
The most distinctive feature of the interorganizational level of analysis, there­
fore, is its relational ontology. Rather than conceiving the units of analysis as 
atomistic entities that develop in isolation, it conceptualizes them as relational. As 
Jackson and Nexon (1999: 291–2) note in an early treatment of ‘relationalism’ in 
IR, citing Charles Tilly: ‘Relationalism, on the other hand, treats configurations of 
ties—recurrent sociocultural interaction—between social aggregates of various 
sorts and their component parts as the building blocks of social analysis’ (see also 
Jackson and Nexon  2018; Emirbayer  1997).14 In this analytic perspective, the 
main causal effects flow from attributes of the relationships between ROs rather 
than ROs proper (regional level of analysis) or the system as a whole (global level 
of analysis). Similar regional institutions reflect similar attributes in the relations 
between ROs, whereas differences in regional institutions represent variation in 
such relationships. The direction of causal influence flows horizontally between 
units rather than vertically towards units, either from within or from without. 
Relational types of analysis have recently risen in prominence in political science 
and IR as scholars have become interested in interactions and networks. For 
example, contemporary scholarship on international institutions drawing on con­
cepts such as diffusion, interregionalism, Europeanization, institutional interplay, 
and regime complexity instantiate core assumptions of relational styles of analysis 
(see e.g. Alter and Meunier 2009; Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013; Raustiala and 
Victor  2004; Sommerer and Tallberg  2019; Young  1994). All of these concepts 
seek to capture causal processes that are located at the inter­ unit level of analysis 
and emphasize interactions.
The concept of diffusion holds particular promise both in overcoming some of 
the core weaknesses in the literature on regional institution building and in 
 capturing the influence of the EU on it. Diffusion is conventionally defined as a 
process of interdependent decision­ making between units of analysis,15 and this 
definition highlights three analytic advantages that the concept can bring to the 
study of ROs. First, it entails interactions between units, and thereby overcomes 
neglect of the interorganizational level of analysis in the literature on regional 
14 I do not take relationalism ‘all the way down’ by conceiving relations as processes that are onto­
logically prior to the units and therefore constitute them. Jackson and Nexon refer to this ontological 
stance as ‘processual relationalism’. Instead, my empirical focus is on the attributes of the relationships 
between the units, which implies that I still treat units as analytically primitive, or pre­ given.
15 I develop this notion more fully in the next chapter.
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organization. Second, the concept is sensitive to the potentially asymmetric 
nature of transfer processes, in which institutional models often radiate outwards 
from the most innovative unit(s). This is a particularly adequate premise in the 
analysis of ROs—a population in which the EU ‘is often (if only implicitly) seen 
as the “gold standard” ’ (Sbragia  2008: 33) due to its prominence, success, and 
active promotion of regional organization worldwide. Third, the diffusion con­
cept is compatible with a range of transfer channels and mechanisms (for an 
overview, see Jetschke and Lenz 2011)—an analytic openness that creates space to 
examine how transfers are shaped by actors on the receiving end.
Thus, diffusion studies need not entail sweeping claims of similarity, if not uni­
formity, in outcomes. As I discuss in the next chapter, diffusion may be conceptu­
alized as a process of interdependent decision­ making that is compatible with a 
range of outcomes. When understood as depending on the relationships between 
ROs, a key source of variation in diffusion outcomes is the nature and intensity of 
these relationships. Another source of variation emerges when we account for the 
specificities of diffusion among IOs. Unlike within states, diffusion among ROs 
takes place not in a hierarchically structured decision context but in a setting of 
decentralized decision­ making in which sovereign governments negotiate stra­
tegic al ly over institutional change. In this context, they often disagree about the 
desired extent of institutional change, including the adoption of external institu­
tional forms. As a result, institutional outcomes in international relations regu­
larly constitute an institutional compromise among different bargaining positions. 
Depending on the configuration of power among the governments involved as 
well as the number of governments that advocate the transfer of an institutional 
form, the outcome reflects the original institutional form to a larger or smaller 
extent. Thus, when diffusion affects the bargaining position of some but not all 
governments involved in a negotiation, institutional similarity with the institu­
tional ‘source’ may be severely muted. Moreover, this study seeks to identify more 
precisely what parts of the outcome can be attributed to diffusion from the 
EU. Most existing studies seek to show that diffusion matters, but fail to spe cify 
those parts of the outcome that are causally attributable to EU diffusion. 
Employing counterfactual reasoning and precise process­ tracing, I attempt to 
make more specific claims about the effects of EU diffusion as a causal factor. This 
may contribute to reconciling competing results in the RO literature on the extent 
to which diffusion matters—a theme I return to in the conclusion.
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes seven decades of empirical research on regional or gan­
iza tion in different parts of the world to demonstrate that references to the EU as 
a relevant causal influence are pervasive. This stands in marked contrast to the 
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theoretical literature, I suggest, which has only recently begun to theorize and 
sys tem at ic al ly explore such interorganizational influence between the EU and 
other ROs using the concept of diffusion. For the most part, the theoretical litera­
ture continues to pitch its explanations at the regional (and subregional) as well as 
global levels of analysis. This chapter thereby confirms a paradox first identified 
by Karl Kaiser in the late 1960s: namely that present theory of regional or gan iza­
tion largely fails to account for an apparently empirically relevant cause. The lit­
erature on regional organization, I conclude, displays an explanatory bias towards 
causes located at the regional and global levels of analysis, and neglects causal 
factors operating at the interorganizational level, the level that shines an analytic 
spotlight on the relations between regional organizations.
I also propose that a shift in explanatory focus towards the interorganizational 
level of analysis entails a different ontological starting point: rather than treating 
ROs as atomistic entities whose institutional designs reflect properties of the ROs 
and their member states, on the one side (regional and subregional level), or of 
the international system as a whole, on the other (global level), we need to treat 
our units of analysis as relational. Only when we do so can we start to recognize 
that important causal effects flow from the relationships between ROs, and espe­
cially from the EU towards other ROs. In the next chapter, I use the diffusion lit­
erature to develop a theory of the EU’s interorganizational influence that is 
compatible with this ontological premise.
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3
Theorizing Interorganizational Influence 
from the European Union
A Diffusion Framework
The main argument of this book is that the European Union (EU) systematically 
shapes processes of institution building in other regional organizations (ROs). 
This influence operates through two distinct pathways—active and passive 
influence—and is conditioned by the contractual nature of ROs. More broadly, 
the book proposes that interorganizational influence matters for our understanding 
of regional institution building; decision- making is regularly interdependent 
between different ROs.
In this chapter, I lay the analytical foundations for these claims by proposing a 
novel theoretical framework for understanding processes of interorganizational 
diffusion, with a particular focus on the EU as the most prominent pioneer in the 
field of regional organization. In developing this framework, I pay particular 
attention to how interdependent decision- making affects the decentralized 
 setting of negotiations among sovereign governments, which form the basis of 
institutional change and evolution in ROs. The framework suggests that EU 
influence operates through its effect on government’s institutional strategies in 
negotiations over institutional change. An important implication of the framework 
is that it explains variation in the degree of convergence between the original 
institutional arrangement and those that are created elsewhere as a function of 
the extent to which interdependent decision- making shapes national governments’ 
institutional strategies. Only when institutional innovations fully shape collective 
institutional strategies is convergence likely to result. Otherwise, we observe 
various degrees of adaptation, such that the final institutional outcome displays 
limited similarity with the original innovation.
I develop this framework in three steps. First, I outline a heuristic model of 
diffusion between ROs that captures its basic processes and dynamics. I then 
zoom in on the role of organizational pioneers and develop the causal process 
underlying the two pathways and the scope condition of EU influence. Finally, 
I derive testable propositions from the theoretical framework, and specify its 
observable implications at the process level. This framework structures the 
empirical analysis in subsequent chapters, which tests its explanatory power 
through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Even though 
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I  will formulate the theoretical framework with a view to understanding EU 
influence on institutional creation and change in ROs, the framework is more 
broadly applicable. Building on a rich established literature on diffusion in political 
science, sociology, and economics, I theorize how and when prominent pioneer 
organizations shape other organizations in a given field through interdependent 
decision- making. Thus, the general logic of the argument is not confined to 
questions of institutional design but might refer also to policies or other types of 
rules; similarly, it is not confined to ROs and may, in principle, apply to international 
organizations (IOs) more broadly.
Diffusion between regional organizations
Conceptual foundations
For most of the past six decades, scholars of ROs and of international institutions 
more broadly have treated ROs as atomistic entities that develop largely in isola-
tion from each other. As outlined in the previous chapter, established theories 
locate the main drivers of regional institution building within the respective 
organization. This is the case whether we take functional theories of cooperation 
and integration that emphasize ROs as the response to conflicts and problems of 
collective action resulting from economic or security- related interdependence 
within a region, or constructivist and transactionalist approaches that emphasize 
the role of communication and collective identities. Most studies treat different 
ROs as developing largely independently of each other. The literature overwhelm-
ingly works with the implicit assumption of unit independence.
A diffusion framework challenges this assumption by subjecting it to empirical 
scrutiny. It starts from the distinctive claim that ROs are interdependent in their 
decision- making and that, consequently, decisions in some organizations system-
atically shape decisions in others (Gray  1973; Strang  1991; Meyer et al.  1997; 
Simmons and Elkins 2004; Braun and Gilardi 2006). In our context, the claim is 
that the process of regional institution building in a given RO is affected by the 
institutional choices taken in the EU. A diffusion framework conceptualizes units 
of analysis as being embedded in an environment made up of other, similar units, 
and examines how this embeddedness shapes their institutional evolution and 
form. As Gilardi (2012) summarizes, diffusion studies analyse how ‘decisions in 
one country [are] influenced [. . .] by the ideas, norms, and policies displayed or 
even promoted by other countries and international organizations’ (p. 453). Such 
a framework thereby rejects the idea, widespread in the literature on regional 
organization, that institutional decisions in ROs ‘can adequately be understood 
by conceiving of national governments [in different ROs] as making decisions 
independently of each other’ (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett  2006: 787). 
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The  defining characteristic of a diffusion framework is that it starts from the 
assumption of unit interdependence.
From this perspective, the key to understanding regional institution building is 
the direct and indirect linkages between organizations, and the power relations 
that shape their interaction. The idea that linkages and interactions between units 
are central to our understanding of institutional change has deep roots in the 
social sciences, and does not only characterize the literature on diffusion. In 
political science, the concept of interdependence has a long pedigree, denoting a 
situation of mutual dependence that is ‘characterized by reciprocal effects among 
countries or among actors in different countries’ (Keohane and Nye  1977: 7). 
Similarly, Rosenau’s (1980) linkage politics is defined by ‘any recurring sequence 
of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another’ (p. 381). 
Today, the term ‘globalization’ has risen to prominence, and any definition of this 
phenomenon highlights the increasing density of interactions across national 
borders (Scholte 2005; Jahn 2006). In policy analysis, the concepts of policy learn-
ing and policy transfer are said to capture an important source of institutional 
change, tapping the extent to which ‘knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is 
used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in another political system’ (Dolowitz and Marsh  2000: 5; see also 
Dolowitz 2009).
In sociology, scholars of organizations have developed powerful arguments 
about how ‘organizational environments’ or ‘organizational fields’ are key to 
understanding institutional change. The former see institutional change as a 
function of the nature and distribution of resources in organizations’ environ-
ments, which can be characterized by the ‘elaboration of rules and requirements 
to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support 
and legitimacy’ (Scott 2001: 132; see also Pfeffer and Salancik 1975; Aldrich 1979). 
The latter emphasize the importance of the emergence and distribution of le git-
im ate organizational templates within a system of organizations with similar goals 
that are constructed and propagated through global cultural and as so ci ation al 
processes (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The notion of 
‘organizational fields’ directs our attention to ‘ “sets” or “communities” [. . .] of 
organizations that directly interact with one another or are influenced by 
each other in a meaningful way’ (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002: 59; for 
uses of the notion in IR, see Dingwerth and Pattberg  2009; Vetterlein and 
Moschella 2014). Economic sociologists have developed similar arguments about 
the embeddedness of social action. Mark Granovetter (1985) stipulates that ‘the 
behavior and institutions to be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing social 
relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding’ 
(p. 482). He suggests that an atomized conception of human action characterizes 
both under- and oversocialized conceptions of action, and instead proposes that 
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actors’ ‘attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations’ (Granovetter  1985: 487; see also Marsden  1983; 
Uzzi 1997). This is similar to the ‘relationalism’ developed in IR and mentioned in 
the previous chapter.
Finally, network theorists across a variety of disciplines similarly posit that ‘it is 
not actors’ interests, power, or ideology, but the relations among actors that are 
causally significant’ (Goddard 2009: 254, emphasis original; see also Granovetter 
1973; Maoz 2011; Hafner- Burton 2009; Jackson and Nexon 2018: 585–7; Goddard 
2018). Accordingly, scholars of networks zoom in on the relations between actors, 
and the structures formed by these relations, in an attempt to understand how 
they constrain and enable the actors involved in these relations. A common 
feature of these different concepts is that linkages and inter actions shape the 
evolution of units by enabling and constraining decision- making through the 
manipulation of specific resources such as money, information, and legitimacy. 
Thus, the idea that linkages and interactions between ROs matter for regional 
institutional change can draw on a broad conceptual foundation spanning a variety 
of social science disciplines.
Following convention, diffusion is understood as the process by which the 
interactions between ROs come to affect institutional change. For example, Rogers 
(2003: 5) defines diffusion as ‘the process in which an innovation is communi-
cated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system’ 
(see also Elkins and Simmons 2005: 36; Gilardi 2005: 454). Accordingly, diffusion 
studies focus on the process by which organizational decisions in some organiza-
tions shape those taken in other organizations. In sociology, this mainly concerns 
the study of organizations such as business firms, public administrations, museums, 
or universities (for an overview, see Strang and Soule 1998). Comparativists in 
political science and students of international relations tend to study diffusion 
processes among governments. A popular theme among comparativists is the 
spread of policies among governments at various levels, such as cities, subnational 
units, and countries (Gray  1973; Levi- Faur  2005; Shipan and Volden  2008; 
Walker  1969). In international relations, work on diffusion tends to focus on 
cross- national processes. One prevalent subject is the adoption of liberal eco-
nomic policies, which tend to be affected by the policies of relevant peers 
(Simmons and Elkins  2004; Lee and Strang  2006; Brooks and Kurtz  2012); 
another popular theme is the spread of international agreements, such as invest-
ment treaties (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Poulsen and Aisbett 2013) or 
trade agreements (Mansfield and Milner  2012; Baccini and Dür  2012; Baccini, 
Dür, and Haftel  2015). By focusing on interdependent decision- making across 
organizational units, existing diffusion studies provide a welcome corrective to 
purely endogenously focused models of institutional or policy change. While 
these studies recognize that ‘international influences are integrally connected 
to national politics’ (Lee and Strang  2006: 888), their focus generally is on 
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hier arch ic al ly organized units such as business firms or governments. This implies 
that the process of adoption within the respective unit itself has received little 
analytical attention.
I posit that, in order to understand diffusion among ROs, we must prob lem atize 
the adoption process within units. Unlike other types of organization that have 
dominated the study of diffusion, institutional choices in IOs in general, and in 
ROs in particular, are the result of bargaining processes among sovereign 
 governments. These are not hierarchically structured organizations in which a 
specific actor has the legal competence to impose her preferred institutional 
choice on others.1 Consequently, the process of diffusion between ROs cannot 
simply be understood as the adoption of institutional or policy innovations from 
elsewhere, for such a view neglects the fact that intergovernmental negotiations 
among actors with differential interests and power tend to mute the link between 
an external innovation and the final decision. The dynamics and outcomes 
of  decentralized bargaining among heterogeneous actors is a key theme of 
international relations scholarship, yet is hardly covered in the literature on 
diffusion. I argue that studying diffusion between ROs provides an opportunity 
for, and in fact requires, reconnecting these two concerns. Subsequently, I outline 
a model of institutional diffusion that develops this argument.
A heuristic model
For our purpose, it is useful to define diffusion as the process by which institutional 
innovations in one regional organization shape the outcome of intergovernmental 
bargaining over institutional choices in other regional organizations. Like other 
definitions mentioned above, this definition rests on the premise of interdependent 
decision- making, understood as a process, but also specifies such decision- 
making as involving intergovernmental bargaining, which lies at the heart of 
institutional choices in ROs.
The focus on interdependent decision- making implies that claims about diffu-
sion involve an often- implicit counterfactual: the outcome of interest would have 
been different if ROs were atomistic entities. Expressed differently, an explanation 
that draws on diffusion implies that the dynamics and outcomes of intergovern-
mental bargaining over institutional change in ROs would be different if such 
bargaining were shaped only by factors operating at the (intra)regional and global 
1 This distinction between hierarchical and decentralized organizations is akin to the traditional 
distinction in international relations between the hierarchy of nation states and the anarchy that 
dominates the international system. This distinction thus captures two fundamentally different organ-
izing principles, and served as the major justification for the creation of international relations as an 
independent field of study. The distinction also resembles the distinction between markets and hier-
arch ies (Williamson 1975).
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levels of analysis (Lenz 2013). This counterfactual is known as ‘Galton’s problem’, 
after the British social scientist and statistician Francis Galton, who, in relation to 
laws of marriage and descent in anthropology, first raised the possibility that units 
might not be independent of each other (see Naroll 1965; on counterfactuals 
generally, see Fearon 1991 and Levy 2008; on counterfactuals in diffusion 
research, see Starke 2013: 575- 76). This problem is sometimes characterized in 
terms of ‘prerequisites versus diffusion’ (Collier and Messick 1975) or, as Ross and 
Homer (1976: 1) put it, ‘Are correlations between two traits or behaviours, such as 
economic development and political stability, to be explained by functional 
relationships within political systems, or in terms of diffusion and borrowing 
arising from interactions among countries?’ In the current context, the key 
question is whether institutional choices in ROs can be adequately understood as 
being the result of intraregional characteristics and abstract global processes, i.e. 
arguments located at the (sub)regional or global levels of analysis, or whether 
they must take interactions between ROs into account, i.e. consider the interor-
ganizational level of analysis.
This discussion suggests that any argument about diffusion entails a (counter-
factual) comparison between two situations: one of independent decision- 
making, in which units are thought of as atomistic entities, and one of 
interdependent decision- making, in which they interact. Modelling this compari-
son explicitly is the core idea of the heuristic model developed below. I take the 
‘classical’ counterfactual at the unit level one step further by thinking of inter-
actions not at the level of ROs per se but in terms of interactions between an RO 
and the institutional preferences or strategies of governments, individually or 
collectively, in another RO. I argue that the effects of diffusion are even dis cern-
ible in cases in which not all governments’ institutional preferences or strategies 
are shaped by other organizations in similar ways, but in which diffusion affects 
only a subset of them.
I develop the heuristic model of diffusion between ROs in two steps. I first 
outline a simple model of intergovernmental bargaining under conditions of 
independent decision- making as the baseline and then introduce diffusion into 
the picture.2 A comparison of the respective institutional outcomes indicates (1) 
that diffusion effects are discernible even under relatively restrictive assumptions, 
and (2) that diffusion effects, thus conceived, tend to be smaller in the context of 
diffusion between ROs, and IOs more generally. The model is heuristic insofar as 
it directs attention towards the basic processes and dynamics of a situation with-
out positing clear causal relationships. This will be the task of the chapter’s final 
section.
2 This model resembles the diffusion model developed by Braun and Gilardi (2006). However, it 
focuses less on the cost–benefit considerations of individual policy- makers than on the intergovern-
mental bargaining processes underlying institutional choice.
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Figure 3.1 depicts a one- dimensional model of intergovernmental bargaining 
in a regional organization (RO1) in which two governments (A and B) with dif-
ferent institutional preferences seek to reach agreement on the degree of regional 
institutionalization, measured as departure from the institutional status quo 
(ISQ). The middle point between their institutional preferences constitutes the 
outcome under conditions of independent decision- making—i.e. in the absence 
of diffusion (‘independent’ outcome). The distance between the ISQ and the 
resulting bargaining outcome denotes the extent of institutional change.
The model makes three simplifying assumptions. First, the two governments 
have a collective interest in strengthening an existing institution but differ regard-
ing their preferred degree of institutional strengthening. This assumption simply 
posits that states only come to the negotiating table to discuss institutional change 
once they have already agreed that such change is actually needed. Second, the 
two governments are equal in terms of their relative bargaining power—in other 
words, there is no variation in the ability of a governments to advance its pre-
ferred institutional outcome in the negotiations. This assumption enables us to 
examine actual outcomes as a result of differences in institutional preferences 
(and strategies—see below) only, and it implies that both states make equal con-
cessions in order to find an agreement.3
Third, I assume that the outcome reflects a balanced ‘institutional compromise’ 
between the two governments. Despite the unanimous decision- making that 
generally characterizes institutional reform in ROs, this assumption is defensible 
because the context of regional cooperation is characterized by iterated inter-
action and a long shadow of the future due to geographic ‘lock- in’; ROs are, in 
many ways, communities created by fate (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks  2019).4 
Under these conditions, not even the most powerful government can afford to 
ignore the institutional preferences of other members over extended periods of 
time. Such an assumption is widely shared in the literature. The rational design 
project, for example, posits that institutional outcomes ‘represent their joint 
efforts—and “compromises” among their preferences—to improve their equilibrium 
3 It will be relaxed in the empirical analyses that follow in subsequent chapters.
4 This assumption is widespread also in models of international cooperation more broadly, which 
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Figure 3.1 Negotiated institutional change in regional organizations, independent 
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outcome’ (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001: 781). The literature on arguing 
similarly suggests that the outcome of many international negotiations does not 
simply reflect the preferences of the individual actors, and lowest- common- 
denominator decisions, but a more balanced institutional compromise (Kleine 
and Risse 2010; see also Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2003). The reason 
is that international negotiations seldom involve only ‘powering’ but also include 
a good deal of joint ‘puzzling’ and ‘persuading’ (Blyth  2007). The case studies 
in  the empirical chapters (5- 7) demonstrate the empirical plausibility of this 
assumption.
We now introduce diffusion into this bargaining scenario. Recall that we con-
ceive of diffusion as the process by which institutional innovations affect inter-
governmental bargaining over institutional choices elsewhere. Diffusion thereby 
alters the bargaining context in which governments seek to realize their institu-
tional preferences. Figure 3.2 shows how the bargaining outcome changes when 
interdependent decision- making is posited. I introduce a second regional or gan-
iza tion (RO2), whose institutional status quo (ISQ) constitutes an institutional 
innovation in the other regional organization (RO1). We assume that one of the 
two governments involved in the institutional bargain shifts its preferred institu-
tional outcome towards the institutional innovation as a result of interdependent 
decision- making. Note that A’s institutional preference remains unchanged, but 
its institutional strategy and thereby its bargaining position shifts.5 The intrinsic 
motivations for this shift can be manifold, and they are treated as exogenous in 
the model. A government might consider an institutional innovation to be more 
‘functional’ than existing alternatives in order to solve the cooperation problem at 
5 In the bargaining literature, institutional preferences generally denote a set of ordered values 
assigned to substantive outcomes in the future, whereas institutional strategies underlie the bargaining 
positions that governments adopt in order to realize their institutional preferences (sometimes called 
preferences over actions, as opposed to preferences over outcomes). Thus, strategies, unlike preferences, 
are responses to the specific strategic context, which implies that preferences are more stable over time 














“Pure” adoption eect 
Diusion ‘pull’
Figure 3.2 Negotiated institutional change in regional organizations, interdependent 
decision- making
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hand; it might benefit disproportionately from the anticipated distributional 
consequences of an institutional innovation; or it might deem an institutional 
in nov ation to be more ‘appropriate’. In any case, this shift implies a new preferred 
institutional outcome of government B (RO1, new B), with the distance between 
its old institutional preference (RO1, old B) and the institutional innovation 
constituting what one might term the ‘diffusion pull’. From the perspective of 
mainstream accounts, which conceive diffusion as the process by which other 
units adopt an external institutional or policy innovation, these assumptions are 
restrictive in that (1) the preferred institutional outcome of only a subset of 
relevant actors, not all of them, are affected by an external innovation; and (2) 
this is only partially the case. In other words, according to this model not a single 
government adopts the institutional innovation in another regional organization 
wholesale as its preferred institutional outcome, as much of the existing diffusion 
literature suggests. Even under these comparatively restrictive assumptions, 
Figure  3.2 indicates that diffusion shapes actual institutional outcomes. The 
difference between the ‘independent’ outcome and the ‘interdependent’ outcome 
denotes the diffusion effect. This effect is discernible, but it is smaller than the 
diffusion effect that emerges under the assumption that organizations (fully) 
adopt external institutional innovations, denoted as the ‘pure adoption effect’ 
in Figure 3.2.
The empirical chapters will show that this model of diffusion between ROs 
serves as a useful heuristic for analysing interorganizational diffusion, and it also 
has major theoretical benefits. First, it reconnects the key concern of the literature 
on diffusion, which is to challenge purely endogenous accounts of political out-
comes, with a key problematic in international relations: understanding the 
dynamics of decentralized bargaining among heterogeneous actors. The model 
thereby offers analytical guidance on how institutional scholars of international 
politics may introduce the concerns of scholars of diffusion into their models, 
and indicates where and how their previous models might have been deficient. At 
the same time, it reminds students of diffusion that diffusion effects are likely to 
be smaller in the hard- fought world of decentralized international bargaining 
than in the world of hierarchically structured (domestic) organizations. Second, 
the model bolsters claims in some of the literature on diffusion that convergence 
is not the only possible outcome of diffusion processes, and not even the most 
likely one. As Risse (2016: 88) notes, ‘we rarely see full- scale adoption or conver-
gence around specific models of regional cooperation and integration. The most 
likely outcomes of diffusion with regard to regional cooperation and integration 
are selective adoption, adaptation, and transformation’ (similarly, Braun and 
Gilardi  2006). To date, this claim mainly stands as an empirical one: scholars 
observe that outcomes of diffusion processes vary. However, the model presented 
here lends a conceptual basis to these claims. It suggests that the extent of conver-
gence between the institutional innovation and institutional choices elsewhere 
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depends on the extent to which the innovation affects institutional preferences of 
other actors. Since ROs are composed of many member states with het ero ge neous 
institutional preferences, the outcomes of diffusion processes are likely to be 
diverse as well.
But exactly how does the existence of an institutional innovation in one RO 
shape the institutional preferences of governments in other ROs? The next section 
answers this question with a focus on the EU.
The causal process of European Union influence
Armed with a better understanding of how interdependent decision- making 
affects institutional choices in ROs, we now turn to the causal process that under-
lies interorganizational diffusion from the EU. I argue that organizational pi on-
eers have specific incentives to influence other organizations in their field, 
generating pressure on regional policy- makers to adopt successful institutional 
innovations. This argument grounds the focus on the EU, which I argue has been 
the most important pioneer in the post- Second World War era in the realm of 
regional organization. This section proceeds in two parts. After developing this 
argument at length, I detail two pathways through which the EU influences the 
institutional preferences and strategies of other governments.
The European Union as a pioneer among regional organizations
Organizational pioneers are ‘actors who have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to trans-
form existing ones’ (Hinkle and Schiff  2004: 657). They shape organizations 
around them by acting both as institutional innovators, who introduce new insti-
tutional forms into a system, and as organizational entrepreneurs, who attempt to 
influence other organizations in the system to adopt these novel institutions, both 
actively and passively. Thus, the concept of organizational pioneer reintroduces 
agency, interests, and power into the literature on diffusion.
In the realm of regional organization, the EU has been the main institutional 
innovator. Innovators have ‘the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities’ 
(Emirbayer and Mische  1998: 963), thereby deviating from established institu-
tional forms and practices (see Garud and Karnøe 2001). After the Second World 
War, western European states were not the first to engage in regional economic 
cooperation, but they did so on the basis of ‘a set of quasi- constitutional institu-
tions unique among international organizations’ (Moravcsik  1998: 86). They 
pi on eered a novel approach to regional organization—regional economic integra-
tion guided by supranational institutions—through a range of unprecedented 
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institutional forms that evolved over time. Institutional innovation consisted 
in translating institutional types from the domestic context to the world of 
inter nation al cooperation in order to address long- standing cooperation problems, 
such as how to ensure the effectiveness of cooperation amidst divergent state 
interests (the European Commission), how to secure reliable implementation of 
joint decisions (the European Court of Justice), and how to legitimate a state- driven 
project of economic integration among Europe’s democratic membership (the 
European Parliament, but also the Social and Economic Council and the Committee 
of the Regions) (see Hix 2005). In Duchêne’s famous words, the Community 
brought ‘to international problems the [. . .] structures of contractual politics 
which have in the past been associated almost exclusively with “home” and not 
foreign, that is alien, affairs’ (Duchêne  1973: 19–20, emphasis original). This 
approach broke with the previously dominant approach to international 
co oper ation which saw international organizations as strictly intergovernmen-
tal bargaining forums. As Perry Anderson has noted, European institutions 
emerged ‘through deliberate design “without historical precedent” ’ (quoted in 
Moravcsik 1998: 68).
Having suffered two atrocious wars within a generation, western European 
states institutionalized supranational control over crucial war resources in the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951, and extended 
the principle of supranationalism towards economic cooperation more broadly in 
the 1957 Treaties of Rome which created the European Economic Community. 
In Europe, supranationalism rests on four distinctive institutional types.6 The first 
is the High Authority of the ECSC, and later the European Commission, which, 
akin to national executives, holds far- reaching rights in structuring decision- 
making among member state governments and can bring non- compliance cases 
to the European Court of Justice. Second, the European Court of Justice sits at the 
helm of an international legal system that has adopted many of the same features 
of domestic legal systems. The ‘constitutionalization’ of the EU treaties through 
the Court’s jurisprudence is an unprecedented development in international 
legalization (Weiler  1991; Alter 2001). Third, the empowerment of a directly 
elected parliamentary body to become a co- decision- maker (along with national 
governments) is another institutional innovation that is unmatched to this day 
among IOs (Rittberger 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2020). With the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament as equal co- legislators, the EU has 
developed into a bicameral system akin to many national political systems. Finally, 
the EU has broken new ground in institutionalizing the consultative rights of a 
6 Besides these delegated institutions, qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, which 
was institutionalized on a broad front with the Single European Act of 1986, is another pioneering 
institutional feature of the EU. Given that it follows a different logic of institutional design, I do not 
further consider it here (Lake 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2015).
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range of important stakeholders, such as business and labour  representatives 
(Economic and Social Committee) as well as subnational units (Committee of the 
Regions). In sum, the EU has, over time, pioneered a new ‘model’ of supranational 
regional governance.
Institutional innovation is potentially causally relevant in an organizational 
field because it produces incentives for organizational pioneers to be entrepre-
neurial in attempting to spread these innovations beyond the confines of the 
organization itself. Unlike individual entrepreneurs, who are motivated by ‘strong 
notions about appropriate or desirable behavior’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896), 
there is an institutional logic to organizational entrepreneurship. Institutional 
innovations are uncertain in effect and distinct from the established routines in 
specific organizational fields, which means that ‘organizations which innovate in 
important structural ways bear considerable costs in legitimacy’ (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977: 353). As a result, institutional innovators have a strong incentive 
to shape other organizations in those fields, both directly and indirectly. 
Organizational innovators tend to actively promote the adoption of their novel 
institutional forms by other organizations in order to legitimate the innovation. 
Mitzen (2006) argues for the importance of ontological security (security of the 
self) not only for individuals but also for corporate actors such as states and 
inter nation al organizations. In order to overcome the uncertainty and insecurity 
associated with being ‘different’, with having ‘abnormal’ identities, actors have 
incentives to stabilize their environment ‘by routinizing their relations with sig-
nificant others’ (Mitzen 2006: 342) and by trying to make those ‘significant others’ 
more like oneself (see also Meyer and Jepperson 2000: 110–11). Thus, the activ-
ism of organizational entrepreneurs is central to the spread of institutions. Buzan 
(2004: 222–7), for example, emphasizes the role of ‘vanguards’ in the emergence 
and diffusion of particular social structures that may ultimately acquire global 
form. Goddard, for her part, in her analysis of entrepreneurs in international 
politics, contends that ‘it is this process of building, integrating, and destroying 
ties that lies at the heart of entrepreneurship’ (2009: 250).
These considerations particularly pertain to the European Union. The 
Community has been the most active promoter of regional cooperation around 
the world. Supporting regional integration has been a declared goal of the EU 
since the early 1970s, but its attempts to engage with newly independent states in 
Africa as a group rather than as individual countries—an early form of promoting 
regional cooperation—date back to the early 1960s. Apart from a few global 
 powers and selective ‘strategic’ partners with which it has started to engage in the 
last decade or so, the Community regularly deals with non- member countries on 
a group- to- group basis rather than bilaterally (for a good overview, see Alecu de 
Flers and Regelsberger 2005). Over time, it has developed a holistic policy to sup-
port institution building in existing ROs that consists of various elements (for an 
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overview, see Smith 2014: ch. 4). The European Commission, in particular, pro-
vides technical and financial assistance to policy- makers elsewhere. A range of 
EU actors maintain institutionalized contacts with their counterparts. For 
ex ample, the European Parliament has had long- standing ties with parliamentar-
ians in other regions (for an overview, see Herranz 2005). Similarly, ministers and 
heads of state also engage their counterparts in various regional formats, often 
referred to as ‘political dialogue’ (for a somewhat dated overview, see Monar 1997). 
These dialogues are not only geared towards addressing the state of regional 
cooperation, but generally concern a wide range of topics that are of mutual con-
cern. These dialogue formats often constitute part of formal cooperation agree-
ments between the EU and other ROs—a form of engagement that was 
particularly popular in the 1990s (for an early assessment, see Edwards and 
Regelsberger 1990). Today, the EU has regular interaction involving a variety of 
actors with many ROs, and provides significant amounts of funding to some of 
them. No other international actor supports ROs to a similar extent worldwide; it 
is a distinctive feature of the EU’s external relations.
A good deal of instrumental thinking has been involved in specific interre-
gional relations: scholars have emphasized the aim of producing economies of 
scale by dealing with ROs rather than with individual countries (Monar 1997), 
and the ambition to open up larger regional markets for EU businesses (see e.g. 
Robles 2008). Despite such thinking, these efficiency explanations of EU foreign 
policy have failed to explain why other international actors fail to promote 
regional organization to a comparable degree. What makes the EU distinct, and 
endows it with a distinctive set of motivations, is its identity as a regional or gan-
iza tion. As Smith (2014) notes, this foreign- policy objective ‘clearly derives from 
the nature of the EU itself: internal practice, values and experiences have patently 
produced this particular foreign- policy objective’ (p. 67). The identity ex plan-
ation resonates widely in the literature, in line with the aforementioned incentives 
for institutional entrepreneurship of institutional innovators and Mitzen’s (2006) 
idea of ontological security. Grugel (2004) states flatly that the EU’s promotion of 
regionalism constitutes an attempt to ‘lay down an identity marker’ (p. 621); 
Bretherton and Vogler (1999) emphasize that the EU has an inherent ‘tendency to 
reproduce itself ’ (p. 249); and Bicchi (2006) has made the institutionalist argu-
ment most clearly: ‘My understanding is that much of the EU’s [external] action 
can be characterized as an unreflexive attempt to promote its own model because 
institutions tend to export institutional isomorphism as a default option’ (p. 287). 
By supporting regional organization around the world, the EU not only le git im-
izes itself but also seeks to restructure the international environment in which it 
acts (Söderbaum, Stålgren, and Langenhove 2005). In a more normative vein, 
Nicolaidïs and Howse (2002) contend that the influence of the EU in the world 
‘rests on the synergies between the EC’s being, its political essence, and its doing, 
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its external actions’ (p. 771). Through these means, the EU actively promotes the 
strengthening of regional institutions in other parts of the world as a reflection of 
its own internal experience with institutionalized regional cooperation.
Organizational innovators also act as entrepreneurs in more indirect ways. As 
Meyer (2000) notes, ‘actors themselves, in their eagerness to demonstrate univer-
sality, put their own models—often heavily edited by transmitting scientists, pro-
fessionals and consultants—forward for general emulation’ (p. 242). To the extent 
that organizational innovators are successful, their institutional innovations gain 
credibility, which facilitates the transfer of such innovations. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) influentially argue that ‘organizations tend to model themselves 
after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate 
or successful’ (p. 152). Professional networks, epistemic communities, and aca-
demia often play an important role in such indirect entrepreneurship both by 
theorizing, or rationalizing, novel practices in ways that make them ‘adoptable’ in 
a wide range of contexts (Strang and Meyer 1993) and by distributing and advo-
cating them as ‘best practices’ to governments in ROs (Haas 1992; see also Keck 
and Sikkink 1998).
These arguments also pertain particularly to the EU. The Community puts its 
own models forward for general emulation, and EU representatives regularly 
encourage others to learn from and emulate the EU experience. Chris Patten, for-
mer commissioner for EU external relations, has regularly described the EU as a 
model of regional integration that is potentially valuable for others. Similarly, 
Pascal Lamy, the former commissioner for trade, put the EU model forward for 
general emulation when noting, ‘Regionalism may be a European invention, but 
it is not protected by copyright law!’ (Lamy 2001). David Miliband, the former 
British foreign secretary, even advocated the EU as a ‘model power’ instead of a 
‘superpower’, with Europe’s main strength lying in ‘our ability to set global stand-
ards [. . .] and the power of Europe as an idea and a model’ (Miliband  2007). 
Influential analytical concepts advanced by social scientists tend to blur the 
boundary between description/analysis and prescription. Albeit subtly, they tend 
to portray the EU as a ‘force for good’ (for a critique, see Sjursen 2006; Diez 2005). 
Perhaps most prominently, Manners’ notion of normative power seeks to capture 
the EU’s ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’ 
(Manners 2002: 239)—something that is in keeping with the notion of ‘naturali-
zation’ or ‘theorization’ captured by Meyer and Strang (1993). This notion oper-
ates by affecting discourses, or opinion, about regional cooperation in a largely 
indirect fashion. As Cutler (2001) notes, in the realm of international parliamen-
tary assemblies, the experience of the European Parliament has ‘opened a new 
chapter in the history of parliamentarianism’ (p. 223). Similarly, and as seen in 
the previous chapter, there is much anecdotal evidence that the EU’s experience 
has affected institution building in other parts of the world.
In sum, among ROs the EU is the most prominent organizational pioneer, 
understood as an actor which shapes other organizations by acting both as 
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institutional innovator and as organizational entrepreneur. This discussion suggests 
that the EU’s influence operates in two distinct ways: directly, through active 
engagement with other ROs, and indirectly, by putting its own institutional 
arrangements forward for general emulation.7 Accordingly, the next part of this 
chapter explicates two causal pathways on the basis of this analytical distinction.
Two pathways of European Union influence
We are now in a position to join two analytical threads together. The heuristic 
model of diffusion between ROs, outlined above, suggests that any convincing 
account of EU influence must detail the ways in which one RO affects processes 
of intergovernmental bargaining over institutional change in other ROs. The 
previous part argued that organizational pioneers, of which the EU is the most 
important among ROs, have incentives to shape the institutional evolution of 
other organizations in their field, both directly and indirectly. These insights 
combine into two distinct pathways: active and passive EU influence. Both 
pathways share a common model of influence. In brief, institutional innovation 
in the EU exerts pressure on governments elsewhere to change their institutional 
preferences or strategies, which leads to shifting bargaining positions of one 
or  more governments, which in turn affects international negotiations over 
institutional design in other ROs. However, the pathways differ with regard to the 
specific source of EU influence and the underlying causal process. I explicate each 
pathway in turn.
The first pathway captures the EU’s active influence on institutional strategies 
elsewhere. Here, influence is the result of consciously designed activities by a 
range of EU actors who aim to actively shape institution building processes 
abroad. Hence, this pathway focuses on the supply side of EU influence and is 
colloquially associated with the EU as an actor. The underlying causal process is 
depicted in Figure 3.3.
This pathway posits that EU actors’ direct engagement with counterparts in 
other ROs shapes the institutional strategies that underlie bargaining positions in 
two ways. For one, the EU may provide material incentives to shift bargaining 
positions by changing ‘the relative size of payoffs associated with alternatives’ 
(Braun and Gilardi 2006: 310; see also Börzel and Risse 2012a; Simmons, Dobbin, 
and Garrett 2006: 791). In this case, one or more governments in an RO seek to 
realize their institutional preferences by shifting their bargaining position towards 
EU- type arrangements in order to benefit from the EU’s financial support. 
Sociological institutionalism refers to this process as ‘coercive isomorphism’, 
which DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define as ‘both formal and informal pressures 
7 Even though rarely theorized, this distinction is widespread in the literature on the EU (see e.g. 
Börzel and Risse 2012a; Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006).
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exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent’ 
(p. 150). Regarding the EU, these material pressures concern the provision of 
financial incentives, which can be either positive—strengthening regional 
institutions can result from a desire to attract funding from the Community—or 
negative, where institutional change is the result of a desire to prevent existing 
resources from being withdrawn (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Even 
though the EU does not tie the provision of financial support directly to particular 
types of institutional change, financial dependence on the EU can have a power-
ful effect on the bargaining positions of relevant actors, and therefore ne go ti ations 
over institutional change. As I will show in Chapter  5, threats to withdraw 
funding provided a powerful impetus for institutional reform in the Southern 
African Development Community by affecting governments’ collective institu-
tional strategies.
Moreover, active EU engagement with regional counterparts elsewhere may 
shape the bargaining positions of governments through socialization, which can 
be defined as a ‘process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause 
and effect in the absence of overt coercion’ (Checkel 2001: 562; Johnston 2001). 
Direct interaction between actors creates channels for communication that pro-
vide opportunities for teaching and persuasion. It thereby includes processes 
that  rely both on instrumental and constructivist assumptions, ranging from 
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Figure 3.3 Causal process underlying pathway of active EU influence
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Given the power asymmetries often involved in socialization processes, some 
have referred to this as ‘hegemonic socialization’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). 
Through interaction with the EU, policy- makers elsewhere receive relevant infor-
mation not only about what (and how) institutions work there but also about sali-
ent institutional developments in the process of European integration. Most 
immediately, such interaction might help problematize the institutional status 
quo in an RO—as well as frame the way in which the problem is understood, and 
what potential solutions to it might look like (Duina and Lenz  2016; 
Finnemore 1993). Over time, such interaction may further lead to the generation 
of common knowledge about ‘good’ institutional solutions to particular problems 
(Haas 1992; Grobe  2010; Risse 2000). Research into bounded rationality and 
decision- making has shown that policy- makers often learn from information that 
is readily available (Kahneman 2011; Meseguer 2006), a condition that is posi-
tively affected by opportunities for direct communication. The more extensive 
such communicative channels are, the cheaper it is to acquire information about 
EU institutions.
Similarly, socialization research shows that the intensity and duration of con-
tact crucially shapes the adoption of new ideas about cause and effect 
(Checkel 2005; Bearce and Bondanella 2007). Moreover, informational dynamics 
are deeply influenced by the credibility of the information provider. Actors are 
more likely to learn from and be persuaded by those who enjoy a high degree of 
authority and credibility due to their status, previous success, or other markers of 
social identity (Checkel 2001; 2005: 811, 813; Johnston 2001). These are all char-
acteristics that the EU appears to possess among ROs. This has led sociological 
institutions to posit that socialization is most likely to lead to isomorphic institu-
tional change in highly professionalized contexts (DiMaggio and Powell  1983). 
Scholars have documented such social processes of persuasion and teaching in 
the establishment of the Andean Court of Justice in 1979. The Court’s creation 
occurred ‘not as a result of direct pressure from or financial linkages to the EU’ 
(Gray 2014: 10); instead, networks of Andean and EU experts in the legal realms 
played a key role in the court’s establishment. Saldías offered a detailed account of 
how personal connections between EU legal experts and influential consultants, 
as well as officials in the Andean region, led to a change in relevant actors’ beliefs 
about cause–effect relationships regarding effective legal systems within eco-
nomic integration schemes (Alter, Helfer, and Saldías 2012; Saldías 2013).
The second pathway captures the EU’s passive influence on other ROs. The EU 
is not only in the vanguard as an international actor, actively supporting regional 
institution building. It is, above all, the most successful pioneer of institutional-
ized economic cooperation among neighbouring countries in the post- Second 
World War era. This pathway captures the idea that EU influence stems from the 
success and attractiveness of its institutional designs. It focuses on the demand 
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side of influence and is colloquially associated with the EU as a model. The 
underlying causal process is depicted in Figure 3.4.
This pathway starts with the EU’s own institutional evolution as a source of 
information on institutional effects, which may shape the institutional strategies 
of governments elsewhere in two main ways. For one, actors may learn from the 
EU, a process concerning information about the effects of institutional choices 
generated and pioneered by others (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett  2006; 
Gilardi 2010; 2012). As institutional innovations start to take effect, they enable 
other policy- makers to gauge whether they have been successful at generating the 
desired outcomes. This general insight is intuitive: rather than experimenting 
with novel institutions, policy- makers can use the information generated by 
 others in the design of their own institutions. Thus, familiarity and success are 
key conditions for learning. As Ovodenko and Keohane (2012) note, ‘institutional 
designs that are familiar and perceived by a wide variety of participants in ne go ti-
ations as successful in relevant contexts should have greater chances of being 
adopted than those that are new’ (p. 523). Moreover, diffusion is facilitated by 
theorization; that is, cause–effect relationships derived from a specific experience 
become theorized as being generally applicable. By abstracting from the spe ci fi-
city of the context in which desirable effects are initially generated, the or iza tion 
suggests that ‘similar practices can be adopted by all members of a the or et ic al ly 
defined population, with similar effect’, and that they work by ‘turning diffusion 
into rational choice’ (Strang and Meyer 1993: 496, 500, respectively). However, 
not all relevant actors are similarly familiar with EU institutions or perceive EU 
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institutions as being similarly successful, even when theorized. For example, one 
government may view the design of the European Court of Justice as immensely 
successful in ensuring a relatively high level of compliance with EU law, and 
therefore seek to advance a similar design in intergovernmental ne go ti ations over 
institutional change. Another government, in contrast, may view the same insti-
tution as dangerously threatening national sovereignty, and learn from the EU’s 
experience with the ‘constitutionalization’ of EU treaties through the European 
Court of Justice that such an institutional form should be avoided. Thus, learning 
is likely to affect the institutional preferences and strategies of governments in 
diverse ways (see also Gilardi 2010).
From this perspective, the EU’s own institutional evolution can be expected to 
affect (some) governments’ institutional strategies, and ultimately regional insti-
tution building elsewhere. Some of the general conditions for learning are present 
in the EU case. Compared to ROs, information on EU institutions and their 
effects tends to be more readily available for policy- makers around the world, 
partly due to the extensive academic literature on the organization. At the same 
time, recent research on outside perceptions of the EU indicates that political 
elites in countries involved in regional integration processes view the EU not only 
as ‘the most successful example of regional integration’ (Fioramonti and 
Poletti 2008: 172) but also as highly relevant to their own efforts at institutional-
ized regional cooperation (Final Report 2008; Chaban, Holland, and Ryan 2009; 
Yukawa 2018). As EU institutions evolve, the information derived from the EU 
experience is likely to evolve too. For example, it is widely recognized that the 
European Court of Justice’s decisions that established the principles of direct 
effect and supremacy of EU law in the 1960s were key to the success of European 
(legal) integration (Weiler 1991). As a result, several other ROs that have been 
eager to copy the EU’s success, such as the Andean Community, have formally 
codified these principles in their treaties rather than ‘waiting’ for a regional court 
to develop them through case law. Similarly, the EU is the most theorized RO, 
and such theorization is also likely to evolve over time—tracking the EU’s own 
institutional development. For instance, the insight that the effectiveness of a 
regional legal system hinges on individuals being allowed to access regional 
courts could only spread after individuals had started to regularly use the 
European Court of Justice. Now widely accepted, this insight took decades to 
emerge and was emphatically established by Karen Alter’s work (Alter 2014). In 
this vein, Alter (2012) has argued that the evolution of the dispute settlement 
mechanism in the Economic Community of West African States can be explained 
as the result of a learning process from the EU experience.
Moreover, the EU may affect institutional preferences and strategies elsewhere 
by shaping notions of appropriate institutional design. This is often referred to as 
‘emulation’, conceived as a process in which ‘actors model their behaviour on the 
examples provided by others’ (Lee and Strang 2006: 889). Emulation is motivated 
by an aspiration to behave in ways widely seen as legitimate and credible. As 
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organizational fields become structured through associational processes, they 
develop standards for the legitimate institutional forms that organizations grad-
ual ly adopt in an attempt to enhance their legitimacy—and ultimately their 
chances of long- term survival (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Institutional pioneers 
are particularly likely to be emulated, given the premium that exists in or gan iza-
tion al fields for appearing similar in structural form to the most admired and 
successful organizations (Haveman 1993). Therefore, drastic change in one such 
or gan iza tion can induce similar change in other organizations. As Weyland 
(2008) notes, ‘drastic change in one country often prompts emulation efforts in 
other nations by calling attention to problems and offering ideas for solutions’ 
(p. 290).
From this perspective also, the EU’s own institutional evolution may shape 
bargaining positions elsewhere. Case studies regularly report that policy- makers 
view the EU as ‘the most advanced model of regional integration’ (Jetschke and 
Murray 2012). Hence, it is plausible to posit that the EU is the main exemplar 
among ROs whose behaviour is likely to be emulated by other governments. EU 
institutions might not only provide boilerplate solutions to given problems; insti-
tutional change in the EU may also alert regional policy- makers to the urgency of 
addressing certain problems in regional integration in the first place (Duina and 
Lenz 2016). Again, however, different governments are likely to vary in the extent 
to which they adopt EU institutions as bargaining positions in intergovernmental 
negotiations. One government might view the creation of an European 
Parliament- type parliamentary assembly, for example, as the best or the most 
appropriate way to enhance the legitimacy of an RO, and advocate a respective 
institutional change in negotiations. Another government might fear that similar 
dynamics of self- empowerment, as in the European Parliament case, occur at 
home, and therefore stick to its initial preference for confining regional co oper-
ation mainly to governmental actors. Chapter 6 describes such a dynamic in the 
case of the establishment of the Mercosur Review Tribunal.
While I posit a central role for governments in the causal process by which the 
EU shapes institution building in other ROs, I do not argue that non- state actors 
are irrelevant. The study of regional organization has a rich tradition of emphasiz-
ing the role of supranational entrepreneurs, starting with Haas’s (1958) neofunc-
tionalist account in The Uniting of Europe. Beyond regionalism, students of 
international cooperation have also highlighted the role of international bureau-
crats, expert networks, and other transnational actors in the dynamics and 
outcomes of international politics (for an overview, see Risse 2012). In the inter-
nation al negotiations I consider, non- state actors play no formal role, because 
such negotiations are exclusively in the hands of member- state governments. 
Nevertheless, such actors may be instrumental in governments’ adoption of EU- 
type institutional preferences and strategies. Such a role of non- state actors is 
fully compatible with my theoretical framework, which is indifferent to the 
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specific actors who transmit causally relevant information from the EU to 
national governments.
Scope condition of European Union influence: the role of 
contractual open- endedness
Under what conditions are the two pathways developed in the previous section 
likely to become salient in affecting processes of institution building beyond the 
EU? What enables their operation?
Recent advances in the study of causal mechanisms show that causal processes 
may be triggered by a variety of conditions that provide a context conducive to its 
operation. As Pawson puts it succinctly, ‘whether [a] mechanism is triggered 
depends on context’ (Pawson 2002: 342; see also Mackie 1965). I argue that while 
some of these contextual conditions are closely related to the process of EU influ-
ence, such as when the EU actively promotes EU- type institutional change, others 
are not. For example, EU influence may occur when other organizations seek to 
solve a particular cooperation problem that the EU has successfully solved previ-
ously. In this case, the context that is (potentially) conducive to the operation of 
EU influence is the emergence of this cooperation problem—a factor exogenous 
to my model. This illustrates the general insight that often ‘causation resides in 
the interaction between the mechanism and the context in which it operates’ 
(Falleti and Lynch 2009: 3; see also Beach and Pedersen 2018: 847). Our know-
ledge of the contextual conditions that trigger the operation of a particular mech-
an ism tend to be incomplete—that is, a mechanism may be triggered by a variety 
of contextual conditions, only some of which are generally known.8 While much 
diffusion research still treats such potential contextual conditions as mere con-
trols, recent research increasingly seeks to model the interaction between diffu-
sion and domestic factors (see e.g. Aklin and Urpelainen 2014; Grigorescu 2010; 
Linos 2011). Qualitative research on diffusion especially shows the importance of 
context. In a study of norm diffusion in European ROs, for example, Jeff Checkel 
argues that ‘domestic politics—in particular, institutional and historical contexts—
delimit the causal role of persuasion/social learning’ (Checkel 2001: 553). What are 
the relevant contexts that enable EU influence on processes of regional institution 
building elsewhere?
I posit that contractual open- endedness is a key organizational characteristic 
that provides a context conducive to EU influence. Contractual open- endedness 
captures the extent to which the contract, upon which an RO rests, contains 
open- ended commitments—that is, commitments that do not clearly specify the 
8 Some even argue that mechanisms ‘are triggered under generally unknown conditions’ 
(Elster 1998: 45, my emphasis).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 30/04/21, SPi
72 Interorganizational Diffusion
purpose of the process of regional cooperation. ROs rest on a formal contract in 
which states voluntarily agree to bind themselves to a set of formal rules to facili-
tate cooperation. While all such contracts are incomplete to some extent, they 
vary in the extent to which they contain open- ended commitments. At one 
extreme, contracts are fixed in the sense that cooperation is geared towards 
achieving some predefined and specific goal, such as establishing a free- trade 
area. In these organizations, cooperation is a problem- solving exercise that helps 
governments to solve a well- delineated transnational problem. At the other 
extreme, contracts are open- ended in that the ultimate result of cooperation is 
vague and ill- defined. In this case, cooperation entails not only problem- solving 
but also community- building. ROs that define their purpose in vague terms 
engage the transnational problems that confront them by building and strength-
ening a regional community (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks  2019). Cooperation is 
intended to evolve over time, such that the process of cooperation has intrinsic 
value because the result is largely indeterminate.
Two examples illustrate the difference. First, NAFTA approximates a fixed con-
tract. The final goal of the cooperation ‘process’ is to create a free- trade area with 
a pre- defined scope that entails mainly free trade in goods, services, and invest-
ment (NAFTA 1992). Once this is achieved, the organization has fulfilled its pur-
pose; NAFTA is not intended as an organization that might develop beyond this 
state of affairs. The Andean Community, in contrast, rests on an open- ended 
contract where the ultimate ambition is ‘to strengthen the union of their peoples 
and to lay the foundations for advancing toward the formation of an Andean sub-
regional community’ (CAN 1996, preamble). This is an ill- defined purpose that is 
impossible, and unfeasible, to specify in terms of the steps to be taken from 
the outset.
This understanding of contractual incompleteness as open- ended commit-
ments deviates from the more conventional understanding, which captures the 
extent to which contracts ‘specify the full array of responsibilities and obligations 
of the contracting parties, as well as anticipate every future contingency that may 
arise throughout the course of the exchange relationship’ (Cooley and Spruyt 
2009: 8). This conventional understanding refers to the specificity of commit-
ments in ‘existing’ policy areas.9 Crucially, these two contractual characteristics 
do not necessarily co- vary. Even organizations based on open- ended commit-
ments start cooperation in specific policy areas, for which commitments might 
be relatively precise. For example, the founding contract of the Organizations 
of Eastern Caribbean States contains open- ended commitments regarding the 
ultimate purpose of the organization, but it also contains specific policy commit-
ments regarding the creation of a common market that are quite detailed, 
9 This is similar to the idea of precision as one dimension of the concept of legalization (Abbott 
et al. 2000).
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encompassing nearly 30 pages of text. Importantly, the creation of a common 
market is seen only as an initial step in a longer process towards creating a ‘closer 
union among the peoples of the East Caribbean’ (OECS 1968, preamble).
The character of an RO’s contract conditions the causal role of EU influence 
for both demand- and supply- side reasons. On the demand side, open- endedness 
gives rise to an endogenous capacity for institutional change as institutions adapt 
to evolving policy commitments over time, and this multiplies opportunities 
for EU influence. Open- ended commitments imply that governments find it 
impossible to predict the path that cooperation will take from the outset 
because it is not directed at achieving a particular goal. Instead, the attempt to 
address the problems that governments confront as a community over time 
generally requires adapting cooperative institutions in line with evolving needs 
(Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019). As a result, institutional change is likely to be 
more frequent in such organizations (Lenz et al. 2015). From this perspective, 
open- ended cooperation projects resemble nation- building processes in their 
lack of a master plan. Fixed contracts, in contrast, are bound to be inherently 
static. Their purpose is to engage in a well- specified range of activities that are 
detailed ex ante. Institutions, in this context, can be designed at the outset, and 
opportunities for the EU to shape the design process are diminished because 
institutional change will be less frequent.
On the supply side, ROs based on open- ended contracts share a fundamental 
organizational characteristic with the EU, which also rests on an open- ended 
contract, and this enables EU influence to operate because it renders analogies 
between these organizations more credible. A substantial literature in psychology, 
political science, and related fields shows that analogical reasoning is an im port-
ant source of human problem- solving because analogies are a powerful cognitive 
tool to comprehend the world (Blechman and Hart 1980; Khong 1992; Vosniadou 
and Ortony 1989; Zerubavel 1999; see also Sunstein 1993). It rests on the basic 
insight that ‘objects and events in the phenomenal world are almost never approached 
as if they were sui generis configurations but rather are assimilated into pre- 
existing structures in the mind of the perceiver’ (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 36). 
Analogical reasoning is an inductive form of reasoning and entails a (not neces-
sarily consciously conducted) mapping exercise (Gentner 1983), in which a new 
situation is matched with a familiar situation on the basis of some commonality, 
which is then used to make inferences about the new situation on the basis of 
other characteristics of the familiar situation. More abstractly, analogical 
reason ing ‘involves the transfer of relational information from a domain that 
already exists in memory [. . .] to the domain to be explained’ (Vosniadou and 
Ortony 1989: 6). For example, actors may puzzle over how to enhance compli-
ance with the cooperative rules in an RO (new situation), and they may turn to 
the EU for insights into how to deal with the situation because of some common-
ality between the organizations. Analogical reasoning suggests that the new 
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problem may be successfully tackled through the establishment of a standing 
court to which individuals have access. This example, though hypothetical, 
approximates the type of reasoning that empirical studies unravel as underpin-
ning the establishment of the Andean Court of Justice (Alter, Helfer, and 
Saldiás 2012).
When are such analogies with the EU likely to occur? What is the relevant 
commonality among ROs that endows analogies to the EU with some baseline 
credibility among social actors? I contend that an open- ended contract is 
the  defining organizational characteristic that structures and legitimizes 
 comparisons and thereby facilitates diffusion from the EU. The insight that 
structural commonalities facilitate diffusion is well established in sociology. 
Strang and Meyer note that the ‘cultural understanding that social entities 
belong to a common social category constructs a tie between them. [. . .] We 
argue that where actors are seen as falling into the same social category, diffu-
sion should be rapid’ (Strang and Meyer  1993: 490). Specifically, similarity 
with the EU in a key organizational characteristic has two consequences that 
delimit the causal role of EU influence. First, such similarity is likely to 
enhance the supply of EU- type institutional proposals in international negoti-
ations over institutional change because a larger number of relevant actors 
perceive them as relevant for their own organization. When an RO is engaged 
in a community- building process, learning from and emulating EU institu-
tions more readily suggests itself to actors who aim to solve regional cooperation 
problems. In contrast, when organizations pursue a narrow and well- defined 
purpose, analogies with the EU appear far- fetched and irrelevant to social 
actors, and can be expected to be rare(r).
Second, basic similarity with the EU as regards the nature of the contract 
enhances the chance that EU- type proposals are successfully advanced in inter-
nation al negotiations over institutional change in ROs. Parallels in key or gan iza-
tion al characteristics signal a baseline plausibility of analogies that aim to justify 
specific behavioural prescriptions. Credible analogies legitimize demands and 
thereby make it harder for opponents of the prescription resulting from an ana-
logy to reject that prescription. Such analogies are thus a powerful resource in 
the discursive struggle over institutional change (e.g. see Baccini and Koenig- 
Archibugi  2014; Linos  2013), and their strategic use can ‘trap’ opponents into 
concessions that they would not otherwise make (Schimmelfennig 2001). This 
applies with particular force in the case of organizations—such as ROs—that con-
stitute communities of fate, where negotiations are rarely pure power games but 
are based on diffuse reciprocity, involving ‘mutual concessions within the context 
of shared commitments and values’ (Keohane 1986: 4). In this context, obligation 
forms an important part of international negotiations, and credible analogies 
signal appropriate behaviour in parallel situations.
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In sum, organizations that provide more opportunities for EU influence on 
processes of regional institution building due to higher rates of institutional 
change, and that facilitate the legitimation of EU- type institutional proposals 
when advanced in international negotiations over institutional change, provide a 
more conducive context for EU influence to operate. In contrast, ROs that are 
largely static institutional creatures provide few opportunities for EU influence, 
and those that differ in key organizational characteristics hamper the credibility 
of EU- type institutional proposals, thereby providing a more hostile context for 
EU influence. I argue that contractual open- endedness is a fundamental or gan-
iza tion al characteristic that unites these contextual conditions, and thus consti-
tutes an important scope condition for EU influence.
Testable implications and alternative explanations
The diffusion framework developed in the previous sections generates a variety of 
testable implications, some of which are developed in this section. These are sub-
sequently subjected to systematic tests in the empirical chapters that follow. 
Implications concern each of the two pathways—active and passive—of EU influ-
ence as well as the stipulated scope condition. Each implication is developed in 
two steps. I first propose an explicit hypothesis that relates variation in under-
lying structural conditions to variation in outcomes. These hypotheses will be 
tested quantitatively in Chapter  4. Second, I derive a series of process- level 
observable implications. These form the basis of an examination of the causal 
processes underlying the influence of the EU in the case studies presented in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Hypothesis 1 (Active EU influence)
The more extensive active EU engagement is with other ROs, the more likely 
these ROs are to develop stronger regional institutions, ceteris paribus.
This hypothesis captures the basic structural relationship that underlies the path-
way of active EU influence. It posits that the pressure exerted by organizational 
pioneers increases as the pioneer itself becomes more active in promoting its 
institutional innovations abroad. Specifically, as the EU engages other ROs more 
intensively, it should also be more successful in shaping national governments’ 
institutional strategies in the negotiation over institutional change in the direc-
tion of EU institutions, both by socializing policy- makers elsewhere and by 
affecting their incentives to form stronger regional institutions. Thus, I expect the 
scope and intensity of direct interaction with the EU to affect regional institution 
building elsewhere.
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The pathway of active EU influence also generates a range of causal process 
observations.
 • Sequence. Changes in governments’ institutional strategies track engage-
ment with EU actors, including financial inducements and iterated inter-
action in common institutions that serve as opportunities for teaching and 
persuasion. In other words, diachronic variation exists between (change in) 
EU engagement and strategy change.
 • Process. Interaction with the EU induces strategy change on the part of rele-
vant actors, which subsequently translates into the bargaining positions of 
one or several governments. Governments that have been affected by EU- 
induced strategy change table proposals in institutional bargaining situ-
ations that suggest the creation of EU- type institutions.10 Verbal justifications 
of their position, either in public or in private, refer to changed institutional 
incentives induced by changes in EU policy, or by interaction with EU 
officials.
 • Outcome. Institutional bargaining leads to stronger regional institutions, 
which to some extent reflects the bargaining position of those governments 
with EU- type institutional strategies. Those governments and the EU itself 
will push for the speedy and effective operationalization of these institu-
tions, whereas governments that initially favoured weaker forms of institu-
tionalization will be more reluctant. Depending on the relative influence of 
these two camps, the operationalization of the institution may take time, 
and practices may deviate substantially from the formal rules that were col-
lectively agreed upon. In the most extreme case—that is, if the creation of an 
institution was induced primarily by EU incentives without genuine local 
support—the institution in question may be abolished again by member 
states once an opportunity arises or they become cognizant of particularly 
negative effects.
Hypothesis 2 (Passive EU influence)
As the EU enhances its institutional authority over time, other ROs are more 
likely to build stronger regional institutions, ceteris paribus.
This is a key implication of the EU’s passive influence on processes of regional 
institution building elsewhere. According to this pathway, the availability of 
information about EU institutions conditions processes of learning from and 
10 The underlying assumption here is that direct engagement with the EU leads to EU- type institu-
tional proposals being tabled by some governments. This assumption is not strictly necessary, but it is 
reasonable, and one that is confirmed in the empirical chapters.
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emulation of EU institutions elsewhere. When EU institutions change, information 
on those institutions tends to become more readily available for some time, due 
to increasing attention to the EU by global media outlets and by the academic 
community. Availability, in turn, is a key condition for EU- type institutional change.
The pathway of passive EU influence also generates a range of causal 
process- observations.
 • Sequence. Changes in governments’ institutional strategies track changes in 
the EU’s own institutional framework or contact with relevant epistemic 
actors who transmit information on EU- type institutions. These strategy 
changes subsequently translate into the bargaining positions of one or 
several governments.
 • Process. The creation of an EU- type institution is one proposal over which 
governments negotiate in institutional bargaining situations. Verbal justifi-
cations of their position, in public or in private, refer to inspiration from the 
EU, or outright admit to having adopted the creation of an EU- type institu-
tion as a bargaining position.
 • Outcome. Institutional bargaining leads to stronger regional institutions, 
which to some extent reflects the institutional position of those govern-
ments with EU- type institutional strategies.
Hypothesis 3 (Conditional EU influence)
The more open- ended the contract upon which a RO rests, the more likely it is 
that EU influence—both active and passive—will lead to stronger regional 
institutions.
This hypothesis captures the idea that some ROs are more likely than others to 
be susceptible to outside influence, including diffusion pressures from the EU, 
depending on the nature of their contracts. Not all organizations are similarly 
capable of evolving institutionally, and such variation is a function of the 
extent to which they contain open- ended commitments that may evolve over 
time, and therefore require institutional adaptation. Moreover, an open- ended 
contract constructs a tie between an RO and the EU, thereby facilitating the 
construction of credible institutional analogies that can be powerful discursive 
tools in the struggle over institutional change in international negotiations. 
Thus, I expect both active and passive influence from the EU to be conditional 
on the degree to which institutional change and credible analogical reasoning 
is possible.
Again, the hypothesized scope condition generates a range of causal process 
observations that can be traced empirically.
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 • In ROs based on open- ended contracts, EU influence is reflected in concrete 
institutional proposals and seriously debated in policy- relevant circles, 
whereas in ROs based on fixed contracts, references to the EU are largely 
abstract, are not reflected in concrete institutional proposals or seriously 
debated, or may not exist at all.
 • In ROs based on open- ended contracts, policy- relevant actors construct 
similarities with the EU and use them to justify EU- type institutional pro-
posals. Such proposals enjoy an a priori legitimacy given relevant simi lar-
ities between organizations. Conversely, in ROs based on fixed contracts, 
policy- relevant actors reject similarities with the EU and therefore reject 
such proposals, or do not even reach the stage of being seriously discussed 
among policy- relevant actors.
In the following chapters, I put these hypotheses to a systematic empirical test 
and explicitly recognize potential alternatives that may drive institutional change 
in ROs. Depending on the specific institution and the specific RO in question, 
relevant alternative explanations vary, in ways which I develop more fully in those 
chapters. However, the diffusion framework developed in this chapter challenges 
two broad sets of theoretical alternatives that share the assumption of independ-
ent policy- making across units. Specifically, emphasizing the role of or gan iza-
tion al pioneers in shaping regional institution building elsewhere involves the 
claim that such processes cannot be adequately understood by focusing on rele-
vant characteristics of ROs themselves (regional level of analysis) or on broader 
structural change in the system as a whole (global level of analysis). Regarding the 
former, unit- level explanations view institutional change in ROs as being driven 
by characteristics of the organizations themselves or the characteristics of the 
member states that form them. As described in the previous chapter, these 
ex plan ations encompass such intraregional factors as levels of democracy, the 
extent of economic interdependence within an organization, or the distribution 
of material capabilities among the member states. While such regional- level 
explanations may provide important insights into the process of regional institu-
tion building, the theoretical claim associated with a diffusion framework is that 
such explanations are insufficient to account for the phenomenon under study. 
Even when combined, they do not provide an adequate explanation.
Regarding the latter, a diffusion framework also rejects the notion that broader 
structural changes beyond direct and indirect interactions between ROs offer an 
adequate explanation of institutional change. In other words, systemic ex plan-
ations of regional institution building, such as the increasing integration of 
national economies associated with globalization or the end of the Cold War, are 
similarly irreducible to interorganizational influence. As Simmons et al. (2006) 
note in a pioneering volume on the diffusion of liberal economic policies, an 
explanation that emphasizes diffusion also rejects arguments that ‘tend to reduce 
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“external influences” to simple exogenous factors, notably changes in relative 
prices around the world’ (p. 788). In sum, explanations operating at the unit and 
systemic levels of analysis are the basic alternatives to a diffusion framework that 
focuses on inter- unit influences that result from interdependent decision- making 
between ROs.
However, the argument advanced here focuses specifically on the influence 
of the EU, and is therefore also distinct from alternative arguments about 
 diffusion that emphasize other interorganizational interactions. Despite shar-
ing the same conceptual foundations, arguments that highlight, say, the role of 
neighbouring ROs also constitute alternative explanations (see e.g. Börzel and 
Hüllen 2015). The chapters that follow will make an effort to distinguish the 
argument about EU influence not only from arguments focusing on unit- or 
system- level characteristics but also from alternative arguments about diffu-
sion. The quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, for example, also controls for the 
respective levels of regional and global institutionalization—arguments that 
are compatible with the idea of diffusion. Similarly, in the case study chapters, 
I distinguish whether certain institutional proposals had their origin in the EU 
or in other ROs with similar institutional features. However, caution is advised. 
It might well be that a government’s institutional bargaining position is the 
result of diffusion from a neighbouring RO that was affected by diffusion from 
the EU. As I have argued before, ‘EU ideational diffusion tends to work in 
 indirect ways, and can therefore be removed from the EU as a definable actor 
or even specifiable source of influence’ (Lenz 2013: 220). As the effects of diffu-
sion from the EU increase in order, it becomes increasingly difficult to trace 
them empirically. Solingen refers to this problem of higher- order effects when 
reminding readers:
as social reality is often even more complex, domestic conditions may themselves 
be the product of sedimentation of prior or historically more remote diffusion 
(legal norms, for instance, sometimes sediment over centuries). This should 
sensitize us to the possible presence of second- and third- order effects of 
antecedent diffusion even where no direct diffusion seems evident.
(Solingen 2012: 633)
Ultimately, practices that diffuse, whether from the EU or other sources, might 
become theorized in abstract terms. The power of theorization as a mechanism of 
diffusion lies in the fact that it turns diffusion into a rational choice (see 
Lenz 2018). It is very difficult to empirically identify the initial sources of such 
theorized practices. Therefore, the following empirical chapters will make an 
effort to distinguish the argument about EU influence from alternative arguments 
about diffusion, but the main theoretical alternatives considered refer to unit- and 
system- level factors.
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Conclusion
This chapter has laid out the analytical building blocks for the theoretical 
argument in this book. I argue that the EU systematically shapes the process of 
institution building in other ROs through both active engagement and the passive 
influence that stems from its own institutional designs and their evolution. These 
two pathways do not necessarily lead to the wholesale adoption of EU- type insti-
tutions, as much of the research on diffusion suggests; but they affect institutional 
outcomes by shaping the bargaining positions adopted by individual govern-
ments (or other key actors) in the negotiations over institutional change in ROs. 
However, this influence of the EU is bounded. I suggest that these two pathways 
are delimited in their causal role by the nature of an RO’s contract. Contracts that 
contain open- ended commitments possess an endogenous capacity for institu-
tional change, thereby providing more numerous opportunities for EU influence, 
and they signal similarity in key organizational characteristics that facilitate the 
construction of credible analogies with the EU, thereby making it more difficult 
for opponents of EU- type institutional change to reject such change outright. We 
will now consider how these arguments stand up empirically.
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Explaining the European Union’s 




In the previous chapter, I developed the main theoretical argument of this book: 
that the EU systematically shapes institution building in other ROs through 
interdependent decision- making. This interorganizational influence operates 
through two distinct pathways—active and passive influence—and is conditioned 
by the contractual nature of an RO.
In this chapter, I examine this argument quantitatively, using a novel dataset 
that gauges variation—cross- sectional and over time—in the institutionalization 
of 36 ROs, including the EU, from 1950 (or the time of their establishment) to 
2017. Quantitative statistical analysis allows me to determine whether the EU 
indeed shapes regional institution building across a large number of cases, how 
sizeable this influence is, and how it compares to that of other factors that have 
been argued to shape regional institution building. These include important 
explanations at the regional and global levels of analysis that have been advanced 
to account for institutional change in ROs, as well as alternative diffusion 
influences. In contrast to other quantitative studies of diffusion, my goal is not to 
adjudicate between different causal mechanisms. Recent research has shown that 
such attempts have proved difficult in quantitative research due to the challenge 
of matching indicators and concepts, and the fact that distinct mechanisms ‘are 
often interrelated’ empirically (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013: 695; Maggetti 
and Gilardi  2016). My analysis therefore focuses on measuring the conditions 
under which the two identified pathways of EU influence are likely to matter, and 
on assessing their explanatory power.
The analysis shows robust support for my argument, with two main findings. 
First, both the intensity of an RO’s engagement with the EU (active influence) and 
the EU’s own institutional trajectory (passive influence) are individually (and 
jointly) correlated with the level of institutionalization in other ROs. Second, 
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these effects are strongest in ROs that are based on contracts containing 
 open- ended commitments. Together, these findings suggest that the creation and 
subsequent institutional evolution of the EU has made a difference to the evolution 
of institutions in other ROs. Counterfactually, member states would have built 
less institutionalized ROs in the absence of the EU.
Preparing the ground: case selection, operationalization of the 
main variables, and initial quantitative analyses
The first step in any quantitative analysis is to construct an appropriate dataset. 
This task involves important conceptual and operational choices that are justified 
in this section. It proceeds in three parts. I discuss the dataset and the selection of 
cases; operationalize the dependent variable RO Institutionalization and the main 
independent variables capturing EU influence; and conduct some initial quantitative 
analyses.
Dataset and cases
My dataset draws on the Measure of International Authority (MIA) dataset devel-
oped by Liesbet Hooghe et al. (2017) in order to construct the main dependent 
variable of the analysis, but rearranges and extends the data to fit the current pur-
pose. The resulting dataset has the form of a panel, which means that data varies 
across time for a number of entities—i.e. ROs—and the panel is unbalanced 
because ROs enter the dataset at different points in time—namely, the year of 
their creation.
In that dataset, ROs are defined in conventional terms as formal international 
organizations (IOs) that are composed of three or more geographically proximate 
states having a continuous institutional framework. According to this definition, 
ROs are conceptually distinct from agreements such as the EU–Mercosur 
Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement, alliances such as the Cairns 
Group, and informal arrangements such as ASEAN+3. They are based on a written 
contract formally entered into by their member states; that is, they are designed for a 
continuous purpose and therefore have the capacity for ongoing collective decision- 
making. The sample was compiled by consulting the Correlates of War dataset and 
selecting organizations that have a distinct physical location or website, a formal 
structure (i.e. a legislative body, executive, and administration), at least 30 
permanent staff (based on information in the Yearbook of International 
Organizations), a written constitution or convention, and a decision- making 
body that meets at least once a year.
The dataset identified 36 ROs (including the EU itself) that fit all (or all but 
one) of these criteria and that do not emanate from other IOs. The dataset 
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includes most of the ROs that scholars of comparative regionalism are familiar 
with and that make up the bulk of the secondary literature, such as ASEAN, the 
Council of Europe, SADC, the African Union, NAFTA, the Andean Community, 
Mercosur, and the Caribbean Community, but also encompasses lesser- known 
cases, such as the South Pacific Commission, the Benelux Community, the Latin 
American Economic System, and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. 
Also forming part of the sample are two ROs that no longer exist—the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance and the first East African Community. The sam-
ple is broadly comprehensive of states and continents, and includes all ROs that 
have exercised significant authority since 1950.
The dataset measures variation in the design of these 36 ROs for the period 
between 1950 (or the year of their establishment) and 2017. Figure 4.1 shows 
the entry dates of all the ROs in the sample (and the end dates, where appro-
priate). ROs enter the dataset throughout the entire period while also reflect-
ing the trends and fashions of regionalism as an organizational form. Five 
organizations were created prior to or in 1950 and enter the dataset from the 
start; four ROs were founded in the 1950s (including the predecessor to the EU, 
the ECSC, in 1952); and ten followed in the 1960s—the decade with the high-
est activity in terms of newly created ROs during the entire period. Four new 
ROs emerged in the 1970s, which was a period of declining interest in region-
alism as an organizational form. This changed again in the 1980s: seven new 
ROs emerged during this decade and five new organizations followed in the 
1990s. The youngest organization in the sample is the Shanghai Cooperation 
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Figure 4.1 Sample of regional organizations, including entry (and end) dates
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Dependent variable: measuring regional institution building
This study analyses the European Union’s interorganizational influence on the 
process by which policy- makers in other ROs create and change regional institu-
tions. The dependent variable thus refers to the different permanent bodies that 
constitute an RO. The very definition of ROs eliminates substantial variation in 
basic institutional features. All or almost all of the organizations in the sample 
have the following: an independent secretariat possessing administrative functions; 
a standing body, generally composed of national ministers, that regularly convenes 
in order to adopt secondary legislation; and some form of executive body that 
supervises implementation. The vast majority of ROs also feature some form of 
dispute settlement body, and one comprising non- state actors such as parlia-
mentarians, business representatives, and/or non- governmental organizations. 
Whereas these features distinguish ROs from other international institutional 
frameworks such as agreements, alliances, or informal arrangements (for the 
distinction between formal and informal intergovernmental organizations, see 
Vabulas and Snidal 2013), they are insufficient to capture meaningful vari ation in 
institutional strength within this group.1 We therefore need to move beyond such 
basic measures of institutionalization to gauge variation in regional institution 
building—and the EU’s specific influence on it.
One way to do this is to construct a more fine- grained measure of institutional 
design that not only codes the existence/nonexistence of important institutional 
types but also seeks to estimate their competences in decision- making. Once the 
basic institutional framework of an RO has been set up during its founding years, 
subsequent institutional change regularly entails fine- tuning the competences of 
existing institutions rather than creating new ones. The measure used here focuses 
on those institutions that enjoy some degree of independence from member- state 
control, and thereby characterize ‘supranational’ elements in ROs. This is a key 
characteristic on which most conceptualizations of international institutional 
design converge (see e.g. Abbott and Snidal  1998; Haftel and Thompson  2006; 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2015). Specifically, such 
independence is often conceptualized as delegation, which can be defined as ‘a 
conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the lat-
ter to act on behalf of the former’ (Hawkins et al. 2006: 7; for an overview of rele-
vant concepts, see Hooghe and Marks  2015). The principals—i.e. the member 
states—retain ultimate control, but delegated agents enjoy a degree of autonomy 
that can, and often does, change over time. Thus conceived, regional in sti tu tion al-
iza tion is considered to be of major theoretical significance and is widely used 
in other empirical studies of ROs, preferential trade agreements, and global 
organizations. It is also a difficult case by which to assess EU influence, for several 
1 For example, almost all ROs in the sample are ‘interventionist organizations’ according to 
Boehmer et al. (2004), their highest category.
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reasons: institutionalization entails real costs for states (both material and in 
terms of national sovereignty); it enhances the danger of unanticipated 
 consequences occurring, due to agency slack; it is formalized, and thus visible 
rather than obscured; and it entails a certain permanence due to its inclusion in 
inter nation al treaties that are difficult to change.
The dependent variable ‘RO institutionalization’ is an additive index that 
captures the extent to which member states create four generic types of regional 
institutions—general secretariats, parliamentary bodies, judicial bodies, and 
consultative bodies—that are not composed of member- state representatives and 
that formally endow these institutions with the competences to aid in regional 
decision- making or dispute adjudication. The measure assesses the formal rules 
that can be observed in treaties, constitutions, conventions, special statutes, 
proto cols, and rules of procedure—in other words, rules which can be specified 
independent of actual behaviour. The strength of each of these types of institution 
is measured on an additive scale and then normalized. The four components are 
added together and the final score is normalized again, generating a score of 
regional institutional strength for each year of a given RO’s existence. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the aggregate measure is 0.91, indicating very high internal 
consistency. Below, I discuss each component in turn and give examples from the 
sample of ROs while excluding the EU itself (N=35). Further detail on the coding 
scheme is provided in Appendix A.
The first component is general secretariats. They provide the backbone of an 
RO and form the principal focus of work on IOs and their independence (Barnett 
and Finnemore  2004; Bradley and Kelley  2008; Hawkins et al.  2006; Johnson 
2013). As Abbott and Snidal (1998) noted, ‘the very existence of a centralized sec-
retariat implies some operational autonomy’ (p. 9). General sec re tar iats tend to be 
the most institutionally stable RO body and the most predictably supranational. 
Staffed with independent experts, such a supranational bureaucracy can be 
characterized as ‘a permanent technical or administrative body that manages the 
operation of the IO on a regular basis’ (Haftel and Thompson 2006: 260). Some of 
these management tasks include running the RO’s headquarters, organizing meet-
ings, and maintaining records, but some secretariats also have agenda- setting and 
executive competences. Secretariats can significantly enhance the efficiency of 
regional cooperation by supporting state interactions and providing operational 
activities in the implementation of programmes and policy. Specifically, they may 
structure agendas, facilitate interstate bargaining, frame strategic plans, and pro-
vide background research (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Hawkins et al. 2006; Hooghe 
and Marks  2015). Their main functions, then, are to facilitate member- state 
decision- making and to execute policy. With the sole exception of the High 
Authority of the ECSC (1952–6), general secretariats do not adopt policy.2
2 There might be exceptions with regard to certain administrative acts, but these are generally 
adopted within the narrow confines of secondary legislation adopted by member states.
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The institutional strength of general secretariats is measured on the basis of an 
11- point scale that assesses: (1) whether an independent secretariat exists (one 
dimension); (2) whether it has agenda- setting competences in six decision areas: 
accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non- 
compliance, and policy- making (six dimensions); (3) whether it can initiate for-
mal proceedings against a member state that is in non- compliance with the rules 
of an RO (one dimension); (4) whether it holds a monopoly of policy initiation 
(one dimension); and (5) whether it (exclusively) holds executive powers such as 
framing multi- year strategic plans or turning general legislation into directives or 
executive orders (two dimensions). Almost all of the ROs in the dataset have an 
independent general secretariat with infrastructural functions, even though it 
sometimes takes a few years after an organization’s founding to set it up. However, 
the extent to which the secretariat facilitates member- state bargaining, monitors 
compliance, and carries out executive functions varies considerably. For example, 
while general secretariats in 29 ROs can set the agenda on budget and/or policy, 
only three secretariats hold an exclusive right to initiative. Moreover, only seven 
ROs endow secretariats with agenda- setting competences in three or more deci-
sion areas; only six empower them to bring non- compliance suits against member 
states; while secretariats in 14 ROs hold executive powers, a competence that is 
exclusive in only two organizations.
The second component is parliamentary bodies, which are institutionalized 
forums for regular deliberation among elected representatives. Parliamentary 
bodies are distinctive as an institutional form in that they are not designed pri-
marily to enhance the efficiency of regional cooperation, but are ‘forum[s] for 
ensuring democratic accountability’ (Cutler 2001: 224). Unlike general sec re tar-
iats, expert advisory bodies, or courts, they do not lower the transaction costs of 
international cooperation or provide expert knowledge that facilitates the design 
of legislation or the monitoring and enforcing of agreements (Lenz, Burilkov, and 
Viola 2019: 1096- 97). Instead, parliamentary bodies tend to be principals them-
selves in that they represent the electorate of the member states alongside govern-
ments and their ‘political and policy preferences are prone to being misaligned 
with the preferences of IOs’ intergovernmental bodies because IPIs [international 
parliamentary institutions] often include opposition parties and change their 
composition as a result of national elections taking place at different points in 
time in the member states’ (Rocabert et al. 2019: 611). Parliamentary bodies serve 
an important legitimating function in regional cooperation (Lenz, Burilkov, and 
Viola 2019; Schimmelfennig et al. 2020).
The institutional strength of regional parliamentary bodies is measured on the 
basis of a nine- point scale that assesses: (1) whether such bodies exist and have a 
formal status within the RO (two dimensions); (2) whether they are directly 
elected (one dimension); and (3) whether they hold agenda- setting and/or 
 legislative competences in the aforementioned decision areas of accession, 
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 suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non- compliance, 
and policy- making (six dimensions). Approximately half of the ROs in the sample 
feature a parliamentary body (N=19), which also tends to be assigned formal 
status within an RO over time. However, their formal competences tend to be 
weak. Only three parliamentary bodies have legislative competences in at least 
one decision area, generally in policy- making. Agenda- setting powers are more 
widespread, with nine parliaments holding them in at least one decision area. 
Only two of those nine parliaments hold agenda- setting powers in more than two 
decision areas. Directly elected parliamentary bodies are also rare: only two 
organizations have them. According to this measure, parliamentary bodies tend 
to be significantly weaker than general secretariats in ROs.
The third component is other non- state bodies, which are other collective bodies 
composed of non- state actors that facilitate state decision- making in an RO. Their 
composition may vary, ranging from representatives of business and labour via 
technical experts or representatives of indigenous peoples to non- governmental 
organizations. These bodies may serve both legitimation and efficiency purposes. 
They can give a voice to powerful or marginalized social groups that have a stake 
in regional cooperation, and they can serve to tap the information and expertise 
held by other non- governmental actors to improve decision- making and enhance 
implementation (Tallberg et al. 2013). As with general secretariats, such bodies 
generally do not have legislative competences.
The institutional strength of other non- state bodies is measured on the basis of 
an eight- point scale that assesses: (1) whether such bodies exist and have a formal 
status within the RO (two dimensions); and (2) whether they have agenda- setting 
competences in six decision areas: accession, suspension, constitutional reform, 
budgetary allocation, financial non- compliance, and policy- making (six 
dimensions). The measure codes up to two different non- state bodies, even 
though a few organizations have more than that; in such cases, I coded the most 
institutionalized ones. When there are separate labour and business councils, 
I  coded them as one because they tend to be integrated in most organizations 
(again choosing the more institutionalized one). About two- thirds of ROs today 
have some kind of other non- state body (N=22), but only nine organizations have 
two (or more) such bodies. Almost three- quarters of these have formal consultative 
status (N=16). Thus, these bodies are somewhat more widespread than parlia-
mentary bodies, but their competences are more limited. Only nine non- state 
bodies hold agenda- setting competence (40 per cent, compared to 50 per cent in 
parliamentary bodies, not counting those with legislative competences), and all of 
them are confined to a single decision area, generally policy- making. Among 
parliamentary bodies, in contrast, in nine ROs they hold agenda- setting or 
 legislative  powers in at least two decision areas.
The fourth component is judicial bodies. Judicial bodies are expert bodies that 
adjudicate disputes among member states, enforce compliance with the rules of 
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an RO, and ensure the authoritative and impartial application of RO law (Smith 
2000; Abbott et al. 2000; Alter and Hooghe 2016). Dispute resolution may be con-
ceived as a distinct reason to delegate to an independent institution in order to 
secure the social benefits of cooperation (Hawkins et al. 2006: 17). Disputes tend 
to arise due to the incomplete nature of RO law. In many ROs, dispute settlement 
is a multi- stage process consisting of political negotiations, mediation, con cili-
ation, arbitration, and adjudication. The measure focuses on legalized dispute 
settle ment that involves an independent third party—i.e. arbitration and adjudi-
cation. It conceives of legal dispute settlement as a continuum from low to high 
legalization (see Smith 2000).
The institutional strength of regional judicial bodies is measured on the basis 
of a seven- point scale that assesses (based on McCall Smith 2000 and Hooghe et al. 
2017) whether the dispute settlement system is obligatory; whether it is auto-
matic; how the tribunal is composed; whether adjudication is binding; whether 
non- state actors have access; whether there is a remedy for non- compliance with 
a ruling; and whether there is a preliminary ruling system of national court refer-
rals. When there are two separate dispute settlement streams, the more legalized 
one is coded. Approximately two- thirds of ROs have an automatic third- party 
dispute settlement system today (N=24) and grant access to private actors (N=23). 
More than half of ROs feature dispute settlement systems that are obligatory 
(N=17) (i.e. a member state cannot opt out), and involve a standing tribunal 
(N=18). Adjudication is fully binding on member states in 18 ROs, and some 
form of remedy exists in 18 organizations. Preliminary rulings exist in only 10 
ROs and rulings only take direct effect in eight organizations. While there is some 
diversity in these features, they tend to be hierarchically ordered (Smith 2000; 
Kono 2007; Jo and Namgung 2012; Hooghe et al. 2013).
Figure 4.2 gives a sense of the sample variation of the aggregate measure of RO 
institutionalization. The darkly shaded boxplots cover the inter- quartile range 
from the 25th to the 75th percentiles, and the lighter extensions indicate the full 
range of values; the dot designates the mean score over the entire period. The fig-
ure shows that ROs vary strongly in their degree of institutionalization, both 
cross- sectionally and over time. Variation between ROs reaches from the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with a mean value of 0.02 and the 
South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with a mean value of 
0.09 to the Andean Community (CAN) with a mean value of 0.51. The other ROs 
are distributed fairly evenly between these two poles. In the lower third of the 
distribution are ROs as diverse as the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Latin American 
Economic System (SELA). The upper third of the sample also contains a diverse 
set of ROs, including the new East African Community (EAC2), the Benelux 
Community, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The large majority of ROs change 
their institutional frameworks over time (N=33, 91 per cent), as indicated by 
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the extended boxplots; only three are static entities. However, the extent of 
institutional change varies widely across organizations. Some of the most dynamic 
en tities are the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), SADC, and ECOWAS. However, 
 others change only very little over time, despite having been founded long ago; 
such organizations include the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Nordic 
Council (NordC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
and SCO. Organizations that change little tend to be ‘stuck’ at low levels of in sti tu-
tion al iza tion. This implies the observation that change in regional in sti tu tion al-
iza tion is almost uniformly upwards. There are several instances of change that 
diminish institutionalization over time (see also Figure 1.2), the most prominent 
of which may be the abolition of the SADC Tribunal discussed in Chapter  5. 
However, not a single RO has a lower level of institutionalization in 2017 than it 
did in its founding period. Over the entire lifespan of an RO, the net effect of 
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Figure 4.2 Sample variation in RO Institutionalization
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Operationalizing European Union influence
According to the diffusion framework outlined in the previous chapter, EU influ-
ence operates through two distinct pathways: it can actively support the in sti tu-
tion al iza tion of ROs through direct engagement with other ROs (active influence), 
and its own institutional evolution might shape regional institutionalization else-
where in more indirect ways (passive influence). I discuss their operationalization 
in turn.
Active EU influence is operationalized through an aggregate index that meas-
ures the EU’s institutionalized engagement with other ROs. I construct an index, 
EU Engagement, that consists of three components, each of which is designed to 
capture the various ways in which the EU may actively shape regional institution 
building elsewhere. The index is quantitative, and the components are normal-
ized and weighted equally in the aggregate index. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.863, 
which indicates high scalability.
The first of the three components is the EU’s financial support to other ROs, 
which is the main way in which the Community shapes incentives for institutional 
change. EU funding is an ordinal variable (with four categories) that captures the 
amount of funding directed to a specific RO in a given year, encompassing both 
institutional and project support (x = EU funding to RO; x < 1 million €; 1 < x < 4 
million €; 4 < x < 8 million €; x > 8 million €). Funding streams were coded on the 
basis of a variety of official documents, primarily issued by the EU itself, such as 
regional strategy papers and interregional funding agreements. This data was 
augmented with information from the ROs themselves—for example, in the form 
of press statements, website entries, or meeting records that document significant 
EU funding streams. By 2017, 43 per cent of the organizations had not received 
any funding from the EU during their lifespan, including the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), the GCC, the Latin American Economic System, the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and SCO. Amongst the most heavily 
funded organizations are the Council of Europe, Mercosur, the Andean Community, 
and SADC.
The second component is EU interregional cooperation agreements, which are 
a more indirect way in which EU engagement shapes incentives for institutional 
change. Institutionalized cooperation measures the policy scope and obligation of 
all of the EU’s agreements with other ROs in the dataset, based on the assumption 
that interregional agreements with a wider policy scope and a higher degree of 
obligation are more likely to exert stronger effects of institutional feedback. An 
interregional agreement’s policy scope is assessed based on a list of 29 policy 
areas, adapted from Lenz et al. (2015), in order to account for the specificities of 
interregional cooperation. Cooperation is recorded in a specific policy area when 
the agreement explicitly codifies substantive cooperation in the main body of the 
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agreement. The binding nature of cooperation is assessed on a three- point scale 
that measures the nature of obligations associated with cooperation (non- binding 
vs binding) as well as the existence of interregional monitoring institutions, which 
forms the highest category of obligation. The institutionalized cooperation score 
is the product of the two standardized components of policy scope and obliga-
tion. I assess a total of 15 agreements that between them involve nine different 
ROs. This assessment excludes recent Interim Economic Partnership Agreements 
with African subregions because these tend to include only a subset of members. 
At the low end of the spectrum are agreements with the GCC (1989) and the 
Andean Pact (1983), both of which are relatively narrow in scope and involve no 
binding commitments. At the other end of the spectrum are agreements with the 
Central American Integration System (2003) and the African Union (2007), both 
of which involve binding commitments.
The third component is the frequency of institutionalized contact between the 
EU and an RO, which is widely used as a proxy for opportunities for teaching and 
persuasion in quantitative studies (Bearce and Bondanella 2007: 71–13). EU con-
tact is a count of instances of institutionalized contact between EU representa-
tives and their counterparts in a given year across three levels: (1) ministers and 
heads of state, (2) parliamentarians, and (3) technical experts, including repre-
sentatives of the European Commission. The count assumes a value of three when 
all three sets of actors met in a given year, and zero when none of them met—or 
when no institutionalization of contact took place. Contacts were coded on the 
basis of a variety of documents, such as meeting programmes, draft agendas, cal-
endars, ‘history documents’ of delegations with specific ROs, joint or final com-
muniqués of interregional meetings, and annual reports. This data was augmented 
by website entries and written information elicited by email. The EU has had 
institutionalized contact with 23 out of the 35 organizations in the dataset, but the 
frequency and intensity of such contact has varied strongly. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, interregional meetings between technical experts are the most frequent 
overall, followed by meetings between parliamentarians. In terms of organiza-
tions, the most frequent contacts are with EFTA and the African Union. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the EU has some contact with both the Organization 
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the Organization of 
American States, but these are rather low- level and much less frequent than those 
in the upper categories.
The second key explanatory variable is passive EU influence, which I operation-
alize as the evolution of the degree of institutionalization in the EU, coded in the 
same way as for other ROs.3 As shown in Figure 4.3, EU institutionalization has 
3 This is an imperfect indicator in two important ways. Empirically, it only captures over- time vari-
ation and not cross- sectional variation. Philosophically, this indicator it not (strictly speaking) a 
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increased steadily over time, with the exception of the transition from the ECSC 
towards the European Economic Community in the years following 1957.4 This 
was most apparent between the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and the 1999 Treaty of 
Amsterdam, after which it tapers off. Figure 4.3 also shows that the EU retains, by 
some margin, the highest level of institutionalization throughout the entire 
period, which provides the rationale for expecting the EU’s level of in sti tu tion al-
iza tion, at any given point in time, to lead other ROs to create stronger regional 
institutions. Nevertheless, the ROs with the maximum values clearly approach 
the EU’s level of institutionalization over time; in fact, the RO with the highest 
value in 2017, the Andean Community, reached the EU’s level of in sti tu tion al iza-
tion in the 1970s. This also holds, albeit to a lesser extent, for the ROs in the high-
est quartile, and especially for the period since the early 1990s. In this upper 
range we see some convergence in levels of institutionalization, understood 
broadly as institutional developments in a broadly similar direction but with 
relational measure but one that gauges a substantive characteristic of the unit of interest, the EU. Thus, 
it conforms more closely to the substantive style of analysis than to a relational style of analysis (even 
though the empirical analysis regresses this indicator on the institutionalization of other ROs, thereby 
entailing a measure of inter- unit dynamics). A better indicator would seek to capture the differential 
reception of EU institution building in other ROs, perhaps through media or discourse analysis. I seek 
to uncover this reception qualitatively in the case studies.































Figure 4.3  EU institutionalization and RO Institutionalization
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different magnitudes. This is not the case for the mean evolution of regional in sti-
tu tion al iza tion, which runs largely in parallel with the EU’s institutional trajec-
tory. In the lower parts of the distribution, we see very modest movement.
Initial quantitative analyses: bivariate relationships
With these operationalizations of the dependent and main independent variables 
in place, we can start to explore relationships between them. The basic claim is 
that the EU systematically shapes institution building in other ROs, both actively 
and passively. This claim implies both that the EU’s own institutional evolution 
should affect the institutional evolution of ROs elsewhere (passive influence) and 
that more intensive engagement with the EU will lead to more strongly institu-
tionalized ROs elsewhere (active influence). These are falsifiable claims. If EU 
influence does not matter, we should not see systematic variation in institutional 
evolution in line with the EU’s own development, and ROs’ levels of in sti tu tion al-
iza tion should look identical, on average, across different levels of EU engagement.
I start by exploring the EU’s active influence on regional institution building. 
A  key implication of the theoretical argument is that ROs that engage more 
closely with the EU should display higher levels of institutionalization. Table 4.1 
confirms this expectation. It shows that higher categories of EU engagement are, 
without exception, associated with higher levels of regional in sti tu tion al iza tion 
across different time periods. These differences across categories, which have 
been confirmed by a t- test, are highly statistically significant, indicating that it is 
unlikely that they are the result of chance alone. Remarkably, ROs that engage 
closely with the EU—a phenomenon of the post- Cold War era—display levels of 
institutionalization that are around 50 per cent higher than those of ROs that 
have little contact with the EU, and twice as high as organizations that have no 
contact at all with the EU. In substantive terms, the average difference between no 
active EU engagement and high active EU engagement amounts to the difference 
of having a general secretariat with a non- exclusive right to initiate legislation and 
draft the budget, a body composed of non- state representatives with formal 
consultative status, and a third- party dispute settlement mechanism with ad hoc 
arbitrators and rulings that are conditionally binding. This is a large substantive 
difference in institutionalization. Table  4.1 also indicates that the EU’s engage-
ment with other regions has gradually expanded. Whereas engagement was very 
limited until 1970, it started expanding significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, the extensive support for ROs that we see today in organizations such 
as Mercosur, SADC, and the African Union only started in the 1990s.
I now turn to an initial exploration of the relationship between the EU’s own 
institutional development and levels of institutionalization in other ROs—what 
I term ‘passive EU influence’. Simple time- series models allow us to gauge whether 
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there is a relationship between these two variables. Table  4.2 shows that the 
bi vari ate relationship is strongly statistically significant. Thus, there is a system-
atic positive relationship between the EU’s level of  in sti tu tion al iza tion and the 
mean level of institutionalization among the other ROs.
These bivariate quantitative analyses offer initial evidence for the claim that 
the  EU systematically shapes the process of institution building in other ROs. 
However, a more rigorous test must ensure that these associations are not spurious. 
It would have to control for alternative explanations of the outcome and deal with 
the problem of endogeneity—i.e. the danger that correlation does not  indicate 
causation.
Modelling the conditions of European Union influence:  
a multivariate analysis
The clear bivariate patterns that the previous quantitative analyses unearthed pro-
vide initial support for Hypotheses 1 (active EU influence) and 2 (passive EU 
influence), but do not take into account the potential limitations on the scope 
of the theory or consider potential alternative explanations. As discussed in 






Mean with  
low EU  
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Δ Mean with  
medium EU  
engagement





1950–1980 0.137 0.155 0.057*** None   None  
1980–2000 0.176 0.183 0.007* 0.290 0.114*** None  
2000–2017 0.239 0.298 0.058*** 0.384 0.145*** 0.466 0.226***
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.






Number of observations 66
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3, the diffusion framework posits that certain types of RO should be 
particularly susceptible to the influence of the EU—namely, those based upon 
contracts that contain open- ended commitments. In addition, most studies of 
regional institutions posit explanatory factors that are located below and above 
the interorganizational level of analysis: they emphasize specific characteristics of 
ROs themselves (regional factors), or influences flowing from the international 
system as a whole (global factors). Therefore, a more rigorous empirical test of the 
relationship between the EU and the institutionalization of other ROs must con-
sider these alternatives.
Multivariate statistical models are suited to examining the relative explanatory 
power of a variety of potential explanatory factors, and to ascertaining whether 
the influence of the EU continues to predict variation in regional in sti tu tion al iza-
tion after alternative explanations have been taken into account. In particular, 
models that include multiple variables can estimate how an RO’s degree of in sti tu-
tion al iza tion differs between organizations that are identical in terms of add-
ition al factors but ‘exposed’ to different levels of both EU engagement and the 
EU’s own institutional evolution. Moreover, such models allow for an analysis of 
interaction effects. After discussing and operationalizing the hypothesized scope 
condition and the main alternative explanations, I present the model and the 
results of the multivariate analysis.
Operationalizing the scope condition ‘contractual open- endedness’
I start by operationalizing the scope condition ‘contractual open- endedness’. In 
the absence of prior measures, I measure this scope condition as a trichotomous 
variable that taps the extent to which the commitments that member states 
engage in are open- ended. There are two key dimensions of open- endedness, 
which I combine into a single indicator (see Table  4.3). The first is the open- 
endedness of the policy scope, which I assess on the basis of the stipulated 
objectives of cooperation. This dimension distinguishes organizations with a 
concrete and narrow organizational objective (fixed)—for example OAPEC, 
whose principal aim lies in ‘the cooperation of the members in various forms of 
economic activity in the petroleum industry’ (OAPEC 1968, Art. 2)—from 
Table 4.3. Measuring contractual open- endedness
Type of contract Policy scope Actor scope
Open- ended Open- ended Open- ended
Intermediate Open- ended Fixed
Fixed Fixed Fixed
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those that pursue only a vague and broad- based objective vis- à- vis cooperation 
(open- ended)—such as the SCO, whose aim is ‘to consolidate multidisciplinary 
cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability 
in the region’ and to ‘facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, 
social and cultural development in the region through joint action on the basis of 
equal partnership’ (SCO 2002, Art. 1).
The second key dimension is that of the open- endedness of actor scope, which 
I assess based on whether the treaties emphasize national sovereignty and make 
reference to governments, member states, or countries as the only relevant 
actors. It distinguishes state- centred organizations (fixed) from those that pro-
vide for the potential participation of a wider group of actors in the cooperation 
process (open- ended). State- centred organizations achieve cooperation objectives 
through intergovernmental cooperation, wherein national governments are the 
only legitimate actors. This is reflected in the fact that treaties regularly emphasize 
national sovereignty and make continuous reference to governments, member 
states, or countries as the only relevant actors. Organizations with a more open- 
ended actor scope do not have these characteristics. Actors encompass loosely 
defined representatives of ‘the people’ as well as national governments. Such 
organizations typically include transformational commitments vis- à- vis their 
societies, which are expressed in references made to a ‘union of peoples’, a ‘com-
munity of peoples’, or an ‘ever- closer union’.
At the time of their founding, the 36 ROs in my sample were divided in roughly 
equal parts across the three categories identified in Table 4.3. While an organiza-
tion can change its degree of contractual open- endedness over time, this is quite 
rare. I code six single- interval moves towards greater open- endedness. The ana lysis, 
presented below, uses the original contracts for the purpose of this investigation.
Alternative explanations and control variables
The first set of alternative explanations concerns explanatory factors located at the 
regional level of analysis. The structural characteristics of units are typically 
the null hypothesis of diffusion studies. The analysis considers several controls 
internal to each RO, including the most important explanations for international 
institutional change in general.
Intraregional trade. Perhaps the most firmly grounded expectation in the 
literature is that international institution building should co- vary with economic 
interdependence (Haftel 2013; Keohane 1984). Economic exchange develops its 
welfare- improving potential to the fullest with stable, predictable property rights. 
Hence, trade that traverses international borders creates a demand for co ord in ation 
among states in order to provide uniform rules. Reducing barriers to cross- border 
trade is a core rationale of many ROs; therefore, one might expect that the growth 
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of trade interdependence within an RO leads to greater in sti tu tion al iza tion. 
I  measure trade interdependence, ‘intra- RO trade’, as a region’s total trade 
(imports plus exports) as a proportion of member countries’ total trade.
Power asymmetry. Scholars in the tradition of Waltzian neorealism hypothesize 
that powerful states reject strong institutionalization because it inhibits unilateral 
action, and instead prefer intergovernmental arrangements: ‘[F]orms of legaliza-
tion that involve limited delegation [. . .] provide the crucial basis for cooperation 
between the weak and the strong’ (Abbott and Snidal  2000: 448). Conversely, 
hegemonic stability theory suggests that an unequal distribution of power may 
expedite the provision of public goods because the dominant state can internalize 
its benefits and be willing to pay the costs (Krasner 1976; Mattli 1999). Moreover, 
a hegemon may find the rule of law useful in eliciting the compliance of weaker 
members. I control for these possibilities with a measure of power dispersion—
Power asymmetry—that is the ratio of the material capabilities of the most power-
ful member state to the average of all other members. The Composite Index of 
National Material Capabilities (CINC) Version 4.0 provides a summary measure 
of military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel 
production, urban population, and total population for individual countries 
(Singer 1988; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).
Members. The degree of institutionalization within an organization might be 
sensitive to the size of its overall membership base. As the number of members 
grows, decentralized cooperation in the absence of centralized institutions may 
become more costly as a result of issue- cycling and increasing informational 
asymmetry (Hawkins et al.  2006; Hooghe and Marks  2015). This grounds the 
hypothesis, drawn from the rational design literature, that ‘centralization of infor-
mation is [. . .] increasingly valuable with larger numbers’ (Koremenos, Lipson, 
and Snidal  2001: 789). I measure ‘members’ as the natural log of the absolute 
number of member states in a given year, assuming that the effect of one add-
ition al member joining declines as the absolute number increases.
Democracy. Norms of appropriate behaviour in democratic states—or, alterna-
tively, the political context in newly democratizing countries—may render elites 
more willing to delegate to IOs (Risse- Kappen 1995; Grigorescu 2015). An impli-
cation of the findings of the democratic peace literature is that autocracies are 
more likely than democracies to be fearful of exploitation. In particular, newly 
democratizing states may use international institutions as external commitment 
devices (Moravcsik 2000). I measure ‘democracy’ as the annual Combined Polity 
Score in the Polity IV dataset.
Per capita GDP. Finally, I control for the mean per capita GDP of member 
states in an RO in a given year on the premise that the richer the members, the 
greater the demand for international cooperation and, correspondingly, the 
degree of regional institutionalization. Accordingly, I measure the log of the mean 
per capita GDP of member states to account for the great variance in this control.
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The second set of alternative explanations concerns explanatory factors located 
at the global level of analysis. Especially more recent literature in comparative 
regionalism has emphasized the influence of systemic processes that impact ROs 
‘from above’.
Globalization. Perhaps the most firmly grounded expectation on systemic 
influences on regional institutionalization emphasize the influence of globaliza-
tion. As economic, social, and political exchanges that cross national borders 
grow, a variety of actors are likely to engage in cooperative endeavours in order to 
manage such interdependencies. In particular, the ‘New Regionalism’ literature 
emphasizes that ROs are often created in order to manage such globalization pro-
cesses (for an overview, see Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). The institutionalization 
of regional bodies by state governments might also follow this logic. I divulge the 
impact of ‘globalization’ through the widely used KOF Index of Globalization, 
which captures the economic, social, and political connections that countries 
have with the rest of the world (1970–2017) (Dreher 2006). I include an aggre-
gated measure based on the RO mean of each member state’s globalization score 
for a given year.
Cold War. Various other developments that one might expect to affect regional 
institutionalization cluster at the end of the Cold War, and I introduce a time 
dummy (0 = post- 1990) to nullify their potential confounding effects. The end 
of intense ideologically driven bipolar competition created new demands for 
regional cooperation, ones that might be reflected in deeper institutionalization 
(Hurrell 1995a). The end of the Cold War also roughly coincides with a stalemate 
in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. As the prospects for continued multilateral trade 
liberalization appeared bleak by the late 1980s, states turned towards regional 
options instead—a development that may have led to (the creation of) institu-
tionally more ambitious ROs.
Regional diffusion. In order to distinguish EU influence from alternative diffu-
sion influences, I include a regional diffusion measure. The diffusion literature 
suggests that patterns of diffusion cluster among neighbouring countries or adja-
cent ROs; that is, there is a strong geographic element to diffusion processes 
(Brinks and Coppedge  2006; Weyland  2008: 283). Neighbouring states, and 
therefore also neighbouring ROs, tend to be in particularly close contact and 
regularly exchange relevant information; they also tend to share important cul-
tural characteristics, which are likely to enhance the credibility and potential rele-
vance of the information they receive (Simmons and Elkins  2004). Moreover, 
ROs within specific geographic regions tend to display significant overlaps in 
membership, which may lead to similar institutional changes (see e.g. Holzinger, 
Knill, and Sommerer  2008; Panke and Stapel  2018). In order to capture such 
‘neighbourhood’ effects, I measure ‘regional diffusion’ as the average level of 
in sti tu tion al iza tion of all neighbouring ROs in the same geographic region 
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(the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia)—with the exception of 
the RO in question.
Diffusion may also operate at the global rather than the regional level. Sociological 
institutionalists in particular expect ROs, as a distinct category of organization, to 
become more similar in their institutional structure over time due to the emer-
gence of a norm of ‘acceptable’ forms of institutionalization (Powers and Goertz 
2011; DiMaggio and Powell  1983). I tap into such processes by measuring the 
average level of institutionalization in the sample in a given year, again with the 
exception of the specific RO in question. Given that the variable ‘global diffusion’ 
highly correlates with regional diffusion (r=0.83), and furthermore is autocor-
related with ‘regional diffusion’, I include the former variable in a series of 
robustness checks.
Summary statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables used in the ana lysis 
are contained in Appendix B.
Model specification
With regard to model specification, I select panel data OLS regression as the most 
appropriate. Institutionalization theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, but it is a con-
tinuous variable, with a maximum in the dataset of 0.67. Therefore, logit and pro-
bit models, designed respectively for categorical and ordinal dependent variables, 
are not appropriate. Furthermore, I include models that incorporate all right- 
hand- side variables for robustness purposes. ROs do not all appear at the same 
time, and thus the data is unbalanced, necessitating the adoption of a fixed- effects 
model, confirmed by a Hausman test (Greene 2008). As panel data often raises 
the issue of non- stationary unit roots and trending, a Fisher- type test with an 
advanced Dickey–Fuller component (Becketti  2013) was used to detect their 
presence, and in order to mitigate their impact, differencing and detrending were 
used. Furthermore, robust standard errors are used in the estimations.
The main analysis does not lag the independent variables, for several reasons. 
For one, EU influence may cause regional institutionalization even when it does 
not temporally precede it. The reason is that EU decisions to engage with other 
actors or to change its own institutions are discussed and often decided upon long 
before they are actually implemented. For example, the entry into force of an 
interregional cooperation agreement can often be anticipated several years in 
advance, and may already exert causal effects even before it starts operating. The 
same holds for the entry into force of a new EU treaty (passive influence). Given 
that change in EU influence is generally anticipated, the moment in time when I 
record its value generally follows the moment in time when it may start generating 
causal effects, rendering lags superfluous. This is further compounded, in the case 
of EU engagement, by the fact that this form of EU influence is deeply rooted in 
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history, as I showed in Chapter 2. While specific levels of EU engagement can and 
do change over time, decisions about engagement as such are often taken during 
the founding phase of an organization—sometimes before its formal constitution—
and are strongly conditioned by former colonial ties (Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 
2005). In line with this argument, a reverse causality test, reported in Appendix C, 
shows that EU engagement is conditioned by region. Finally, a Fischer- type test was 
used to detect the necessity of using lags and found none. Nevertheless, I report a 
robustness check in the Appendix that includes a set of models in which the 
independent variables are lagged by two years. The results are similar.
Finally, contractual open- endedness is a key variable—it takes two forms. It is 
analysed both on its own and as part of an interaction with EU engagement and EU 
institutionalization. Contractual open- endedness takes values of 1 (fixed contract), 
2 (intermediate contract), and 3 (open- ended contract). As an interaction term, it 
serves to uncover whether active and passive EU influence vary across ROs that 
differ as regards their contractual characteristics. The interaction takes the form:
 ( )1 2 1 2        Y c ax bx d x x SE= + + + +  
where x1 is the continuous variable ‘EU engagement/EU institutionalization, x2 is 
the factor variable ‘contractual open- endedness’, and d(x1 x2) is the inter action term.
Results of the multivariate analysis
Results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Table  4.4. I estimate seven 
main models that gauge the two conditions of EU influence and their interaction 
with contractual open- endedness. These models, each of which includes the full 
 battery of controls identified before, are: Model 1: contractual open- endedness; 
Model 2: EU engagement; Model 3: EU engagement interacted with contractual 
open- endedness; Model 4: EU institutionalization; Model 5: EU institutionalization 
interacted with contractual open- endedness; Model 6: EU engagement and EU 
institutionalization; and Model 7: EU engagement and EU institutionalization as 
well as contractual open- endedness. I discuss these results, including their statis-
tical and substantive significance, for the two EU influence variables, then turn 
towards the controls, before examining the robustness checks I conducted.
European Union influence variables
In line with Hypothesis 1 (active EU influence), I find robust evidence for the claim 
that EU engagement—an aggregate index of funding, interregional agreements, and 
institutionalized contacts—is associated with higher levels of in sti tu tion al iza tion 
in other ROs. This comes with positive and strongly statistically significant 
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Table 4.4. EU influence and RO institutionalization
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R2: within 0.392 0.529 0.555 0.439 0.530 0.557 0.580
R2: between 0.144 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.227 0.014 0.133
R2: overall 0.191 0.076 0.091 0.065 0.237 0.079 0.182
Note: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses).
* p < 0.1,** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01.
coefficients in Models 2, 6, and 7. These results indicate that the EU’s efforts to 
boost regional institutionalization have been successful and do exert an independent 
effect. Disaggregating EU engagement into its three constituent components and 
conducting the regression with each of the components independently does 
not affect the results (see Table C3 in Appendix C for results).
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Passive EU influence, on the other hand, is measured by the EU’s own trajectory 
of institutionalization. Model 4 indicates that higher levels of in sti tu tion al iza tion 
in other ROs are associated with increases in the EU’s own degree of institution-
alization, lending support to Hypothesis 2. This result holds true when both 
EU engagement and EU institutionalization are included in the same model 
(Model 6), as well as when contractual open- endedness is also added (Model 7).
On its own, contractual open- endedness is significantly correlated with 
regional institutionalization, meaning that organizations based on more open- 
ended commitments are more likely to achieve high levels of institutionalization 
(Model 1). This reconfirms the analysis undertaken in Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 
(2019), and holds true for organizations with intermediate and open- ended con-
tracts when interacted with EU engagement and EU institutionalization. These 
results are in line with Hypothesis 3, which states that ROs resting on more open- 
ended commitments are more likely to be susceptible to EU influence.
Specifically, the effect of EU engagement varies across different types of ROs, as 
captured by contractual open- endedness. Active EU influence greatly increases in 
organizations that have an open- ended contract, as demonstrated by the positive 
and significant interaction in Model 3. These results bolster the conditional 
hypothesis that EU engagement is most effective in ROs that rest on open- ended 
commitments because such commitments facilitate the creation of new institu-
tional arrangements and the reform of existing ones. Unsurprisingly, the existing 
case study evidence that has demonstrated EU influence on other ROs mainly 
concerns organizations with open- ended contracts, including Mercosur, SADC, 
and the Andean Community.
As with active EU influence, I find strong support for the idea that institutional 
evolution in the EU is associated with higher levels of institutionalization in specific 
types of organizations, primarily those based on open- ended contracts. Model 5 
shows a positive and statistically significant effect for the respective interaction 
term, while both EU institutionalization and contractual open- endedness are 
highly significant in the mixed Model 7. Furthermore, both intermediate and 
open- ended contracts show strong interaction with EU institutionalization, as 
shown in Model 5. These results lend strong support to Hypothesis 3, indicating 
that primarily organizations with open- ended commitments are responsive to the EU’s 
own trajectory of institutionalization. Where the ultimate purpose of cooperation 
is clearly defined from the outset, institutional change in an important reference 
organization—in this case, the EU—does not affect an organization’s own level 
of institutionalization. Conversely, when an organization pursues similar 
community- building ambitions to those in the EU, drawing analogies to the EU’s 
success is more credible and, in turn, facilitates the strengthening of regional 
institutions.
How substantive are the effects of the EU on levels of regional in sti tu tion al iza-
tion? I first turn to active EU influence. Figure 4.4 plots the predicted values of 
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RO institutionalization for the different values (low, up to the 33rd percentile; 
medium, between the 33rd and 66th percentiles; and high, between the 66th and 
100th percentiles) of the EU engagement measure between 1950 and 2017 based 
on Model 7, with other variables being held at their mean. The figure shows that 
institutionalization grows faster the more closely the EU engages with other ROs, 
even though RO institutionalization has generally increased over time, as indi-
cated by the upward slope of the baseline category ‘no EU engagement’. The most 
pronounced effect is in ROs deeply engaged with the EU, a phenomenon that 
began emerging from 1990 on. However, even for ROs that have medium- level 
engagement with the EU, the effect on institutionalization is noticeable, being 
statistically distinguishable from low active engagement throughout the entire 
period. Figure  4.4 also shows that low levels of engagement cannot be reliably 
distinguished from no EU engagement, as indicated by the overlapping confi-
dence intervals between the two lines.
The EU’s own institutional development also makes a distinguishable differ-
ence. Figure 4.5 plots the predicted effects of the interaction between EU institution-
alization and contractual open- endedness over time based on Model 5, with other 
variables being held at their mean. The figure illustrates that in sti tu tion al iza tion in 
the EU exerts its strongest impact on ROs with an open- ended contract, statistically 
distinguishable from the other two categories of contractual open- endedness 





























Figure 4.4  EU engagement and RO Institutionalization (fitted), 1950–2017
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with an intermediate contract. I interpret this result as evidence that the EU 
serves as an important reference point for learning and emulation processes, pri-
marily for those ROs that are similar to the EU with regard to open- ended com-
mitments. Overall, these results lend strong support to the idea that, at least for 
certain types of organization, decision- making is indeed interdependent across 
organizations, even in the absence of active EU influence.
Controls
Let us now examine the effects of the control variables. I start by considering 
intraregional variables that gauge specific internal characteristics of ROs. 
Somewhat surprisingly, little support for most of these variables is discernible. 
The only exception is membership. There is fairly consistent support for the 
rational design claim that a greater number of members leads to higher levels of 
institutionalization, confirming a finding by Hooghe and Marks (2015). The coef-
ficients are consistently positive and reach conventional levels of significance in 
six out of seven models, suggesting that the functional pressures for in sti tu tion al-
iza tion in large membership organizations often overcome the threat of decisional 


























Figure 4.5 EU institutionalization and RO Institutionalization for different levels of 
contractual open- endedness (fitted), 1950–2017
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log of the total membership of the RO, it furthermore supports the notion that 
the impact of growing membership lessens as an RO grows substantially.
However, I find no support for the influential neoliberal- institutionalist claim 
that intraregional trade interdependence affects regional institutionalization, 
which confirms a recent finding by Haftel (2013). Coefficients are inconsistently 
signed and negligibly small. Some of the strongest regional institutions can be 
found in organizations in regions such as Africa and Latin America, where trade 
interdependence is comparatively low. Similarly, power asymmetry is not consist-
ently signed, with very small coefficients that oscillate around 0, and never reach 
statistical significance. Various configurations of power asymmetry between 
members in terms of material capabilities appear to be compatible with both high 
and low levels of regional institutionalization. This challenges the neorealist claim 
that powerful states are generally reluctant to cede sovereignty. Important excep-
tions include South Africa in SADC (but not the Southern African Customs 
Union) and Nigeria in ECOWAS; both ROs are highly unequal in terms of power 
but display comparatively high levels of institutionalization. The influence of 
democracy also finds little statistical support. While consistently positive, coeffi-
cients oscillate around 0 and do not reach statistical significance in any of the 
models. ROs with more democratic member states do not appear to build 
stronger regional institutions in general. Finally, per capita GDP does not have an 
impact on institutionalization, as it is inconsistently signed, does not achieve any 
degree of significance, and, despite being a log of the original variable, shows neg-
ligible coefficients. This suggests that the economic situation of an RO does not 
play a significant role in institutionalization, meaning that such outcomes would 
be the same whether members were developing, middle- income, or high- income 
countries, or any mix thereof.
As noted in Chapter 3, the analytical assumptions underlying alternative chan-
nels of diffusion are compatible with the argument about EU influence. Moreover, 
to the extent that the EU systematically shapes processes of regional institution 
building, it will lead to a gradual increase in the levels of regional in sti tu tion al iza tion 
both in the population as a whole and within macro- regions. This, in turn, should 
further push institutionalization in those ROs whose levels are below average in 
the respective reference group. However, regional diffusion (measured as the average 
level of institutionalization of all neighbouring ROs in five geographic macro- 
regions, excluding the RO in question) is neither significant in any of the models, 
nor is it consistently signed, indicating that this is not a substantive contributor to 
RO institutionalization. Results are similar for global diffusion, discussed below.
Finally, I turn to alternative external influences at the global level of analysis, 
specifically the impact of the Cold War (signed 1 until 1989 and 0 afterwards). 
While otherwise negatively signed and not significant in models including only 
contractual open- endedness or EU engagement, it is positively signed and statis-
tically significant in models that include EU institutionalization (Models 4–7), 
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indicating that the presence of bipolar superpower competition had a mitigating 
impact on passive EU influence, and in turn on RO institutionalization, and that 
the absence of this intense superpower competition following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 provided novel opportunities for institutionalization. 
Interestingly, this control loses some of its significance and coefficient size in the 
table that excludes European ROs (Table C3, Appendix C), indicating that the 
impact of the Cold War disproportionately affected institutionalization in Europe, 
as Europe was the central theatre of superpower competition in the period. Yet, 
I do not find any support for the idea that an RO’s connectedness with the rest of 
the world drives its level of institutionalization. The variable ‘globalization’ is 
inconsistently signed, never reaches conventional levels of statistical significance, 
and has negligibly small coefficients. Just as in the case of GDP, this control meas-
ures a certain type of economic development, and the lack of significance indi-
cates that it is not relevant to institutionalization.
Robustness checks
A counterargument may posit that active EU influence is endogenous to regional 
institutionalization because the EU might be interested in dealing with more 
established organizations and those that have similar levels of institutionalization. 
In other words, high levels of RO institutionalization may attract more extensive 
engagement with the EU—rather than active EU influence causing an increase in 
RO institutionalization. I control for this possibility by testing for reverse causal-
ity, i.e. I re- ran Models 1–3 with ‘RO institutionalization’ as the independent 
variable and ‘EU engagement’ as the dependent variable—also including the 
interaction with contractual open- endedness. As shown by Table C1 (Appendix C), 
RO institutionalization is not a significant factor in determining whether or not 
the EU actively engages with a specific RO. One should note, however, that the 
EU is more engaged in macro- regions, such as Africa or the Americas, in which 
levels of institutionalization tend to be higher, as indicated by the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for regional diffusion.
Based on the assumption that channels of EU influence might be more infor-
mal in situations in which EU membership overlaps with that of other ROs, I also 
conducted the analysis while excluding European ROs. One may reason that 
overlapping membership enables regular interaction and more informal forms of 
cooperation that are not captured in the indicators composing the active EU 
influence measure. Specifically, the manifold interactions with EFTA have not 
induced an institutional strengthening of EFTA itself, but have engendered a new 
institutional arrangement—the European Economic Area—in which three out of 
four EFTA member states are subjected to the EU’s institutions and rules 
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(Haukeland Fredriksen 2012). Such idiosyncrasies, which may abound among 
European ROs, are impossible to capture in the wide- ranging statistical analysis. 
As indicated in Table C2 in Appendix C, however, this does not change the sub-
stantive results presented in Table 4.4.
I also re- ran Models 2 (EU engagement plus controls) and 7 (full model) while 
disaggregating the measure of active EU influence into its three components—
funding, cooperation agreements (policy scope, obligation), and contacts—in 
order to ensure that the effects of this variable are not dependent on any single 
component. The results, shown in Table C3, show that each of the components 
reaches high levels of statistical significance and comparable effect sizes to the 
aggregated index on its own. This indicates that the results on active EU influence 
presented in Table 4.4 do not depend on any single component of the measure.
In a similar vein, I undertook to disaggregate institutionalization into its four 
components—general secretariat, parliamentary body, non- state bodies, and 
judicial bodies—and examine them in turn using models 2 (active EU influence), 
4 (passive EU influence), and 7 (full model) in order to ensure that causality in 
the models is not due to any single element of the dependent variable. Overall, 
the results show substantial continuity between the components and confirm the 
high degree of internal consistency of the aggregate index (Table C4, Appendix 
C). EU engagement and EU institutionalization are without exception strongly 
positively correlated. So the influence of the EU on regional institutionalization 
does not hinge on a single type of institution. On the other hand, while contrac-
tual open- endedness plays an important role in parliamentary and judicial bod-
ies, that is not the case for general secretariats or non- state bodies, where 
democracy and prosperity tend to play a more substantive role.
An alternative measure of contractual open- endedness was used as well. This 
measure—used in Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks (2019)—is dichotomous instead of 
trichotomous because it eliminates the actor scope dimension, thereby collapsing 
the intermediate and open- ended categories of the trichotomous measure (for an 
extensive description, see Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks  2019: 151–3). The results, 
displayed in Table C5, show strong support for the alternate measure of contrac-
tual open- endedness, and do not substantively alter the results of the main 
analysis.
As mentioned in model design, an analysis of the main models, but including 
two- year lags, is also included in Table C6, Appendix C. The results show strong 
continuity with the main analysis, with identical substantive results, demonstrat-
ing that the results are insensitive to lag structures. In a similar vein, the analysis 
was repeated, but with global diffusion replacing regional diffusion, as the two are 
highly correlated. This analysis does not show strong support for global diffusion 
as a causal factor, as it is inconsistently signed and not significant in any model 
(Table C7).
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Conclusion
This chapter quantitatively tests the book’s central claim that the EU sys tem at ic-
al ly shapes processes of regional institution building, by drawing on a new dataset 
on the institutional design of 36 ROs (including the EU itself) in the period from 
1950 to 2017. I show that both the EU’s engagement with other ROs (active influ-
ence) as well as the EU’s own institutional development (passive influence) are 
associated with higher levels of institutionalization in other ROs, but that these 
effects vary across different types of organizations. ROs based on contracts that 
contain open- ended commitments are more susceptible to outside influence and 
display greater levels of institutional diffusion from the EU than ROs that are 
based on fixed contracts. An endogenous capacity for institutional change, 
 coupled with the ability of local actors to draw credible analogies with the EU due 
to similarities in their organizational purpose, appears to facilitate operation of 
the two pathways of EU influence.
More generally, this chapter has demonstrated that interorganizational influ-
ence matters for the process of regional institution building. Our understanding 
of institution building processes appears to be seriously incomplete when empha-
sizing only the intraregional or global levels of analysis. Only one of the associ-
ated variables, the size of an RO’s membership, has a consistently positive impact 
on regional institution building, while other variables at these levels of analysis, 
including prominent ones such as intraregional economic interdependence, 
intraregional power asymmetry, or globalization, do not. Thus, the quantitative 
analysis confirms that international institutional design is regularly interdepend-
ent across ROs, in particular between the EU and its counterparts elsewhere.
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5
Active European Union Influence
Institutional Change in the Southern African 
Development Community
The previous chapter demonstrates that active EU influence—which operates 
through financial support, institutionalized contacts between actors from both 
sides, and interregional cooperation agreements—is associated with higher levels 
of institutionalization in the population of ROs, and that this influence can be a 
substantively important source of variation in those organizations with which the 
EU engages closely. Yet a multivariate statistical analysis estimates the effect of 
independent variables on outcomes without shedding light on the process by 
which this effect occurs. In Chapter 3, I theorized that active EU influence oper­
ates by shaping the institutional preferences and strategies that governments seek 
to realize in international negotiations. In this chapter, I trace this causal process 
in an inferentially powerful, typical, and substantively important case in order 
to assess its operation. I thus connect the dots of the fourfold causal pathway 
outlined in Chapter 3.
In so doing, I analyse an episode of institutional change in SADC, the estab­
lishment of a supranational tribunal. SADC is one of the most important sub­
region al organizations in Africa, and home to the continent’s most powerful state, 
South Africa. The EU has engaged closely with SADC from its inception, and the 
organization is rooted in an open­ ended contract, thereby fulfilling the scope 
condition for EU influence. I argue that especially the EU’s financial contribu­
tions to SADC, on which the organization is heavily dependent, allowed it to 
shape member states’ collective preference ordering. SADC member states share 
two collective preferences: attracting donor funding for the organization and cre­
ating regional institutions that protect national sovereignty. Throughout the 
1980s, member states could pursue these preferences simultaneously as inter­
nation al donors saw the organization as an important ‘stronghold’ in the fight 
against apartheid in South Africa. With the end of apartheid and other global 
transformations in the early 1990s, however, these preferences increasingly came 
into conflict. When the EU threatened to withdraw funding, as was the case in 
the early 1990s and again in the late 1990s, SADC member states prioritized the 
continued attraction of donor funding over their preference for sovereignty­ 
preserving regional institutions. This induced, first, the inclusion of the Tribunal 
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in the SADC Treaty in 1992 and, eventually, its operationalization in 2005. Thus, 
the establishment of the SADC Tribunal reflects, I suggest, an institutional strat­
egy to satisfy their collective preference for continued support by international 
donors, largely at the expense of their preference for sovereignty­ protecting insti­
tutions, when member states realized that they could no longer pursue these pref­
erences simultaneously. I conclude that, counterfactually, the Tribunal would not 
have been established in the absence of active influence by the EU.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part specifies the rationale for 
selecting the respective institutional episode in SADC. The second part gives 
some background on the chosen case, and identifies the puzzle by engaging with 
alternative explanations that have been advanced to account for the establishment 
of international dispute settlement mechanisms. The third part traces the EU’s 
active influence on the institutional preferences and strategies of governments, 
and their subsequent interaction in international negotiations over institu­
tional change.
Case selection rationales: representativeness, causal leverage, 
and substantive importance
In general, single case studies that aim to test theory are most useful when they 
are representative and provide causal leverage (Elman, Gerring, and Mahoney 
2016: 378; Gerring 2008: 645; Seawright and Gerring 2008: 295–6)—two criteria 
that I evaluate for the chosen case below. Such case studies are particularly important 
in diffusion studies because diffusion, conceived as a process of interdependent 
decision­ making, leaves its most distinctive empirical traces at the level of the 
decision­ making process, not its outcome. Let us consider representativeness and 
causal leverage alongside substantive importance in turn.
Representativeness is the ‘traditional’ criterion employed by the literature on 
case selection in multi­ method research (Lieberman  2005: 444; Gerring  2007a: 
91–2). Typical cases display low residuals in the statistical analysis—so­ called 
‘on­ liers’—thereby facilitating generalizability and enhancing the external validity 
of within­ case analysis. This is the case for SADC. Figure 5.1 locates the or gan­
iza tion in relation to the regression line of the model that examines the effect of 
EU engagement (Model 7 in Table 4.4). As the figure indicates, the establish­
ment of the SADC Tribunal moves the organization from a level of institution­
alization near the regression line in 2005 (‘SADC, 2005’ in the figure) to a level 
of institutionalization which other ROs, with which the EU engages closely, 
roughly reach about a decade later, on average (‘SADC, 2006’ in the figure). 
Thus, I interpret the SADC case as an early instance of the general type of 
 institutional change that the EU can effect when it engages other organizations 
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closely—a trajectory that other organizations in this EU engagement category 
have followed subsequently.
The SADC case also provides causal leverage because it assumes high values on 
the active EU influence variable (X) as well as the outcome variable ‘RO institu­
tionalization’ (Y), while resting on an open­ ended contract (see Falleti and Lynch 
2009; Seawright  2016; Weller and Barnes  2016). SADC has regularly received 
more than 50 and up to 70 per cent of its budget from EU sources, and the EU has 
had constant contact with the organization over the course of many years, even 
decades, suggesting that this might serve as a perfect case for observing how the 
active influence pathway works. If EU engagement does not make a difference in 
SADC, it is unlikely to do so anywhere (Gerring 2007). From the perspective of 
active EU influence, therefore, SADC is a likely case.
At the same time, SADC is an organization in which policy­ makers were not 
bent on emulating the European integration experience, including its institutions, 
from the start, which allows me to ‘isolate’ to some extent the EU’s active influ­
ence from a desire, on the part of member state governments, to emulate the EU 
independently of its active support. Policy­ makers initially rejected EU­ type inte­
gration arrangements, and opted for a unique design that was rooted in a strongly 
decentralized structure. As Brett and Gissel note, the organization’s early institu­




























Figure 5.1 Location of the SADC case in the multivariate analysis of active  
EU influence
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integration theory by any group of Third World nations’ (Brett and Gissel 2018: 
209). Similarly, Lee contends that ‘the member states rejected the EU model, thus 
becoming the first regional economic organisation in Africa to do so’ (Lee 2003: 
47). The fact that SADC was, at least during its founding period, an ‘anti­ EU’ 
organization affords us the opportunity to control for passive EU influence largely 
by design.
For reasons developed in the introduction, I examine active EU influence on 
the establishment of the SADC Tribunal, a more narrowly delineated institutional 
episode which forms part of the ‘RO institutionalization’ measure used in Chapter 4. 
This specific episode affords additional causal leverage because it approximates an 
ideal­ typical ‘crucial case’ in that ‘the causal effect of X1 on Y can be isolated from 
other potentially confounding factors’ (Gerring  2007b: 238). As we have seen, 
SADC presents a (most) likely case from the perspective of active EU influence. 
On the other hand, the organization is a difficult case, if not a least likely case, for 
the establishment of a strong dispute settlement mechanism due to the structural 
conditions that characterize the organization and its membership. As I discuss in the 
next section, the overwhelming majority of explanations advanced to explain the 
design of dispute settlement mechanisms in IOs would expect SADC to feature a 
weak mechanism, or none at all (or to encounter other major empirical anomalies).
Finally, the establishment of the SADC Tribunal is a substantively important 
case. SADC is one of the most important ROs in Africa, based in two of Africa’s 
economically most powerful states, South Africa and Angola. Academic interest 
in the field of regional organization is distributed highly unevenly across ROs, 
and SADC is a much­ studied case. This has the added pragmatic advantage that 
there is a sizeable secondary literature on which the case study can draw. In par­
ticular, the establishment of the Tribunal was an important event in the institu­
tional evolution of the organization. As Ruppel notes, ‘The establishment of the 
Tribunal was a major event in SADC’s history as an organisation as well as in the 
development of its law and jurisprudence’ (Ruppel 2012: 93). It is, hence, substan­
tively relevant for understanding the organization and its institutional evolution.
In sum, tracing the active influence of the EU on the establishment of the 
SADC Tribunal provides a near­ ideal setting for complementary within­ case 
analysis of the statistical regularities detected in Chapter 4 because it is a repre­
sentative case in relation to the group of organizations with which the EU engages 
closely; it is inferentially powerful because it approximates Gerring’s ‘pathway 
case’ logic; and it is substantively important.
Dispute settlement in SADC
SADC is an RO in Southern Africa that currently encompasses 15 member states. 
It established a permanent Tribunal in 2005 that marked a big step in the 
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legalization of the organization. I begin the analysis of active EU influence by 
 giving some background on the organization and outlining its institutional evolu­
tion, with a focus on dispute settlement. Next, I consider standard explanations 
for the establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms. I then analyse the three 
steps of the causal process by engaging the distinct observable implications of 
the pathway.
Background: SADC and the evolution of institutionalized 
dispute settlement
Widely seen at the time as the ‘most important and exciting co­ operation in 
southern Africa’ (Hill  1983: 222), SADC originated in the early 1980s as the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and its 
institutions have developed enormously over time. While cooperation started as a 
strictly member state­ driven and decentralized form of sectoral coordination at 
the regional level, with minimal levels of institutionalization, over a period of 
40 years it has evolved into an ambitious project of regional economic integration, 
including a common currency, with strong central institutions.
Formalizing the common desire of the frontline states to lessen economic 
dependence on South Africa under the apartheid regime, the organization was 
born on 1 April 1980 with the adoption of the declaration ‘Southern Africa: 
Towards Economic Liberation’, and institutionalized with a memorandum of 
understanding, signed on 20 July 1981. The core idea was to enlist financial and 
ideological support from international donors in coordinating national economic 
development plans based on a commonly agreed programme of action. From the 
beginning, member states pursued a vision of regional cooperation that deliber­
ately broke with the approach of many previous such efforts on the African con­
tin ent, and put member states’ national interests and autonomy centre stage. 
Anglin (1983) observes an unequivocal ‘emphasis on actions not institutions. [. . .] 
SADCC is innovative in [. . .] the respect paid to the sensitivities of members to 
infringements of their national sovereignty’ (pp. 691–2). This becomes most 
apparent in the degree to which member states assumed responsibility for managing 
SADCC’s operational programmes. Individual member state governments were 
endowed with the right to advance cooperation in specific policy sectors, steered by 
member state­ dominated sectoral commissions. The establishment of a small secre­
tariat in Gaborone, Botswana, was thus (as the first chairman of SADCC notes) the 
expression of a ‘deliberately business­ like approach, in which institutions follow 
achievement’ (cited in Anglin 1983: 696). Strong regional institutions that could 
constrain member states’ freedom of manoeuvre were deliberately rejected.
Namibia’s independence and, more importantly, the imminent end of apart­
heid in South Africa in the early 1990s changed the structural context for regional 
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cooperation and triggered a fundamental transformation of the organization. 
With the adoption of the SADC Treaty on 17 August 1992, the organization’s pur­
pose shifted from ‘economic autarky toward the more traditional goal of regional 
integration’ (Herbst 2007: 139). This transition went hand in hand with increas­
ing legalization. The organization largely maintained its decentralized nature 
based on sectoral cooperation units directed by individual member states, but 
nevertheless modestly strengthened the existing secretariat and provided for a 
supranational Tribunal in the treaty. Furthermore, the member states established 
the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security in an attempt to buttress SADC’s 
security dimension in 1996 and, in the same year, adopted a trade protocol envis­
aging the creation of a free trade area, which entered into force in 2000. The trade 
protocol contains a tiered dispute settlement mechanism for trade matters that 
involves the establishment of expert panels, with the Tribunal as dispute settle­
ment of ‘last resort’ (art. 32, SADC Trade Protocol 1996).
By the late 1990s, however, widespread implementation failure and political 
tensions had sobered the initial enthusiasm and led to a questioning of SADC’s 
original set­ up (Gibb  1998; Lee  1999). In 2001, the Summit adopted a reform 
package entailing far­ reaching changes to the institutional framework in order to 
more effectively execute SADC’s original mandate. It abolished the sectoral 
co ord in at ing units, centralized tasks in the secretariat around four directorates 
with executive functions, and revamped the intergovernmental structure (for an 
overview of the restructuring exercise, see Tjønneland  2005). Besides institu­
tional restructuring, member states agreed on a ten­ year agenda for integration in 
2003, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which inter 
alia outlines the process of creating an EU­ style common market and a common 
currency. Intensified efforts at regional economic integration, as well as ne go ti­
ations with the EU over so­ called Economic Partnership Agreements, have once 
again brought to the fore the problem of overlapping membership in regional 
integration (Engel and Asche 2008; Krapohl and Van Huut 2020; Stevens 2006). 
Attempts are under way to rationalize existing economic agreements, partly 
under the umbrella of the African Union. The most important of these ra tion al­
iza tion projects is the so­ called Tripartite Agreement, adopted in 2008, which 
seeks to merge integration efforts in SADC, COMESA (the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa), and the EAC.
The institutions of dispute settlement, and in particular the SADC Tribunal, 
have followed a particularly noteworthy trajectory.1 After a decade of minimal 
institutionalization, mention of a Tribunal found its way into the 1992 SADC 
Treaty, which stipulates: ‘The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to 
and the proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary 
1 The 1996 SADC Trade Protocol contains its own dispute settlement mechanism for trade dis­
putes that entails recommendations by ad hoc panels.
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instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it’ (SADC 
Treaty 1992, art. 16.1). While the other institutions in the agreement were quickly 
established, the Tribunal took more than a decade to become operational. After 
several years of negotiation, it was only in August 2000 that the Summit adopted a 
protocol that specified the Tribunal’s composition, power, and procedures. It 
entered into force in the following year, when member states incorporated it into 
the amended SADC treaty (SADC Treaty Amended 2001, art. 16). The Tribunal 
became operational with the establishment of headquarters in Windhoek, Namibia, 
and the appointment of judges in 2005. Until its dissolution, 15 of 16 SADC 
member states fell under its jurisdiction (Alter 2014: appendix).
The operationalization of the SADC Tribunal marked a fundamental change in 
the ability of member states and non­ state actors to enforce SADC legislation. It is 
independent and can make impartial judgements.2 According to the Protocol on 
the SADC Tribunal, the Tribunal is a standing court with its own infrastructure 
and budget, consisting of at least ten ‘jurists of recognised competence’ serving a 
five­ year term, renewable once (arts. 3 and 6, SADC Tribunal Protocol 2000). For 
those member states that have ratified the Protocol, the Tribunal holds compul­
sory jurisdiction for issues related to the interpretation and application of com­
munity law (arts. 14 and 15). There is an automatic right to review regarding 
disputes between states and the Community, between natural or legal persons 
and the Community, and between the Community and its staff (arts. 17, 18, and 
19). And its rulings are final and binding on member states (art. 24). Not only the 
member states but also individuals have access to the Tribunal, once they have 
exhausted all domestic remedies (arts. 15 and 18). The supranational jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal is embedded in the domestic legal system of member states. In 
principle, the decisions of the Tribunal have direct effect: ‘States and institutions 
of the Community shall take forthwith all measures necessary to ensure execution 
of decisions of the Tribunal’ (art. 32.2). However, the Summit retains a gate­ keeping 
role when member states fail to comply with a ruling (art. 32.5). The Protocol also 
contains a preliminary rulings procedure (art. 16), according to which domestic 
courts can ask the Tribunal to rule on a case before it that engages community 
law. Art. 16 is an almost literal copy of article 177 of the Treaty of Rome.
Taken together, the Tribunal’s institutional design meets the characteristics 
of what Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter (2000) term ‘transnational dispute 
resolution’ and what Alter (2006) refers to as ‘new­ style international courts.’ 
More importantly, its key institutional elements match those of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), such that Alter (2012) refers to the SADC Tribunal as an 
‘ECJ copy.’ It even goes beyond the ECJ’s competences by explicitly providing 
for the development of ‘Community jurisprudence’ that draws not only on 
2 In describing the design of the SADC Tribunal, I draw loosely on the literature on legalization, 
especially on Smith (2000), Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter (2000), and Hooghe et al. (2017).
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community law but also on national and international law and the principles 
underlying it (Art. 21b).3
The fate of the SADC Tribunal has been fairly short­ lived. In the wake of a 
high­ profile case—the 2008 Campbell case, in which a white farmer sued the 
Zimbabwean government for expropriating his farm, and the Tribunal found that 
the land seizures conducted as part of a land reform violated the rule of law, 
enshrined in SADC treaties—the Zimbabwean government initiated a process by 
which the SADC governments gradually weakened and ultimately disbanded the 
Tribunal (Nathan  2013). Nevertheless, since Zimbabwean President Mugabe’s 
death in September 2019, there has been talk of re­ establishing the Tribunal. 
Especially in South Africa, influential voices consider such a move.
What explains the Tribunal’s establishment and design? 
Existing explanations
The establishment and design of the SADC Tribunal, described in the previous 
section, poses a puzzle from the perspective of several theoretical arguments that 
deal with dispute settlement design in international relations. Most of these 
explanations share the conceptual focus on the regional level of analysis, that is, 
they assume that the main causes of member states’ choices of regional institu­
tions concern the attributes of ROs and their constituent member states. Consider 
five arguments that explain the level of legalization of international dispute settle­
ment mechanisms, four of which are located at the regional level of analysis and 
one at the global level. The results are summarized in Table 5.1 below.
First and most fundamentally, the SADC Tribunal’s establishment and op era­
tion al iza tion are unexpected in view of the fact that member states have been, 
and continue to be, concerned about a loss of national sovereignty. As I will 
detail below, member states largely share a collective preference in favour of 
sovereignty­ preserving regional institutions. We would expect the sovereignty 
costs of a highly legalized dispute settlement mechanism to be prohibitively 
high for states with a distinct concern about safeguarding national sovereignty 
(Moravcsik 2000: 227; Smith 2000: 144–45). And indeed, the story of the Tribunal’s 
demise is an exemplary case of how concerns about national sovereignty shape 
the (re­)design of international institutions. In the justifications given by Zimbabwe’s 
representatives for why they initiated the abolishment of the Tribunal after the 
Campbell case, sovereignty concerns dominate. Yet, sovereignty concerns do not 
explain why the Tribunal was established in the first place. After all, the Tribunal 
emerged ‘after the ECJ’s [European Court of Justice’s] legal revolution, with 
3 For a good overview, see Ruppel and Bangamwabo (2008).
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perfect hindsight’ (Alter 2012: 140). Policy­ makers should have been aware that 
the Tribunal’s design features facilitate the enforcement of legal rules because it 
creates routes to circumvent the gatekeeping role of states; in short, it is common 
knowledge that the Tribunal’s design encroaches on national sovereignty, and 
hence should have been anticipated.
Functional arguments explain why sovereignty concerns are generally not the 
only consideration of policy­ makers in the design of international institutions. 
After all, in order to reap the benefits of international cooperation, some pooling 
and delegation of sovereignty is commonly required, and tends to make co op er ation 
more efficient (Keohane 1984). Specifically, more legalized dispute settlement is 
expected to enhance treaty compliance, which is particularly valu able when the 
anticipated benefits of cooperation are high (Allee and Elsig 2016: 96; Arnold 
and Rittberger 2013: 105–6; Smith 2000: 149–50; generally, Hawkins et al. 2006; 
Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998). Functional institutionalism may explain, there­
fore, why the issue of dispute settlement started entering the SADC agenda 
once member states had agreed to develop the organization from a body to 
Table 5.1. Existing explanations of international dispute settlement design 
and SADC
Explanation SADC situation Expected outcome
Regional level of analysis
Sovereignty 
concerns
Most member states share 
strong concern about national 
sovereignty.
Detrimental to strong dispute 
settlement mechanism.
Functionalism Limited intraregional 
interdependence.
Ambitious integration objective 
(common market, customs union) 
and more complex cooperation 
problems.
Detrimental to strong dispute 
settlement mechanism.
Conducive to strong dispute 
settlement mechanism, but time 




High; relatively low dependence 
on regional market of regional 
hegemon, South Africa.
Detrimental to strong dispute 
settlement mechanism.
Regime type Most member states are  
non­ democracies; average level 
of democracy is fairly low.
Detrimental to strong dispute 
settlement mechanism.
Global level of analysis
WTO 
membership
Holds for all member states, 
except the Seychelles.
Adoption of WTO model  
(or weaker).
Source: author’s depiction.
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coordinate national development policies towards a body that facilitates economic 
integration.4 With the new objectives that were specifically geared towards 
 liberalizing trade between member states, the functional need for legalized dispute 
settlement rose. The fact that both debates started in parallel in the early 1990s, 
prior to the adoption of the SADC Treaty, is compatible with this view. 
Nevertheless, the fact that member states took ten years to make the Tribunal 
operational provides functional arguments with a puzzle. If there are good func­
tional reasons to establish a strong dispute settlement mechanism, this should 
lead to timely operationalization.
After all, given the limited economic complementarity among the member 
states, few political actors anticipated the realization of large trade gains. The 
structure of economic interdependence in the region is oriented towards trade 
with international partners, such as the EU and the United States, rather than 
with each other (Krapohl and Fink 2013; generally, see Garzón 2017). According 
to data from the Unu­ cris trade database, only around five per cent of the region’s 
external trade was conducted intra­ regionally during the 1990s—a figure that is 
even lower than in many other developing regions, such as East Asia and Latin 
America (for the comparison, see Lenz 2018: 37). It is not surprising, therefore, 
that expert studies have regularly warned of inflated expectations regarding 
intra­ regional trade liberalization. In preparation of the SADC Treaty, an expert 
study noted that ‘promoting trade integration as a simple linear process [. . .] [from 
a preferential trade agreement to an economic union] is inappropriate for the 
SADCC region at this stage or [sic] its development’ (SADCC 1992: 27; similarly, 
Green 1990: 107). Moreover, there are at least two institutional models that are 
functionally equivalent in ensuring the credibility of commitments: the dispute 
settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ECJ (see also 
below). Functional arguments have trouble to account for institutional choice in 
situations of functional equivalence.
Third, the authority of the SADC Tribunal is surprising in view of the power 
asymmetry that exists within the organization. Most scholars expect strong power 
asymmetries to inhibit stronger legalization because strong states ‘view the cre­
ation of supranational commitment institutions with scepticism’ (Arnold and 
Rittberger 2013: 105; Smith 2000: 149; Abbott and Snidal 2000: 448; Grieco 1990). 
The power asymmetries among SADC member states are large, larger than in 
most other African ROs (and beyond). During the 1990s, South Africa combined 
more than two­ thirds of the region’s gross domestic product, and had more than 
one­ fourth of the total population and among the highest per capita incomes. At 
the same time, it was relatively less dependent on the regional market than were 
4 The nature of the cooperation problem also becomes more complex as a result of this change in 
purpose, which means that the likelihood of a (strong) dispute settlement mechanism increases (for 
the general argument, see Koremenos 2007).
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other member states, enhancing its relative bargaining power over institutional 
outcomes vis­ à­ vis their peers (Krapohl and Fink 2013: 484). When the regional 
hegemon is also the least dependent on the regional market, a strong dispute 
settle ment mechanism is very unlikely to emerge.
Fourth, the creation of the Tribunal is similarly surprising in view of the regime 
types that constitute SADC’s membership. Scholars generally contend that supra­
national dispute settlement is more likely to emerge among democratic states, for 
two reasons. First, democracies find it easier than autocracies to disburse author­
ity across different levels of government, rather than to centralize it, including to 
IOs, because they are less fearful of supranational authority (Risse­ Kappen 1995; 
Simmons  2009). Second, democracies are more responsive than autocracies to 
the political interests of different economic interest groups. Whereas autocracies 
tend to have their support base primarily among import­ competing firms, and 
thereby tend to reject strong supranational commitments, democratic states try 
to balance the interests of import­ and export­ competing firms more fairly, while 
they generally have stronger export­ promoting constituencies that are in favour 
of stronger legalization (Jo and Namgung 2012: 1046–48; Mansfield, Milner, and 
Rosendorff  2002; see also Solingen  2008). SADC’s membership is not overly 
democratic. The average polity IV score, which measures a country’s level of 
democracy, rose in the second half of the 1990s, among other reasons due to 
South Africa’s accession to the organization; however, it remains limited, hoover­
ing somewhere between autocratic and democratic during the 1990s.
Finally, an explanation at the global level of analysis may posit that ROs focus­
ing on economic issues are likely to align their dispute settlement systems with 
the arrangement in the WTO, which marked a significant move towards more 
legalization when compared to the prior system (see Keohane, Moravcsik, and 
Slaughter 2000). The transaction costs of a more institutionalized system in the 
RO are certainly lower when the member states are also members of the WTO 
and therefore subject to its compulsory jurisdiction because, unless explicitly pro­
hibited, they can take an economic dispute within the RO to the WTO system.5 
As Alter notes, the WTO dispute settlement system serves as ‘a default system for 
resolving trade disputes’ (Alter 2012: 138). However, this explanation encounters 
two severe anomalies. First, negotiations on the SADC Tribunal were concluded 
before the WTO negotiations on dispute settlement had really taken shape, and 
process evidence indicates that reference to the WTO system—as opposed to the 
EU system—was essentially non­ existent. Moreover, the member states decided 
not only to upgrade their dispute settlement system to the WTO level, but to go 
beyond it with the adoption of an EU­ type system; the institutional extension 
5 With the exception of the Seychelles, all SADC member states were also members of the WTO in 
2000, when the Protocol on the Tribunal was adopted.
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beyond the WTO level is unaccounted for by this argument.6 Second, member 
states took ten years to operationalize the Tribunal which they had agreed upon 
in the Windhoek treaty.
Taken together, the establishment of the SADC Tribunal constitutes a the or et­
ic al puzzle from the perspective of existing explanations of international dispute 
settlement design. While functional theories of institutional design in particular 
generate implications that are compatible with some parts of the story, actual pro­
cess evidence on functional considerations dominating the decision­ making pro­
cess is scarce. I suggest that the causes emphasized by existing explanations point 
to an institutional equilibrium that is largely reflected in the previous and current 
dispute settlement arrangement, which relies on a fairly weak system centred 
around ad hoc panels to adjudicate trade disputes. We may even say that the sys­
tem that existed prior to the entry into force of the Trade Protocol—a Tribunal 
existed, but was not operational—is compatible with member­ state interests. Why 
did the organization deviate from this institutional equilibrium for some time? 
My answer is that this ‘deviation’ was due to the EU’s active influence, specifically 
the threat to withdraw funding from the organization.
Establishing the SADC Tribunal: the role of EU incentives
This section traces the establishment of the SADC Tribunal in two steps. The first 
part analyses governments’ preferences and institutional strategies with a view to 
identifying whether, and how, the EU might have shaped them. The second part 
examines how these institutional preferences and strategies are reflected in the final 
outcome by tracing the process of negotiation. I argue that the threat by the EU to 
withdraw financial support, on which the organization had become even more 
dependent after the end of the Cold War, forced member states to prioritize their 
collective preference for attracting donor funding in support of regional cooperation 
over their preference for sovereignty­ protecting regional institutions. As a result, 
they decided that the establishment of the SADC Tribunal was the most promising 
strategy to continue attracting donor funding, above all from the EU itself.
Institutional preferences and strategies
SADC member states share two collective preferences that underpin regional 
cooperation and shape the institutional strategies they pursue. The first one is to 
6 Some scholars even suggest that dispute settlement mechanisms in regional trade agreements 
adopted after the strengthening of the multilateral system in the Uruguay round should be weaker 
than before to allow states to ‘forum shop’ between mechanisms at different levels of legalization (Jo 
and Namgung  2012: 1049–51). For them, even a WTO­ type dispute settlement mechanism in a 
regional agreement constitutes a theoretical puzzle.
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attract donor funding for the organization’s activities. During the first decade of 
the organization’s existence, this preference underpinned the purpose of lessening 
economic dependence on apartheid South Africa: international donors largely 
financed a common programme of action to that end. Yet even after South Africa 
joined the organization in 1994 and the organization’s purpose shifted towards 
regional economic integration, this collective preference remained strong. The 
Consultative Conferences, annual meetings of SADC officials with representatives 
from international donors, continued to be ‘the most important event in the 
SADC’s calendar of activities’ (Sidaway 1998: 54). The extensive sections in the 
organization’s record that deal with relations with its international donors similarly 
attest to this collective preference. Christopher Clapham and others have con­
vincingly shown that the attraction of international donor funding for regional 
organizations serves the purpose of stabilizing fragile states (Clapham 1996; see 
also Bayart 2000; Brown 2013).
In line with the structural incentives outlined in the previous section, the 
second collective preference is one in favour of sovereignty­ preserving regional 
institutions, which underpins member states long­ held opposition to a per man­
ent Tribunal with supranational competences. This preference is reflected in the 
organization’s initial institutional set­ up, which is minimal and fully controlled by 
member states, as described before. During the 1980s, organizational reform was 
minor and primarily sought to improve the working procedures of sectoral 
co oper ation. In 1987, for example, member states defined clear criteria for the 
selection of projects for inclusion into the programme of action, and revised the 
approval process in order to ensure that selected projects were of clear regional 
relevance while constituting national developmental priorities (Mandaza and 
Tostensen 1994: 37–9). As late as August 1991—a year before the Windhoek Treaty 
codified the Tribunal—an expert group that had been tasked with a formalization 
of the organization concluded confidently in its final report that ‘the institutions 
governing SADCC are adequate and effective generally’ (Malima et al. 1991: 375). 
Given that the report ‘takes into account the views expressed by member states’ 
(SADCC Council of Ministers  1991b: 371), this statement expresses member 
states’ collective institutional preference at the time.
During the 1980s, member states pursued these collective preferences sim ul­
tan eous ly. International donors were willing to provide ample resources to the 
organization in their effort to support the international struggle against apartheid 
in South Africa, while being largely indifferent to the institutional set­ up of 
SADCC. This allowed member states to attract donor funding while realizing 
their preference for sovereignty­ preserving regional institutions through 
SADCC’s strongly member state­ driven and decentralized structure.
However, several external developments from the late 1980s onwards made it 
increasingly difficult for member states to pursue their collective preferences har­
moniously. For one, the inception of structural adjustment programmes during 
the second half of the 1980s in response to the foreign debt crisis threatened 
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 01/05/21, SPi
124 Interorganizational Diffusion
SADCC’s sectoral cooperation programme and further increased the organization’s 
dependence on external funding, reaching 90 per cent of the organization’s pro­
gramme in the late 1980s. The adjustment programmes forced member states to 
increasingly shift their limited financial resources towards servicing countries’ 
debt obligations (for a general overview, see Eichengreen and Lindert 1992). 
As a Secretariat note to the Council in 1987 warned, ‘the mounting difficulties for 
SADCC member states to meet their debt­ service obligations’ would make it very 
difficult to ‘contract new debt for implementation of the Organisation’s Programme 
of Action’ (SADCC Secretariat 1987: 70). These growing financial constraints on 
regional cooperation meant that ‘most of the financing for the Programme 
[would] have to come from [. . .] SADCC’s cooperation partners’ (SADCC 
Secretariat 1987: 67). This development rendered member states even more sensi­
tive than before to donors’ priorities.
Yet the end of the Cold War generated considerable uncertainty as to the 
con tinued willingness of donors to satisfy a growing need for external financial 
resources because Southern Africa lost its geostrategic importance. Many coun­
tries of the quickly dissolving Soviet bloc withdrew their contributions entirely, 
which enhanced the importance of remaining western European donors, above 
all the European Community. Yet policy­ makers in the European Community 
seemed to increasingly shift their attention towards the countries in trans form­
ation in central and eastern Europe. These concerns regarding the Community’s 
commitment to the region were heightened by the fact that Community repre­
sentatives had voiced dissatisfaction with SADCC’s poor disbursement rates of 
European funds before. In 1988, an internal Secretariat document noted flatly 
that ‘the rate of disbursing allocated resources has been very slow’ and worried 
that if no remedial measures were taken, ‘a time will come when the cooperating 
partners will begin to reschedule the undisbursed resources out of the incomplete 
projects and out of the SADCC region’ (SADCC Secretariat  1988: 94, 95). In 
addition, South Africa’s transition to black majority rule seemed imminent in the 
early 1990s, and this fuelled expectations that external funding for the or gan iza­
tion would recede even further. As SADCC’s executive secretary at the time, 
Simba Makoni, noted:
Support from the international community has not really come to us on our 
own account. It has come to us as sympathy support against apartheid [. . .] So 
while one appreciates the amount that we have been receiving, the spirit behind 
the figures is not a very comforting one, because if it remains the basis for that 
support, when apartheid goes, then so will the funds go with it. 
(cited in Brett and Gissel 2018: 209–10)
And indeed, the general concern that important donors would turn their back on 
SADCC appeared to materialize in the early 1990s, when the European Community 
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 01/05/21, SPi
Active European Union Influence 125
considered redistributing financial support away from the  organization. Repeated 
complaints about the low disbursement rates in SADCC projects ushered in a 
credible threat that the new Lomé Convention—Lomé IV—would significantly 
reduce financial aid to the organization. A Secretariat document noted worry­
ingly: ‘On all accounts, if the EEC [European Economic Community] position is 
sustained, the SADCC Programme will suffer enormously from a reduced 
regional allocation’ (SADCC Secretariat  1991a: 51; see also Adelmann 2008: 7; 
Holland  1995: 269). By that time, a general sensitivity to the priorities of their 
cooperation partners had come to focus primarily on the European Community, 
the most important remaining donor.
These developments occurred against a general fear of marginalization that 
encompassed the continent in view of increasing tendencies towards regionaliza­
tion elsewhere in the world—developments that eventually convinced policy­ 
makers of the need to refocus their efforts from sectoral coordination to economic 
integration. The European Community was not just an important donor, but also 
an attractive example of successful economic integration—and a forerunner of 
potential times to come. In the late 1980s Botswana’s President Quett Masire 
warned of the growing international competitive pressures that were embodied in 
Europe’s attempt to complete the internal market. At the 1988 Summit, he argued, 
‘We understand that the Single European Act of 1987 will come into effect soon, 
paving the way for the creation of an Internal EEC market in 1992. If the 
Europeans need this kind of economic cooperation, we must need it even more’ 
(Masire 1988: 33). A few years later, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe noted 
that ‘the 1990s are likely to be a decade of trading blocs and growing multi­ 
lateralism’ and stated the need to ‘develop SADCC from being a sectoral co ord in­
ation machinery to that of a full economic integration programme’ (SADCC 
Summit 1991: 53). Thus, in view of the difficulties to sustain donor­ financed sec­
toral development programmes and of the larger changes in the world economy 
brought about by the end of the Cold War, member states became convinced that 
trade liberalization—which had not played a role during the first decade of 
co oper ation—should be the organization’s primary purpose. But how ought this 
new ambition be realized?
The debate quickly came to revolve around two competing models—both of 
which were seen to be compatible with wider African ambitions to form Regional 
Economic Communities (SADCC Council of Ministers 1991a: 33–5). A Secretariat 
note in 1991 captured the choice succinctly:
In the face of the region’s realities, and the current international tendencies 
toward the establishment of economic blocks, the region must accept to trans­
form itself into an economic block similar to the proposed North American free 
trade zone or the European Economic Community. 
(SADCC Secretariat 1991b: 361)
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Shortly thereafter, there seems to have been agreement among member states to 
establish an EU­ type common market. The SADCC Council of Ministers resolved 
that the new framework for regional integration must provide ‘for crossborder 
investment, trade and labour and capital flow across national boundaries’ 
(SADCC Council of Ministers  1991a: 16) and a few days later, at the SADCC 
Summit, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe spoke of the need for ‘greater 
cooperation in fiscal and monetary affairs; [and] facilitation of movement of 
 peoples, goods and services’ (SADCC Summit 1991: 53). I have shown elsewhere 
how the choice for an EU­ type common market instead of a NAFTA­ like free 
trade agreement constitutes an expression of frame diffusion, according to which 
particular types of problems are linked through analogous reasoning with specific 
solutions in the absence of a thorough cost­ benefit analysis (Lenz 2018). Settling 
on a new organizational purpose was only the beginning. Once member states 
have agreed on the purpose of cooperation, they need to decide upon the institu­
tions that are suitable to guide cooperation towards the new aim. In view of the 
goal to achieve economic integration through trade liberalization, a dispute 
settle ment system quickly became subject of debate.
Early proposals for such a system reflected member states’ collective preference 
for sovereignty­ preserving regional institutions. In 1989, the Council had tasked 
an expert team with making recommendations on the formalization of SADCC 
(SADCC Summit 1989: 3–4). The experts presented their report to the Council 
meeting in August 1991. The report reconfirms the emerging consensus that 
‘stronger emphasis should be given on [sic] the objective of achieving economic 
integration’, and recommends that ‘the settlement of disputes shall be by arbitra­
tion, and an arbitration tribunal or committee will be provided for’ (Malima et al. 
1991: 375, 379). These two institutional options were closely tied to the dispute 
resolution system underpinning the GATT: a committee was the existing GATT 
mechanism while an arbitration tribunal was a reform proposal being discussed 
at the time (see Elsig and Eckhardt 2015: S25). In their close affiliation with the 
GATT system, both of these options were non­ binding. Moreover, the report 
does not list the dispute settlement mechanism among the institutions which are 
to receive a legally codified standing in the new treaty (see Malima et al. 1991: 
380). Thus, this important proposal for the institutional reform of SADCC, which 
expressly took ‘into account the views expressed by member states’ (SADCC 
Council of Ministers  1991b, 3: 371), clearly reflected member states’ collective 
preference for the protection of national sovereignty. However, this proposal 
was soon ‘over­ turned’ by international donors, among which the EU was an 
im port ant one.
The 1992 Consultative Conference marked a turning point because it was at 
this even that member states realized that their collective preferences stood in 
open conflict. In particular, the intention to establish a weak dispute settlement 
system ‘changed dramatically at SADCC’s 1992 Consultative Conference’ (Brett 
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and Gissel 2018: 210). The theme document, which is used by donors to make 
financial pledges for the following period, was elaborated in cooperation with the 
most important donor agencies, including representatives from the EU. It argued 
that international donor support had been ‘predicated on the anti­ apartheid 
struggle’ and would now depend on ‘policy reforms’ related to the integration of 
national economies (SADCC 1992: 19). European donor agencies, in particular, 
indicated that continued financial support could become conditional on 
‘renouncing part of [. . .] sovereignty’, and emphasized that a regional development 
community ‘requires mechanisms of mediation and arbitration, to which all agents 
of integration—governments, business, civil associations and in di vid uals—can 
seek justice’ (SADCC 1992: 145, 41–2).
Given the importance that regional blocs appeared to have in the post­ Cold 
War era, member states resolved to prioritize continued donor support over their 
preference for the protection of national sovereignty. At their first meeting after 
the consultative conference in August 1992, the Council of Ministers followed 
the theme document’s recommendation and denoted the regional Tribunal as 
among ‘the central intergovernmental organs of the community’ (SADCC 
Council of Ministers 1992: 36).7 The Windhoek Treaty, adopted at the Summit in 
August 1992, thus provides for the establishment of a permanent Tribunal with 
compulsory jurisdiction and the power to ‘give advisory opinions’ over all matters 
of the treaty and subsidiary instruments (art. 16, SADC Treaty).
The decision to establish a permanent Tribunal ‘against’ a collective preference 
for sovereignty­ preserving regional institutions thus reflects a collective strategy 
to retain donor support in view of a credible threat that the two preferences stood 
in direct conflict with each other. This threat was directly related to the EU’s 
active involvement in the organization, even though other (primarily European) 
donors appeared to share it too. Other commentators have similarly interpreted 
the Tribunal ‘as part of a new post­ 1989 aid strategy’ and an attempt ‘to signal 
adherence to the regional integration orthodoxies of its new lead donor: the 
European Economic Community’ (Brett 2018: 57, 58). The specific institutional 
details of the new Tribunal were to be laid down in a separate protocol.
International bargaining
Actual work on the Protocol began in early 1997. By the time that work on the 
protocol started, designing the Tribunal based on the template of the new dispute 
settlement system of the WTO, with which the Windhoek stipulations were fully 
compatible, appeared the more appropriate choice when compared to an EU­ type 
7 The decision to refer to it as an intergovernmental body of the community may suggest that 
member states were unaware of the actual competences that such a court would have.
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court for a group of countries that were largely unwilling to cede significant 
amounts of sovereignty. This collective preference had not fundamentally changed 
by then. For one, negotiations for the Tribunal Protocol started only several years 
after the Windhoek Treaty had entered into force. As Asmelash notes, ‘At the 
heart of the delay in adopting the Protocol was the reluctance of the SADC 
Member States to set up a supranational court that would compromise their 
national sovereignty. Several Member States were rather keen on less formal 
means such as arbitration and mediation’ (Asmelash 2017: 2). Hulse and van de 
Vleuten similarly note that ‘the Council and the Summit’s intrinsic motivations to 
establish even a simple inter­ state dispute settling Tribunal were quite low’ (Hulse 
and van der Vleuten 2015: 90). Moreover, in 1996, member states concluded the 
SADC Trade Protocol, which established a separate dispute settlement system 
based on ad hoc panels, and to which only member states had access—a clear 
indication that sovereignty remained a primary consideration of member states. 
Why did member states nevertheless decide to establish an ECJ­ type court?
Member states decided to ‘outsource’ the elaboration of the Protocol to exter­
nal experts. In the second half of 1996, they instructed a small expert panel—
composed of Namibian law professor Walter Kamba and then­ Advocate­ General 
from the European Court of Justice Francis Jacobs (Ruppel 2012: 92; Viljoen 1999: 
200)—to elaborate a draft proposal for the Tribunal (SADC Sector Coordinators 
1996: 799). The expert study was financed by the German Agency for International 
Cooperation (GIZ) (SADC Council of Ministers 1997: 78). The consultants pre­
sented a draft proposal to the member states in February 1997, which suggests the 
establishment of an EU­ type court—largely in line with the theme paper of the 
1992 Consultative Conference, and not surprising in view of the funders and 
writers of the proposal. The text recommends an individual right to access the 
Tribunal, and considers a ‘more general jurisdiction in relation to human rights’ 
(Viljoen 1999: 200).
A stronger commitment to human rights had been debated in the region since 
the transition from the old Conference to the Community. The SADC Treaty 
committed member states to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as 
general principles (art. 4), but it lacks an enforcement mechanism to give credence 
to these treaty stipulations. In February 1994, the SADC Secretariat organized a 
workshop for non­ governmental organizations on human rights, which was 
followed by a ministerial workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in July. 
Attended by representatives from non­ governmental organizations as well as 
government ministers and parliamentarians, the workshop adopted the ‘Windhoek 
Resolutions’ which called for the establishment of an SADC Human Rights 
Commission and an SADC Bill of Rights (SADC Council of Ministers 1994: 6, 42; 
see also Viljoen 1999: 201). These advances culminated, in 1996, in the drafting of 
a SADC Human Rights Charter by non­ governmental organizations from several 
member states (Ruppel 2012: 92)—shortly before work on the Tribunal Protocol 
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began. The draft proposal for the Tribunal Protocol considered these demands 
and advances that had taken place in the meantime.
However, legal experts from the member states who considered the proposal 
for the first time at a meeting in April 1997 rejected the idea of endowing the 
Tribunal with a general human rights jurisdiction. According to the record of the 
first legal experts’ meeting, they decided ‘to delink this matter from the jurisdic­
tion of the proposed Protocol for the reason that SADC would be required to 
develop a separate protocol or legal instrument to govern activities on human 
rights’ (quoted in Viljoen 1999: 201).8 South Africa, in particular, that was ini­
tially in favour of a regional human rights court (see African National Congress 
1993) had changed course on the matter ‘in order to protect its new Constitutional 
Court’ (Brett 2018: 58).
Once these decisions had been taken, work on the Protocol at the regional level 
and primarily among legal experts seems to have proceeded fairly smoothly. 
National legal experts met again in August 1997 and senior officials convened in 
early 1998, before a meeting of the SADC Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General 
in April 1998 adopted the draft protocol and sent it to member states ‘for consid­
eration and to satisfy their constitutional requirements’ (SADC Council of 
Ministers 1998: 123). The ministers explicitly noted that the creation of the tribu­
nal was ‘long over due and that the Tribunal should be created without further 
delay’ (SADC Secretariat 1998: 331), suggesting adoption by the Council and the 
Summit at their meetings in September 1998.
At this point in time, the protocol seems to have been largely finalized in terms 
of content, but this is when member states started dragging their feet reflecting 
continued concerns about national sovereignty. At its meeting in September 1998, 
the Council of Ministers decided that the draft protocol ‘not be recommended to 
the Summit for signature due to the ongoing consultations in Member States’ 
(SADC Council of Ministers  1998: 123). At the Council meeting in February 
1999, the ministers acknowledged that the majority of member states had not 
responded to the request sent by the Secretariat ‘to indicate their positions’ in 
order to finalize the adoption process (SADC Council of Ministers  1999b: 8). 
Another six months later, this situation had not changed. As a result, the Council 
repeated the same statement, word for word, at its meeting in August in Maputo 
(SADC Council of Ministers 1999a: 7) and the Summit, at its meeting in Maputo 
in the same month, was silent on the issue. The Council meeting in February 
2000 did not even mention the issue. It was not until the Council and Summit 
meetings in Windhoek in August 2000 that both bodies adopted the Protocol on 
8 Apparently, the legal experts who considered the proposal had simply ‘not been mandated by 
their respective governments to negotiate about the inclusion of human rights in the proposed tribu­
nal’s jurisdiction’ (Viljoen 1999: 201).
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the SADC Tribunal—two years after the Council of Ministers of Justice had 
re com mend ed the draft protocol for adoption by the Council and the Summit.
What might explain why member states consented to signing the protocol 
in  2000, while they seem to have been reluctant before? Again, it was a threat 
from the EU to stop funding the organization that seems to have induced 
 member states to prioritize their preference for continued donor support over their 
concerns about national sovereignty. Evidence on the three types of observable 
implications—timing, process, and outcome—support the argument that finan­
cial incentives from the EU made member states realize that their collective pref­
erences could no longer be pursued simultaneously. Regarding the timing of the 
decision, it is striking how the decision to adopt the Tribunal Protocol in August 
2000 followed on the heels of a second wave of major dissatisfaction by inter­
nation al donors, and above all the EU, regarding the organization’s performance. 
It was during this period that some bilateral donors started withdrawing their 
financial support while others, once again, considered such steps (Tjønneland 2006: 
20–21). At that time, rumours spread that the EU—by far the largest remaining 
donor—might rationalize its Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP). The Council 
of Ministers noted at its meeting in Windhoek in August 2000:
the EC may be considering to have only one or a few RIPs for Africa, as opposed 
to the current arrangements where there is a separate RIP for subregional groups 
of countries. Therefore, it is desirable that SADC negotiate and convince the EC to 
retain the RIP for the SADC region. (SADC Council of Ministers 2000: 81–82)
In a general context of uncertainty, European donors expressed particular doubts 
about the possibility of improving the record of the organization without an 
enhanced dispute settlement mechanism that could push member states to abide 
by their commitments (see SADC Council of Ministers, February 1999: 112). 
Once again, there is no evidence that EU actors (or others) ever explicitly con­
nected continued funding on the adoption of the Tribunal Protocol (see also Brett 
and Gissel  2018: 211). However, on various occasions EU­ oriented actors con­
veyed their views about ‘what an effective and credible dispute settlement mech­
an ism ought to entail’, as one of my interview partners recounted of Francis 
Jacobs, the Advocate­ General from the European Court of Justice who formed 
part of the expert group drafting the Protocol (Interview with Stephen Kokerai).
The argument that the EU, and especially the financial support it provides to 
SADC, are causally relevant for understanding the adoption of the Tribunal 
Protocol is also bolstered by process observations. Above all, actors intimately 
familiar with the adoption process have made similar arguments—even in public. 
Mauritian judge Ariranga Pillay, who served as chief justice in his home country 
from 1996 until 2007 and later became a judge on and the president of the SADC 
Tribunal, stated that member states created the Tribunal in order ‘to get funds 
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from the European Union and others’ by giving ‘off all the right buzz words, you 
know, “democracy, rule of law, human rights” ’ (Christie 2011). This is not sur­
prising given that a judge from the European Court of Justice participated in the 
drafting process of the Protocol—a fact that many interview partners recall 
 vividly. Charles Mkandawire, who was the registrar at the Tribunal during its 
op er ation, recounts that member states, when looking at article 21 on the applicable 
law and its broad formulation, ‘asked: who drafted this?’ (Interview with the 
author: 19 November 2015). Not surprisingly, therefore, member states later had 
regrets about the design of the Tribunal. During the debate surrounding the dis­
banding of the Tribunal ten years later, the Zimbabwean Minister of Justice, 
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Patrick Chinamasa, complained that the SADC 
Tribunal did not ‘bear the DNA imprint of Sadc countries’ (Zvayi 2011), suggest­
ing that their collective preference for the protection of national sovereignty had 
been ‘violated’ with the decision.
The institutional outcome, finally, displays clear similarity to its EU counter­
part. Member states adopted central design features from the ECJ, while mitigat­
ing its potential intrusiveness. On the one side, the Tribunal Protocol features an 
exclusive competence to constitutional review (SADC Tribunal Protocol 2000, 
art. 17), private access (arts. 15, 18), and a preliminary rulings procedure (art. 16), 
which is a literal copy of article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. It even goes beyond 
the ECJ’s competences by stipulating that non­ compliance suits can be brought 
directly by individuals when all other domestic remedies have been exhausted 
(art. 15b) and by explicitly providing for the development of ‘Community juris­
prudence’ (art. 21b) (for a good overview, see Ruppel and Bangamwabo 2008). 
On the other hand, policy­ makers carefully circumscribed the Tribunal’s compe­
tences to protect national sovereignty. The Protocol thus stipulates that sanctions 
in case of non­ compliance with a ruling could only be imposed by the Summit, 
acting as always by unanimity. Moreover, in the absence of a direct effect doctrine 
and a preliminary rulings procedure that does not require national courts of last 
instance to refer cases to the Tribunal, as in the EU, private access and even pre­
liminary rulings are much less likely to encroach on sovereignty. As long as mem­
ber states do not incorporate rules into their domestic legal corpus, those rules do 
not constitute claimable rights among citizens. The establishment of the Tribunal, 
therefore, reflects a collective strategy to ‘balance’ two competing preferences: 
attracting continued donor support and protecting national sovereignty.
This is further reflected in the fact that questions of how to finance the new 
institution was not much of a concern to policy­ makers during the negotiations 
and afterwards. In a Secretariat note to the Council in August 2000, before the 
adoption of the Protocol by the Council and the Summit, the Secretariat remarks 
that the ‘Council is invited to note that there will be financial implications in 
setting up the Tribunal’ (SADC Secretariat 2000: 444)—a formulation that the 
Summit endorsed at its meeting in August 2000 when it adopted the Tribunal 
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Protocol (SADC Summit 2000: 16). In 2003, the Council of Ministers started 
operationalizing the Tribunal while noting, ‘In view of the resource constraints 
facing Member States, and the fact that there are currently no cases pending, 
Council decided that the tribunal be operationalized at minimum cost’ (SADC 
Council of Ministers 2003: 71). This was possible because the EU was willing to 
step in with financial support—as it had done before. It provided an initial financial 
contribution of €215,000 under the Regional Integration Capacity Building 
Project (SADC Council of Ministers 2003: 71), which constitutes almost a third 
of the total financing of the Tribunal. Note that these commitments were made 
before the Tribunal had actually incurred any cost, since the judges were only 
sworn in in 2005. At the same time, SADC officials knew that the EU was willing 
to support the Tribunal financially on a more continuous basis. A Secretariat note 
in 2005 remarks, for example, ‘Council is invited to further note that European 
Union is prepared to consider further funding for the Tribunal should SADC pre­
sent a request for funding of Tribunal projects’ (SADC Secretariat 2005: 529). In 
return, however, the EU resolved ‘to monitor the implementation of SADC proto­
cols and policies [. . .] and the establishment of an SADC Tribunal’ (Tjønneland 
2006: 18). The tight dependence on the EU, including with regard to the Tribunal, 
continued after the decision to establish the body had been taken.
Moreover, the disbanding of the Tribunal after its contentious ruling in the 
Campbell case further bolsters the argument that the institution’s establishment 
reflects an institutional strategy to realize a preference for continued donor sup­
port over collective concerns about national sovereignty. After these rulings and 
other contentious decisions by the Tribunal, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete 
allegedly remarked to fellow heads of state, ‘We have created a monster that 
will devour us all’ (Christie  2011). At a meeting of the Council in April 2011, 
Zimbabwe raised the concern that the Tribunal should not have jurisdiction 
over matters regarding individuals and member states; Botswana shared these 
reservations, while South Africa apparently raised no objections (Christie 2011). 
Some member states, including the SADC Secretariat, were concerned about 
Zimbabwe’s non­ compliance with the ruling, arguing that ‘this would antagonise 
the international community; they argued that it would tarnish the reputation of 
Sadc’ (Zvayi 2011). Nevertheless, at that point in time member states prioritized 
their preference for retaining national sovereignty (and by implication a weaker 
dispute settlement system) – how this related to their preference for attracting 
donor support goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
Conclusion
Chapter 5 traces the EU’s active influence on the establishment of the Tribunal in 
the Southern African Development Community. It shows how the EU’s financial 
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 01/05/21, SPi
Active European Union Influence 133
support, and threats to reconsider it, shaped member states’ preference ordering 
and, as a result, induced an institutional strategy in favour of establishing and 
operationalizing the SADC Tribunal. Specifically, the financial dependence of 
SADC on EU financial support meant that the EU could force governments to 
prioritize their collective preference for securing donor support over their 
 preference to protect national sovereignty through limited institutionalization. 
In this context, the establishment of the Tribunal reflects member states’ col lect­
ive strategy when they realized that they could no longer satisfy both preferences 
simultaneously.
The evidence presented in this chapter strongly suggests that active EU influ­
ence played an important causal role in the establishment of the SADC Tribunal. 
Counterfactually, it is unlikely that the Tribunal would have been established in 
the mid­ 2000s in the absence of the EU’s active influence, given member states’ 
institutional preferences were stacked against it. They certainly weighted their 
concern for retaining national sovereignty more highly than the effective enforce­
ment of collective decisions as long as the external constraints on their preference 
ordering were modest. This only changed when the EU threatened to withdraw 
funding. Moreover, the organization’s activity, which, from a functional point of 
view, most strongly demanded a dispute settlement and enforcement mechanism, 
namely economic integration, already had an institutionalized dispute settlement 
mechanism contained in the 1996 Trade Protocol. Given the organization’s col­
lect ive preference for attracting donor support and the rather uniform constraint 
imposed by the EU’s threat to withdraw funding from the organization on indi­
vidual member states’ preferences, the outcome is a high degree of institutional 
similarity between the EU and SADC—until the Tribunal was disbanded in 2013. 
Specifically, the SADC Tribunal was a full­ fledged EU­ type court.
While the fate of the SADC Tribunal is unique among ROs, the way in which 
the EU contributed to its establishment is not. The EU provides substantial fund­
ing for many ROs in the global South, and such funding is often accompanied by 
regular contacts with EU officials and the provision of technical expertise in the 
creation of regional institutions and policies. Several ROs in the global South are 
highly dependent on EU funding, and bargaining power between the EU and 
many of its counterparts in the Global South is generally distributed in highly 
asymmetrical ways. Chapter  4 demonstrated that such engagement regularly 
induces higher levels of institutionalization in other ROs—the EU makes a coun­
terfactual difference. In the SADC case, however, this difference made possible 
the organization’s most severe crisis in recent history. In this sense also, active EU 
influence has been truly consequential—yet in ways not originally intended.
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6
Passive European Union Influence
Institutional Change in Mercosur
Chapter  4 showed that the EU’s own institutional evolution is associated with 
increases in the degree of institutionalization in the sample of ROs, and that this 
effect is particularly pronounced in ROs that rest on an open-ended contract. But 
what is the causal mechanism that underpins this correlation between passive EU 
influence and institutional change? In this chapter, I trace the respective pathway 
in a typical, inferentially powerful, and substantively important episode of 
regional institution building: the establishment of a Permanent Review Tribunal 
in Mercosur with the Protocol of Olivos adopted in 2002. Mercosur decision-
makers and policy experts have closely observed the European integration process 
from the organization’s inception and references to the EU are frequent in the 
secondary literature. Moreover, Mercosur is based on an open-ended contract, 
thereby fulfilling the scope condition for EU influence to operate.
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the 
hypothesized causal process of passive EU influence is indeed present in this insti-
tutional episode, and that it operates as theorized. Second, I also aim to show that 
passive EU influence forms a substantively important factor in understanding this 
specific institutional episode. I argue that a focus on passive EU influence gener-
ates counterfactually added value to explaining this process of institutional change 
in Mercosur. Specifically, I propose that Uruguay advanced the establishment of 
an EU-type dispute settlement mechanism in negotiations over a reform of 
Mercosur’s system in the early years of the new millennium, whereas Argentina 
and Brazil advanced proposals for a WTO-type system. The institutional outcome, 
adopted with the Olivos Protocol in 2002, constitutes a compromise between 
these two positions, with identifiable traces left by Uruguay’s insistence on an 
EU-type system, in particular the inclusion of consultative opinions and the pos-
sibility of the disputing parties to access the Permanent Review Tribunal directly.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part specifies the rationale for 
selecting the respective institutional episode in Mercosur. The second part gives 
some background on the chosen case and identifies the puzzle by engaging with 
alternative explanations that have been advanced to account for the establishment 
of international dispute settlement mechanisms. The third part traces the EU’s 
passive influence on the institutional strategies of governments and their 
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subsequent interaction in international negotiations over institutional change. 
The conclusion summarizes the main argument and specifies the extent of passive 
EU influence in this episode.
Case selection rationales: representativeness, causal leverage,  
and substantive importance
As with the analysis of active EU influence, this chapter also selects a case for 
within-case analysis on the basis of three criteria: representativeness, causal lever-
age, and substantive importance (Elman, Gerring, and Mahoney  2016: 378; 
Gerring 2008: 645; Seawright and Gerring 2008: 295–6). Within-case analysis is 
particularly important for examining the pathway of passive EU influence because 
this type of influence is not confined to a change in the EU’s institutional frame-
work as a key condition that triggers the causal process—an implication of the 
theory analysed in Chapter 4. Passive influence from the EU may even make a 
difference to processes of regional institution building when the initial impetus 
for institutional change is unrelated to the EU, such as the emergence of an 
ex ogen ous cooperation problem or crisis.
First, Mercosur is a near-representative case according to the multivariate stat-
is tic al analysis conducted in Chapter  4 because it displays low residuals 
(Lieberman 2005: 444; Gerring 2007a: 91–2). Figure 6.1 locates the organization 
prior to (2003) and after the establishment of the Permanent Review Tribunal 
(2004) in relation to the regression line of the model that examines passive EU 
influence (Model 5 in Table 4.4). As the figure indicates, Mercosur lies near the 
regression line for ROs with an open-ended contract prior to the establishment of 
the Permanent Review Tribunal, and then reaches a level of institutionalization 
afterwards, which other ROs with open-ended contracts roughly achieve towards 
the end of the observation period, on average. Thus, Mercosur is a ‘forerunner’ 
compared to other ROs in this category of contractual open-endedness to reach 
typical levels of institutionalization.
The Mercosur case also provides causal leverage because the operation of the 
passive EU influence pathway is possible due to the values on key independent 
variables of interest (see Mahoney and Goertz 2004). For one, Mercosur rests on 
an open-ended contract, which means that the nature of the organization is con-
ducive to the operation of the pathway. Moreover, due to the relative recency of 
the case, the EU’s close contact with the organization and the presence of active 
EU-oriented epistemic communities, information on EU institutions is readily 
available in the region, even for small states with limited bureaucratic resources. 
The EU’s direct engagement with Mercosur implies, however, that we cannot dis-
tinguish between active and passive EU influence by design; instead, we have to 
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do that through careful process tracing of the various parts of a social mechanism 
(see Beach and Pedersen 2018).
While rendering passive EU influence possible, Mercosur is not a most likely 
case for such influence due to the scepticism of the two largest member states, 
Argentina and Brazil, towards strong regional institutions and their overwhelm-
ing bargaining power. From the inception of the organization, the two largest 
member states were eager to have institutions follow actual achievements in inte-
gration rather than the other way around. This less institutionalized approach is 
generally considered the result of lessons learned from the experience of earlier 
integration efforts in Latin America, and reflects the preferences of Argentina and 
Brazil for full control over the process (Campbell, Rozemberg, and Svarzman 1999: 
145). It is therefore fair to say that Mercosur was, with regard to regional institu-
tions, designed as an ‘anti-EU’ project and Argentinean and Brazilian policy-
makers continue to eschew supranational institutions to this day. Vigevani and 
Cepaluni, for example, emphasize ‘Brazil’s plan to create a non-institutionalized 
Mercosur to preserve its autonomy and allow itself greater international insertion’ 
(Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009: xiii). Therefore, as mentioned above, it is difficult 
to demonstrate passive EU influence for Mercosur. As a result, if EU influence 
can be shown to make a difference under the unfavourable conditions that exist 





























Figure 6.1 Location of the Mercosur case in the multivariate analysis of passive EU 
influence
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For reasons outlined in the introduction, I examine passive EU influence not 
on Mercosur as a whole but on a more narrowly delineated institutional episode, 
the establishment of the Permanent Review Tribunal. This episode affords add-
ition al causal leverage because, as I detail in the next section below, many of the 
structural conditions that characterize the region in the early 2000s would not 
predict a further strengthening of the existing dispute settlement system. 
Therefore, Mercosur constitutes an unlikely case for change on this institutional 
dimension.
Finally, the establishment of the Permanent Review Tribunal is a substantively 
important case. Mercosur is arguably the most important RO in South America, 
home to the region’s two most economically powerful states, Argentina and 
Brazil. It is also quite successful. As Kaltenthaler notes, Mercosur is ‘an example of 
international integration that is only surpassed by the European Union in terms 
of the depth of the integration process’ (Kaltenthaler and Mora  2002: 73). 
Therefore, it forms an extensively studied case in research on regional organization, 
attesting to its relevance. What is more, dispute settlement is a key institutional 
dimension in any ambitious economic organization and one where much is at stake 
for member states. As the SADC case in the last chapter amply demonstrates, the 
national sovereignty costs of institutionalized dispute settlement can be con sid er-
able. Scholars readily recognize that the establishment of the Mercosur tribunal 
was an important event in the organization’s institutional evolution. As Arnold and 
Rittberger (2013) note, the Olivos Protocol introduces ‘far-reaching institutional 
reforms to the existing dispute settlement system’ (p. 98). So it is substantively 
relevant for understanding the organization and its institutional development.
In sum, tracing the passive influence of the EU on the establishment of the 
Permanent Review Tribunal in Mercosur provides a strong setting for comple-
mentary within-case analysis of the statistical regularities detected in Chapter 4 
because it is a near-representative case in relation to the group of organizations 
that rest on an open-ended contract. Moreover, it is inferentially powerful because 
it approaches Gerring’s ‘pathway case’ logic, especially as regards alternative 
explanations; and it is substantively important.
Dispute settlement in Mercosur
Mercosur is an RO in the Southern Cone of Latin America that was founded in 
1991 and currently encompasses five member states: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.1 Member states established a panel-based dispute 
1 The latter entered the organization in 2012 and was suspended in 2016 on the basis of the 1998 
Ushuaia Protocol on democratic commitment.
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settlement system in the 1991 Protocol of Brasília and upgraded it with the 2002 
Protocol of Olivos, which creates the Permanent Review Tribunal. I begin the 
analysis of passive EU influence by giving some background on the organization 
and outlining its institutional evolution, with a focus on dispute settlement. Next, 
I consider standard explanations for the establishment of dispute settlement 
mechanisms in relation to the organization. I then analyse the three steps of the 
causal process by engaging the distinct observable implications of the pathway.
Background: Mercosur and the evolution of institutionalized 
dispute settlement
Mercosur was founded by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in March 
1991 with the signing of the Treaty of Asunción. Widening earlier forms of bilat-
eral cooperation between Argentina and Brazil to incorporate the two smaller 
members Paraguay and Uruguay, Mercosur started with a minimum level of 
institutionalization. While the main goal of integration, the formation of a 
 common market, has not changed over time, economic cooperation has been 
complemented by functional cooperation in other areas, including social and 
cultural policies and the environment. Alongside this expansion in policy scope, 
the institutional framework of Mercosur has also evolved considerably. Today, 
Mercosur features three key central institutions—the Mercosur Secretariat, the 
Mercosur Parliament and the Review Tribunal—alongside two advisory bodies 
composed of non-state representatives: the Economic and Social Consultative 
Forum and the Consultative Forum of Municipalities, Federal States, Provinces 
and Departments.
Mercosur’s inception is rooted in the momentous changes that took place in 
the Southern Cone in the late 1970s and 1980s. In particular, the organization is a 
product of two transformational developments. The first one is Argentina and 
Brazil’s transition from decades of military dictatorship towards democracy, 
which enabled a gradual rapprochement. An early agreement on nuclear energy 
was soon followed by further functional cooperation in the realms of security, 
economics, and infrastructure, which ‘initiated a confidence-building process’ 
(Gardini 2005: 407) that ultimately resulted in the creation of Mercosur (for an 
overview, see Manzetti  1990). The second transformational development at the 
root of Mercosur is a convergence in Argentina and Brazil’s developmental pol-
icies away from a strategy of import substitution towards more outward-oriented 
economic policies. As a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s and the initial failure 
of domestic macroeconomic policies, efforts at integration in the Southern Cone 
developed from the late 1980s onwards in the ‘context of programmes for unilateral 
trade liberalization and structural adjustment’ (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002: 75). 
As policy-makers in Argentina and Brazil sought to stabilize their economies in 
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view of economic crises and amidst broader structural changes in the world 
economy, market integration with neighbouring states became a viable option.
After ten years of bilateral cooperation, Paraguay and Uruguay joined the 
Argentina–Brazil axis and Mercosur sought an ambitious programme of trade 
liberalization that envisaged the creation of a customs union and a common mar-
ket within four years. Mercosur’s first decade successfully focused on cooperation 
in economic affairs, with a manifold increase in the volume of intra-regional 
trade: intra-Mercosur exports rose five-fold between 1990 and 1998 and intra-
Mercosur trade as a percentage of the group’s total trade tripled between 1989 and 
1997 (Kaltenthaler and Mora  2002: 91). The financial crises that enveloped 
Argentina as a result of the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 1999 triggered a 
rethinking in the organization’s policy orientation. Mercosur expanded into non-
economic policy areas such as social, cultural, and educational policies, while 
economic integration stagnated and was even reversed (Carranza 2003; Goméz-
Mera  2005; Riggirozzi  2015). Since then, economic integration has stabilized 
while the organization has engaged in expansion. Venezuela joined in 2012 and is 
currently suspended under the 1998 Ushuaia Protocol on democratic commit-
ment. Mercosur is currently in the process of admitting additional members and 
intends a convergence with the Andean Community.
Despite affinities in purpose, the institutional framework differs markedly 
from that of the EU, even though Mercosur institutions have evolved from very 
low initial levels of institutionalization. The Treaty of Asunción contains a provi-
sional institutional framework, providing for three intergovernmental organs to 
guide the transition towards the common market: (1) a Common Market Council, 
comprised of foreign affairs and economic ministers, is entrusted with the pol it ical 
guidance to achieve the objectives of Mercosur; (2) a Common Market Group, 
composed of representatives from the foreign affairs and finance ministries as 
well as the central banks, proposes decisions based on the Council’s guidelines 
and receives technical and administrative support from a series of working groups 
(subgrupos de trabajo); and (3) a secretariat in Montevideo, Uruguay (arts. 9–16), 
complemented by a negotiation-based dispute settlement mechanism. The Ouro 
Preto Protocol, adopted in 1994, established the per man ent institutional struc-
ture of Mercosur, which confirmed the essential characteristics outlined in the 
founding treaty. It added a Trade Commission, which assists the Council in 
matters concerning the functioning of the customs union, and two consultative 
institutions: a Joint Parliamentary Commission and a Socio-Economic Consultative 
Forum (Sections 3–5).
After early success, serious domestic problems threatened the remarkable 
achievements in the late 1990s. The devaluation of Brazil’s currency in early 1999 
plunged Argentina into a severe economic and financial crisis, from which it is 
still recovering. Amidst increasingly frequent disputes over unilateral protective 
measures that contravened existing Mercosur agreements, integration began to 
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be seriously questioned (Carranza 2003; Mecham 2003). That the integration pro-
cess did not collapse entirely during this period is due to skilled presidential 
diplomacy and continuing convergent strategic interests between the partners 
(Malamud  2003; Goméz-Mera  2005). The crisis nevertheless revealed certain 
structural weaknesses in Mercosur, such as divergent macroeconomic policies or 
the relatively weak institutional framework, triggering a (partial) rethinking of 
the neoliberal integration paradigm of the 1990s (Phillips 2001). When new left-
wing governments entered office in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay in the early 
2000s, Brazilian President Lula announced a ‘relaunch’ of Mercosur. It was at that 
time that ‘suggestions about reforming Mercosur in the image of the EU’ were 
proposed (Mukhametdinov  2007: 224). After a failure to find agreement on a 
complete overhaul of Mercosur’s institutional framework, reform proceeded in a 
more piecemeal fashion and without any attempts to pool sovereignty. Policy-
makers created a Permanent Review Tribunal (see below) and extended the com-
petences of the Mercosur Secretariat to technical issues in 2002. A Committee of 
Permanent Representatives and a ‘European style structural fund’ (Dabène 2009: 
187) were established in 2003 and 2004 respectively. In 2007, the member states 
set up a directly elected Mercosur Parliament, and the creation of a Mercosur 
Court of Justice is currently under discussion. These institutional innovations 
have contributed to a revival of Mercosur integration, admittedly without being 
able to rekindle the initial enthusiasm.
Mercosur’s dispute settlement mechanism is today the most strongly institu-
tionalized supranational body of the organization, and it has taken a remarkable 
development path since the organization’s founding. The Treaty of Asunción con-
tained a provisional dispute settlement mechanism according to which disputes 
were to be settled through direct negotiations between the parties and ultimately, 
if unsuccessful, by a non-binding recommendation of the Common Market 
Council (annex III). The 1991 Protocol of Brasília introduced judicialized third 
party review, which became an integral part of the Treaty of Asunción (Protocol 
of Brasília 1991, art. 33) and its successor, the Ouro Preto Protocol (art. 43). After 
direct negotiations and, if requested, a recommendation by the Common Market 
Group (Chapters 2 and 3), either party can refer the dispute to an ad hoc panel, 
which issues binding awards (arts. 9 and 21). Despite the mechanism’s independ-
ence, access was strongly controlled by member states: private actors need to file a 
brief with the national sections of the Common Market Group, which act as gate-
keepers (Chapter 5). The ad hoc panel can also mandate, upon request by one of 
the disputing parties, the imposition of ‘temporary compensatory measures’, 
which may entail the temporary suspension of concessions (art. 23).
Member states reformed the dispute settlement mechanism with the 2002 
Olivos Protocol, which aims to ‘guarantee the correct implementation, applica-
tion and enforcement of the fundamental tools of the integration process and the 
set of rules of Mercosur, in a consistent and systematic manner’ (Protocol of 
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Olivos 2002, preamble). The Protocol maintains the automatic right to review by 
an ad hoc arbitration panel (art. 10), and adds a Permanent Review Tribunal as a 
second layer, which acts as a court of last instance (Tribunal Permanente de 
Revisión, art. 18). The Tribunal is a standing court ‘with its own infrastructure 
and budget’ (Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 102) that was set up in 2004 with its 
seat in Asunción, Paraguay, after the entrance into force of the Olivos Protocol. It 
is composed of five arbitrators, one of whom is selected for a two-year term, 
renewable, by each member state, while the fifth is nominated jointly for a period 
of three years (art. 18). The decisions of the Arbitration Court are directly binding 
and cannot be appealed (art. 26).2 Non-compliance with the Court’s decisions 
allows the other party ‘to start the application of temporary compensatory meas-
ures’ (art. 31)—a process that is elaborated in much more detail in the Olivos 
Protocol. Private access remains very indirect because national committees have 
to approve claims filed by private individuals or corporations (Chapter  11). In 
addition to being a means of last resort for ad hoc arbitration, the Permanent 
Review Tribunal can also issue consultative opinions (opiniones consultativas) 
(art. 3). These are non-binding and can be requested by member states acting 
jointly, by Mercosur decision-making bodies, by the Mercosur Parliament, and by 
national supreme courts (Decision CMC/37/03, arts. 2 and 11). While consulta-
tive opinions are not directly related to the access of private actors to the dispute 
settlement system, they nevertheless imply that ‘private actor cases may reach the 
MERCOSUR Permanent Review Court’ circumventing national government’s 
gate-keeping role (Alter 2014: 86). Nevertheless, national supreme courts act as 
gatekeepers in embedding Mercosur’s rules in domestic legal systems by declar-
ing national courts’ referrals to the Permanent Review Tribunal admissible (Kühn 
Baca 2017: 413). As of February 2021, three consultative opinions have been 
rendered.3
The Olivos Protocol marks a significant increase in the institutionalization of 
dispute settlement in Mercosur. Applying Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter’s 
(2000) ideal typical distinction between interstate and transnational dispute 
settle ment, Arnold and Rittberger (2013) find that the Olivos reform marks a 
‘qualitative shift’ from interstate conflict litigation ‘towards a more transnational 
DSS [dispute settlement system]’ (pp. 101, 102). Contrasting the WTO and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) models, both of which are strongly institutional-
ized, Alter and Lenz find that Mercosur’s post-Olivos dispute settlement pro ced-
ure largely builds on the WTO model, but includes elements of the ECJ model, 
primarily in the form of the preliminary ruling mechanism, which is copied from 
2 As of Feb. 2021, the Permant Review Tribunal has rendered six rulings (https://www.mercosur.
int/quienes-somos/solucion-controversias/laudos/, accessed 22 Feb. 2021).
3 https://www.mercosur.int/quienes-somos/solucion-controversias/opiniones-consultivas/ 
(accessed 17 Feb. 2021).
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the European Court of Justice (Alter 2014: 92, 206; Lenz 2012a: 168).4 According 
to the quantitative measure discussed in Chapter 4, the Olivos reforms move the 
dispute settlement system from four to five points on a seven-point scale, marking 
an increase of 25 per cent.
What explains the Permanent Review Tribunal’s establishment  
and design? Existing explanations
Chapter 5 reviews a range of explanations for the establishment of dispute settle-
ment mechanisms in IOs. This section reconsiders these explanations, and adds 
an additional one related to learning, in light of the Mercosur case. I argue that 
the establishment of the Permanent Review Tribunal also poses a theoretical puz-
zle, even though the structural conditions in Mercosur are quite different from 
those in SADC. As before, these explanations overwhelmingly share a conceptual 
focus on the regional level of analysis—that is, they assume that the causally rele-
vant incentives and constraints on member states’ institutional design choices 
concern the attributes of ROs and their constituent member states. A plausible 
explanation at the global level of analysis suggests that ROs align their dispute 
settlement systems with that of the WTO of which they are a member. These 
explanations are summarized in Table 6.1.
First, the establishment of the Permanent Review Tribunal—a more independ-
ent institution than the mechanism that existed prior—is unexpected in view of 
the fact that especially the two biggest Mercosur member states, Argentina and 
Brazil, have been and continue to be concerned about a loss of national sover-
eignty (Moravcsik 2000: 227; Smith 2000: 144–5). It is well documented that 
Argentina and Brazil try to minimize the independence of regional institutions 
and to retain their own national sovereignty as much as possible, as is reflected in 
the strongly intergovernmental institutional framework agreed upon by member 
states at Ouro Preto (Vaz 2002; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009: ch. 6). Argentina 
and Brazil put in place a number of institutional safeguards to ensure that they 
retain control over the process of dispute settlement. Among these safeguards are: 
private access remains highly restricted; awards handed down by the ad hoc 
 panels and the Permanent Review Tribunal cannot be enforced directly through 
national legal systems; and the Tribunal’s consultative opinions are advisory only. 
Nevertheless, these explanations are less able to account for institutional evolu-
tion over time. If we assume that Argentina and Brazil have a fairly stable 
4 There has been debate, especially among legal scholars, about setting up a Mercosur Court of 
Justice (see e.g. Logar 1997; Scotti and Klein Vieira 2013). In 2010 the Mercosur Parliament lent its 
support to the idea by presenting member states with a draft protocol, but member states have so far 
failed to consider it (for a detailed analysis, see Kühn Baca 2017).
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institutional preference for preserving national sovereignty, why do they consent 
to the design of a novel dispute settlement system that is significantly more legal-
ized, and therefore sovereignty-constraining, than its predecessor?
Compounding this puzzle is the fact that these two largest members dominate 
the organization due to the enormous power asymmetries in Mercosur. Large 
power asymmetries are generally expected to inhibit legalization, because strong 
states are able to realize their preferences through unilateral action and weak 
cooperative institutions (Arnold and Rittberger  2013; Smith 2000: 149; Abbott 
and Snidal  2000: 448; Grieco  1990). The power asymmetries in Mercosur are 
exceptionally large due to the membership of Brazil in a few-member organiza-
tion. In 2002, when the Olivos Protocol on dispute settlement was adopted, Brazil 
accounted for 81 per cent of total GDP and almost 80 per cent of the total popula-
tion in the organization, according to data from the World Bank.5 At the same 
time, Brazil is relatively less dependent on the regional market than are other 
5 The two biggest states taken together represent more than 96% of total GDP and of the total 
population.
Table 6.1. Existing explanations of international dispute settlement design and 
Mercosur
Explanation Mercosur situation Expected outcome
Regional level of analysis
Sovereignty 
concerns
Large member states, Argentina and 
Brazil, share strong concern about 
national sovereignty.
Detrimental to strong(er) 
dispute settlement.
Power asymmetry High; low dependence on regional 
market of regional hegemon, Brazil.
Detrimental to strong(er) 
dispute settlement.
Functionalism •  Limited and decreasing intraregional 
interdependence.
•  Ambitious integration objective 
(common market, customs union).
•  Lowering transaction costs;  
reassuring investors.
Detrimental to strong(er) 
dispute settlement.
Conducive to strong 






Low usage rates of earlier dispute 
settlement mechanism; minor issues 
referred to arbitration.
Detrimental to strong(er) 
dispute settlement.
Regime type Member states are executive-dominated 
democracies.
Potentially conducive to 
strong(er) dispute 
settlement.
Global level of analysis
WTO membership Holds for all member states. Adoption of WTO model.
Source: author’s depiction.
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member states, enhancing its relative bargaining power over institutional out-
comes (for the general argument, see Krapohl and Fink 2013: 484). This situ ation 
was amplified by the financial crisis in the region that preceded the reform of the 
dispute settlement mechanism. According to data presented in Arnold and 
Rittberger (2013: 110) for Brazil, only about 10 per cent of its external trade 
(imports and experts) depends on the regional market. As in the SADC case, 
when the regional hegemon is also the least dependent on the regional market, an 
institutionalized dispute settlement mechanism is unlikely to emerge. Combining 
the sovereignty-preserving preferences of Argentina and Brazil with the highly 
uneven distribution of power in the organization, the increasing institutionaliza-
tion of dispute settlement constitutes a veritable theoretical puzzle.
Functional arguments explain why sovereignty concerns are generally not the 
only consideration of policy-makers in the design of international institutions. 
After all, in order to reap the benefits of international cooperation, some pooling 
and delegation of sovereignty is commonly required and tends to make co oper ation 
more efficient (Keohane 1984). Specifically, more legalized dispute settle ment is 
expected to enhance treaty compliance, which is particularly valuable when the 
anticipated benefits of cooperation are high (Allee and Elsig 2016: 96; Arnold and 
Rittberger 2013: 105–6; Smith 2000: 149–50; generally, Hawkins et al. 2006; Stone 
Sweet and Brunell  1998). It is an anomaly for functional institutionalism that 
member states started debating a further institutionalization of dispute settle-
ment at a time when the anticipated benefits of cooperation were plummeting 
due to the financial crisis in the region. In general, while intraregional inter-
depend ence rose significantly during Mercosur’s first decade, it remains limited 
in a broader comparative perspective, especially for the organization’s larger 
member states (Garzón 2017; Lenz 2018: 37). Moreover, the ob ject ives of the inte-
gration process did not change during this period but have remained ambitious: 
the creation of a common market and customs union. And while the cooperation 
problems that underly ambitious economic integration are generally complex, 
involving commitment problems, enforcement problems, and uncertainty about 
future states of the world problems (see Koremenos  2007), these problems are 
fairly constant over time, and do not easily account for changes in Mercosur’s 
dispute settlement procedure with the Olivos Protocol.
In a rational institutionalist argument that aligns with this functionalist line of 
reasoning, Arnold and Rittberger (2013) propose that the decision for reform was 
an attempt to reassure investors of the continued viability of Mercosur in view of 
the crisis, as well as an attempt to lower the transaction costs of litigation in view 
of experience with prior rulings. How credible, however, is such a signal, given 
member states’ low usage rates of the earlier dispute settlement mechanism? If 
member states prefer to settle disputes diplomatically in a system with limited 
legalization, are they likely to use a more legalized system more in the future (see 
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also below)? Moreover, conceiving of the dispute settlement system as an assur-
ance mechanism for international investors largely fails to detail the specific insti-
tutional design features chosen. And how, specifically, does the establishment of a 
Permanent Review Tribunal, an appeal body, lower transaction costs? While 
member states may be eager to seek an institutional guarantee ‘allowing a losing 
country another chance to argue against the ad hoc tribunal’s decision’ (Arnold 
and Rittberger 2013: 117), thereby lowering transaction costs, a standing tribunal 
also generates significant costs to finance its establishment and operation. As one 
of the high-level participants in the negotiation, former Uruguayan Foreign 
Minister Didier Opertti, remarks, ‘This Tribunal implies a budget, this Tribunal 
implies a cost’ (Opertti 2004: 154, my translation)6—a distributional effect that 
may weigh even more heavily during times of economic crisis. Moreover, some 
institutional features of the new arrangement, such as the ability to issue consulta-
tive opinions or to use the Tribunal not as an appellate body but as a permanent 
arbitrator, are difficult to explain by transaction cost considerations.
Deepening the puzzle is the fact that member states barely used the previous 
dispute settlement mechanism under the Protocol of Brasília, as they settled their 
disputes mainly through diplomatic channels.7 According to the official website, 
the first award was handed down in 1999—eight years after the mechanism’s 
adoption and six years after its entry into force—and only three awards had been 
given under the protocol until the negotiations for a reform of dispute settlement 
started in May 2000 and five until the negotiations were concluded in 2001.8 
Tallberg and Smith (2014: 139) report that between 1993 and 2005, roughly 20 
interstate disputes were referred to ad hoc panels, of which 10 developed into for-
mal proceedings. This is a remarkably low number in view of the fact that the 
financial crisis in the region that started in 1999 meant that trade conflicts multi-
plied. According to data presented in Gómez-Mera (2013: 17–19), between 1992 
and 2004 there were 31 unilateral and negotiated measures that restricted trade 
only between Argentina and Brazil, thus indicating potential or actually settled 
cases that did not reach the arbitration procedure.9 Moreover, states tended to 
refer the less important issues to arbitration. As Vinuesa notes, ‘only minor differ-
ences have been taken to arbitration in comparison with the impressive agenda of 
potential controversies that were permanently an important part of Mercosur’s 
6 All translations of Spanish or Portuguese texts in this chapter are my own, unless noted otherwise.
7 An Argentinean member of the Common Market Group, which handled many of these com-
plaints, reports that ‘there were other controversies that did not reach the protocol of Brasília ad hoc 
procedure but were handled through these systems that we have that are not jurisdictional [. . .] and 
there was always a lot of good will to resolve conflicts’ (interview with Garcia del Rio, Buenos Aires: 
11 Aug. 2015).
8 https://www.mercosur.int/quienes-somos/solucion-controversias/laudos/ (accessed 17 Feb. 2021).
9 Out of the 10 formal awards under the Brasília Protocol, 5 involved Argentina and Brazil. The 
other 5 involved other combinations of member states, indicating that trade conflicts occurred not 
only between Argentina and Brazil.
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recent negotiating history’ (cited in Tallberg and Smith 2014: 139, my emphasis). 
The low usage rates of arbitration and the minor nature of the conflicts that 
reached arbitration compound the theoretical puzzle. Why do states formally 
strengthen an institution that they barely use and, when they do, only for minor 
conflicts? As we will see, some institutional changes at Olivos constitute an 
attempt to improve the system in view of deficiencies that had started to surface 
with the existing system, but explanatory gaps remain.
The main theoretical anomalies of the Olivos Protocol remain when one con-
siders that all four Mercosur member states are democracies that are generally 
considered to be more likely to commit to supranational dispute settlement 
(Risse-Kappen 1995; Simmons 2009). Despite their formally democratic charac-
ter, most countries in Latin America, including the largest countries in Mercosur, 
Argentina and Brazil, have strongly centralized political systems in which the 
devolution of power is limited (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; O’Donell 1994). 
Nevertheless, the democratic record of Latin American states since their return to 
democracy is broadly in line with the expectation of an institutionalized dispute 
settlement mechanism. Whether the consolidation of democracy since the 
Protocol of Brasília was enacted in 1991 is fully aligned with a significant legaliza-
tion in Olivos, however, is a different question.
Finally, an explanation at the global level of analysis may posit that ROs focus-
ing on economic issues are likely to align their dispute settlement systems with 
the arrangement in the WTO, which marked a significant move towards more 
legalization when compared to the prior system (see Keohane, Moravcsik, and 
Slaughter 2000). The transaction costs of a more institutionalized system in the 
RO are certainly lower when the member states are also members of the WTO 
and therefore subject to its compulsory jurisdiction because, unless explicitly pro-
hibited, they can take an economic dispute within the RO to the WTO system. All 
Mercosur members at the Olivos negotiations are also members of the WTO, and 
should therefore be open to the idea of ‘upgrading’ the previous system in the 
Brasília Protocol to the WTO level of institutionalization. As Alter (2012) sug-
gests, in regional economic organizations, the WTO dispute settlement system 
serves as ‘a default system for resolving trade disputes’ (p. 138). And indeed, the 
Olivos Protocol shares key institutional features with the WTO system. However, 
the empirical record reveals that reference to the WTO played little role during 
the negotiations. In fact, Brazil especially has pursued distinct institutional agendas 
in Mercosur and internationally. Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009) contend that the 
Cardoso government’s quest for autonomy through participation led it to ‘pursue 
a non-institutionalist approach to Mercosur, whilst taking an institutionalist 
approach to its multilateral agenda, particularly regarding global organizations 
such as the United Nations and the WTO’ (p. 56). Moreover, some design elem-
ents go beyond the WTO, including the preliminary rulings system and the fact 
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that the Permanent Review Tribunal can be used as a court of first instance rather 
than merely an appellate body, as in the WTO.
Taken together, the establishment of Mercosur’s Review Tribunal constitutes a 
theoretical puzzle from the perspective of most existing explanations of inter-
nation al dispute settlement design, whether they are located at the regional or 
global levels of analysis. Even if plausible explanations have been advanced to 
account for its establishment, there remain explanatory gaps with regard to specific 
institutional design features adopted at Olivos.
Establishing the Permanent Review Tribunal: the role  
of Uruguay’s EU-type institutional strategy
This section traces the establishment of the Permanent Review Tribunal in two 
steps. The first part analyses the (main) governments’ institutional preferences 
and strategies to identify whether, and how, the EU might have passively shaped 
the resulting negotiating positions. The second part examines how these positions 
are reflected in the final negotiating outcome. To the extent that we can trace the 
causal influence of governments’ preferences and strategies, which were shaped 
by the EU’s passive influence, on the institutional outcome, we may claim that EU 
influence made an identifiable difference.
I argue that Uruguay’s institutional strategy, since about 1994, has been the 
establishment of a Mercosur Court of Justice that is modelled on the ECJ, and 
that this is the strategy that Uruguay sought to advance in the Olivos ne go ti ations. 
This strategy is not the result of active EU influence, and therefore constitutes an 
example of learning and emulation—in other words, passive influence from the 
EU. The larger member states’ preferences have evolved over time, but influence 
from the EU is more difficult to discern. The Olivos Protocol is the result of a 
compromise between different negotiating positions. While the institutional pref-
erences of Argentina and Brazil are more strongly reflected in the final outcome, 
it is due to Uruguay’s strategy to establish an EU-type court of justice that the 
Olivos Protocol entails two institutional features: the provision that the Permanent 
Review Tribunal can issue consultative opinions; and the provision that the two 
parties to a dispute can file a claim directly with the Permanent Review Tribunal, 
without going through an ad hoc arbitration panel first. This stipulation makes 
the Review Tribunal more than a mere appellate body, as it exists for example in 
the WTO, but a proper court that rules on both the facts of a case as well as the 
applicable law. I propose that, counterfactually, had Uruguay not adopted an 
‘EU-type’ institutional strategy, these two design features would not have been 
included in the Olivos Protocol. Passive EU influence, I submit, nudged the dispute 
settlement system in Mercosur towards higher levels of institutionalization.
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Institutional preferences and strategies
Institutional preferences over the form of regional integration in Mercosur have 
long been divided between two ‘camps’. On the one side are the larger members, 
Argentina and Brazil, which generally have been reluctant to create strong 
regional institutions and have favoured intergovernmental arrangements over 
which they have full control. On the other side are Paraguay and Uruguay, the 
two smaller members, which have been in favour of strong(er) regional institu-
tions in order to bind the larger member states and thereby to counterbalance the 
large economic asymmetries in the organization. This preference divergence 
between larger and smaller member states has characterized most institutional 
negotiations in Mercosur since its inception.
The institutional preference divergence between Argentina and Brazil on the 
one side and Paraguay and Uruguay on the other has also been visible in ne go ti-
ations over Mercosur’s dispute settlement system since the beginning. During 
negotiations on the Protocol of Brasília in 1991, Brazil was the most reluctant 
member and sought a purely negotiation-based arrangement (Vaz 2002: 183; see 
also Rey Caro 2004: 194). Paraguay and Uruguay were in favour of a strong 
regional dispute settlement system,10 while Argentina had an interest in commit-
ting Brazil to some institutionalized arrangement that would involve third-party 
adjudication. As Felix Peña, an Argentinian official who participated in the ne go-
ti ations, recounts:
Our concern was to get Brazil to sign on to an institutionalized form of dispute 
settlement that would go beyond mere negotiation. [. . .] A stable process could 
not depend on the goodwill and consent of a single country. We were still in the 
period before the creation of the WTO and the dispute settlement system, which 
exceeded what came from the GATT, in which a country could block the dispute 
settlement system. My obsession was to avoid that Brazil could block the 
process.11
However, negotiations were conducted fairly quickly, and the smaller member 
states especially found it difficult to develop detailed negotiating positions. This 
was to change subsequently.
Key figures in the Uruguayan government had been interested in the EU model 
since the early days of Mercosur, and held a vague institutional preference to fol-
low the EU model in key areas of Mercosur’s institutional framework. Yet it was 
only in the wake of negotiations over the Brasília Protocol that the government 
10 Interview with José Büttner, Paraguayan government official, 24 July 2015.
11 Interview with Felix Peña, Buenos Aires, 30 July 2015.
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started to develop a detailed institutional strategy regarding the organization’s 
dispute settlement mechanism. In 1991 or 1992, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
organized a seminar on the creation of a court of justice in Mercosur. Among the 
participants of the event were two theorists and practitioners of legal integration 
closely associated with the ECJ: one was Pierre Pescatore, who served as a judge at 
the ECJ between 1967 and 1985, and Fernando Uribe Restrepo, who at the time 
served as a judge at the Andean Tribunal of Justice, the ‘ECJ’s jurisdictional 
cousin’ (Alter and Helfer  2010: 563). In the wake of the seminar, the National 
Commission of Layers in Uruguay produced a detailed draft on the creation of a 
Mercosur court of justice (Kühn Baca 2017: 440; Dreyzin de Klor 2003: 8), which 
has since informed Uruguay’s position in negotiations over the revision of 
Mercosur’s dispute settlement system.12
Uruguay’s institutional strategy involves, at its core, the establishment of a 
Mercosur court of justice along the lines of the ECJ. On various occasions, 
Minister Didier Opertti has confirmed this position, both publicly and in private 
(see Dreyzin de Klor 2003: 7–8).13 In the context of a celebration of the twentieth 
anniversary of the Latin American Integration Association at the Uruguayan 
Parliament on 9 November 2000, for example, he lamented the lack of both ‘com-
munity law’ and ‘a court’ needed to ensure the ‘control of legality’ as the EU had 
shown, and insisted on the transfer of the European model to Mercosur (Denot 
Medeiros 2000a: 2). This strategy for the establishment of a court involves the 
following features that are characteristic of the ECJ (Alter 2012): the creation of a 
permanent court with compulsory jurisdiction; one that is able to hear cases 
between states as well as between states and private actors (private access); whose 
decisions are directly binding on member states; and a preliminary rulings sys-
tem that allows actors to request binding advisory opinions from the court on 
matters involving Mercosur law.14 Moreover, Uruguay sought to upgrade 
Mercosur’s administrative secretariat to a technical secretariat that would inter 
alia have the competence to monitor compliance with a ruling (Dreyzin de Klor 
2003: 8; Martínez Puñal 2003: 178; Perotti 2001/2002: 4).
Argentina and Brazil changed their institutional preferences during the late 
1990s, primarily in light of their experience with the actual functioning of the 
dispute settlement mechanism and the financial crisis that enveloped the region 
around the turn of the millennium (see Arnold and Rittberger 2013). During the 
negotiations on the Ouro Preto Protocol, both countries agreed that there was no 
need to revise the mechanism, and decided to integrate the Brasília Protocol into 
Ouro Preto. For most of the 1990s Mercosur made good progress: intraregional 
12 According to Vaz (2002: 221) Uruguay tabled the proposal during the negotiations on the Ouro 
Preto Protocol, where it failed to be considered.
13 Interview with Didier Opertti, Montevideo, 3 Aug. 2015.
14 Interview with Garcia del Rio, Buenos Aires, 11 Aug. 2015; interview with Didier Opertti, 
Montevideo, 3 Aug. 2015.
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trade grew at impressive rates, and emerging disputes were generally settled 
through diplomatic negotiations. This changed with the financial crisis that 
started in 1999, and led both states to reconsider their preferences regarding 
Mercosur, including dispute settlement. Strong tensions between the two coun-
tries raised serious concerns regarding the sustainability of regional integration—
and both countries eventually agreed to relaunch integration rather than to scale 
it back or to abandon it all together.
Among member states, Brazil has long been the most sceptical of a strongly 
institutionalized Mercosur. After the Protocol of Brasília was adopted in 1991, 
Brazil rejected any revision of the dispute settlement system for a long time, even 
though the Protocol explicitly provides for such a revision. Alluding to Uruguay’s 
quest for supranational institutions, including a supranational dispute settlement 
mechanism, Brazil’s Vice-President Marcos Marciel de Oliveira, in a speech to the 
Paraguayan Congress in February 1997, defended the institutional status quo:
Governments as well as private initiatives, businessmen, companies, and citizens 
can call upon the dispute settlement system whenever and however often 
they consider it necessary. [. . .] Our institutions have produced excellent results 
so far and will render the adoption of models that do not correspond to our 
necessities and common experiences obsolete in the end. 
(cited in Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 113)
Nevertheless, during the financial crisis, Brazil decided to deepen its commit-
ment to Mercosur due to several external developments in the international 
economy, including the reinvigoration of the negotiations for a Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas, the failed ministerial negotiations at the WTO in 
Seattle, and renewed interest from the EU in a bi-regional trade deal. As Gómez-
Mera argues, ‘In light of the various external challenges faced by Brazil in the 
late 1990s, the foreign policy elite viewed a reinvigoration and strengthening of 
MERCOSUR as the best strategic option’ (Gómez-Mera  2013: 116; see also 
Vigevani and Cepaluni  2009: 69–73). This ushered in the so-called relaunch 
agenda that Brazil promoted during Argentina’s presidency of Mercosur in the 
first half of 2000. The core of this agenda was to complete the customs union, and 
update the institutional framework in light of this goal. Negotiations over a revi-
sion of the dispute settlement system were, according to Brazil’s then Foreign 
Minister, Celso Lafer, ‘an investment in the credibility of the project’, because 
Olivos ‘was in line with institution building, and therefore it went beyond the 
idea of being intergovernmental.’15
15 Phone interview with Celso Lafer, 7 Aug. 2015. Given the crisis situation, institution building 
‘was also an area where it was possible to think and act without such a direct influence of the difficult 
economic situation’ (interview with Carlos Márcio Cozenday, Brasília, 6 Aug. 2015).
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Initially, Brazil envisaged only minor procedural adjustments to the existing 
dispute settlement mechanism, in light of the experience that policy-makers had 
collected with its functioning to date. In a public debate, the country’s ambassa-
dor to Mercosur, José Artur Denot Medeiros, reiterated that ‘for Brazil, the 
relaunch means continuing Mercosur’s negotiation process—and not an “over-
haul”—based on a renewed political “push” of the Governments of the Member 
States’ (Denot Medeiros 2000b: 2). This is in line with Brazil’s principled position 
that an institutional deepening of Mercosur ‘must result from the effective needs 
of the integration process itself ’ (Denot Medeiros 2001: 3). An Argentinean 
policy-maker involved in the negotiations remarks,
Brazil, I don’t think, had anything too specific. It was the way it was accompany-
ing it [Protocol of Olivos]. Yes, they considered the general review necessary; 
they had also had experience with awards; we’ve all participated in one case. 
They said: ‘well, let’s settle things.’ The reform of the Olivos Protocol was never 
considered, at least at the negotiating table, as a substantial reform and as a, let’s 
say, ‘everything we had so far isn’t working and we have to start again [. . .]’, no, it 
was an improvement.16
Initial proposals included that the intervention of the Common Market Group in 
the resolution of disputes would be optional rather than mandatory; and that the 
Common Market Council should be the body clarifying the content and scope of 
arbitration awards (Dreyzin de Klor 2003: 6–7). Brazil was also in favour of study-
ing simplified procedures for the settlement of disputes in particular issue areas, 
such as rules of origin and anti-dumping (Dreyzin de Klor 2003: 6–7).17
Argentina was hit hard by the financial crisis in the late 1990s. The Argentinean 
economy slid into recession, and disappointment regarding Brazil’s unilateral 
devaluation was widespread. Nevertheless, Argentina’s foreign policy elite never 
questioned its commitment to Mercosur, because other strategic options were 
scarce. As Felix Peña, a high-level ministerial official in Argentina at the time, 
puts it, ‘a “serious” Mercosur [. . .], with few high-quality rules and institutions, 
[is] still the best option that the four member states have for the demanding world 
of globalization and of big regional blocs’ (Peña 2001). After the new government 
of Fernando de la Rúa entered office in December 1999, Argentina and Brazil 
quickly started work on the relaunch agenda.
Argentina had two key institutional demands in the Olivos negotiations: a 
stipulation that would allow member states to choose whether to file a dispute in 
Mercosur or at the WTO; and the establishment of an appellate mechanism that 
would allow parties to a dispute to have the awards of the ad hoc panels reviewed 
16 Interview with Garcia del Rio, Buenos Aires, 11 Aug. 2015.   17 Ibid.
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(Dreyzin de Klor 2003: 6; Perotti 2001/2: 5; see also Gómez-Mera 2013: 127).18 
This position was the result of the country’s bad experience with the second and 
third awards issued by the ad hoc arbitration system, which made Argentina 
question the stipulation in the Brasília Protocol that ad hoc awards are final and 
binding (art. 21) (Arnold and Rittberger  2013: 115–16). In September 1999, 
Argentina lost a case against Brazil regarding subsidies for the production and 
export of pork meat; and in March 2000, it lost to Brazil on the issue of safeguard 
measures on textile products. Argentina was also open to studying the creation of 
a judicial body that would authoritatively interpret Mercosur law in order to 
enhance the consistency of the application of Mercosur law (Dreyzin de Klor 
2003: 6).
International bargaining
The dispute settlement system established with the Protocol of Brasília was envis-
aged to be transitory. The Protocol declares that it ‘will remain in force until the 
Permanent System for Dispute Settlement [. . .] comes into force’ (art. 34, Protocol 
of Brasília).
A first opportunity to revise the system emerged during the negotiations of the 
Ouro Preto Protocol, which at the end of 1994 consolidated Mercosur’s institu-
tional framework. Due to the insistence of Argentina and Brazil, however, mem-
ber states agreed to maintain the existing dispute settlement system, ‘making 
adjustments as necessary to adapt it to the new organic structure of Mercosur’ 
(Vaz 2002: 220–21). As a result, the Ouro Preto Protocol notes that ‘before com-
pleting the process of convergence of the Common External Tariff, the States 
Parties will carry out a review of the current Mercosur dispute settlement system 
with a view to adopting the permanent system’ (art. 44). Even if the smaller mem-
ber states had not succeeded in convincing the larger members that a more insti-
tutionalized arrangement for dispute settlement should be established from the 
outset, it was clear that they would get another chance to push for a stronger sys-
tem. The by-law to the protocol, adopted in 1998, states unequivocally that such 
specifications serve the purpose ‘to ensure the growing effectiveness of Mercosur’s 
dispute settlement mechanisms and to guarantee the legal certainty of the inte-
gration process’ (Decision CMC 17/98).
The worsening financial crisis around the turn of the millennium provided a 
window of opportunity to embark upon a reform of Mercosur’s dispute settle-
ment system. Amidst quickly deteriorating relations between the core member 
states Argentina and Brazil, and expectations among key stakeholders regarding 
18 Ibid. As another Argentinean negotiator put it, ‘We wanted to take a step forward with the dispute 
resolution system, but not go as far as the EU system’ (interview, Buenos Aires, 11 Aug. 2015).
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the future of the organization, member states decided to relaunch the integration 
process. Argentina and Brazil started bilateral negotiations on the content of the 
relaunch agenda in early 2000, after the new Argentinean government of 
Fernando de la Rúa had entered office; and at a regional summit held in April 
2000 in Buenos Aires, the two smaller members announced their support for the 
initiative. The Common Market Council formally decided in June 2000 that this 
relaunch would include a reform of the dispute settlement system (Decision CMC 
25/00). An Ad Hoc Group on Institutional Matters was set up to present a reform 
proposal by December 2000.
The Ad Hoc Group on Institutional Matters provided a negotiating forum for 
delegations from each of the four member states during this early phase of ne go ti-
ations, which lasted from May to December 2000. Given some overlap in negoti-
ating positions, some issues sparked little controversy and were settled early on in 
the negotiations. The most important of these issues was the establishment of an 
appellate body along the lines of the WTO system (art. 18, Protocol of Olivos)—a 
demand by Argentina.19 The Brazilian delegation in the Ad Hoc Group included 
this proposal in a first draft protocol that it presented at its meeting in Brasília in 
August 2000 (Dreyzin de Klor 2003: 7).20 For Brazil, this was a first concession to 
its neighbour, because it did not really see a need to fundamentally change the 
system.21 In a note to the Foreign Ministry following the third arbitration award, 
which Brazil won against Argentina, Ambassador José Artur Denot Medeiros 
lauded the ‘successful completion of the first three arbitration procedures under 
the Protocol of Brasília’ (Denot Medeiros 2000c: 4). At the same time, however, 
Brazil ‘accepted to go that route because we felt that it was reasonable what they 
were asking for if you are in a integration process’.22 The smaller member states 
agreed to the proposal because it aligned with their institutional preference for a 
more institutionalized system of dispute settlement in general. Moreover, states 
agreed on the need to elaborate on the enforcement mechanisms of rulings and 
started developing concrete provisions (arts 31, 32, Protocol of Olivos) (Perotti 
2001/2: 5). While Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay had found agreement on most 
of the critical issues by the end of the year, Uruguay resisted the agreed-upon text 
19 Interview with Carlos Márcio Cozenday, Brasília, 6 Aug. 2015. For a complete list of issues that 
were settled early on in the negotiations, see Perotti (2001/2: 5).
20 Such a body would also allow governments ‘to resolve issues independent from domestic interest 
groups. It would then offer opportunities to blame others’ (interview with Welber Barral, Florence, 18 
Nov. 2015).
21 Arnold and Rittberger argue that Brazil’s initial reluctance to introduce an appellate body 
changed only in the wake of the fourth arbitral award issued in May 2001 (‘poultry case’) (Arnold and 
Rittberger 2013: 120)—a claim that is difficult to reconcile with the secondary sources cited above. 
The ad hoc panel, applying WTO anti-dumping rules, established that Argentina’s anti-dumping 
measures imposed on imports of Brazilian chicken meat would not have to be revoked (Mercosur Ad 
Hoc Arbitration Tribunal 2001). Highly dissatisfied with this decision, Brazil sought a revision of the 
award at the WTO, which it won (WT/DS241-6).
22 Interview with Carlos Márcio Cozenday, Brasília, 6 Aug. 2015.
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because it viewed the proposed changes as being too limited (Dreyzin de Klor 
2003: 7–8; Martínez Puñal 2003: 178). On 6 December it tabled its own proposal, 
which, according to Díaz Barrado (2003), ‘presented positions that were very dif-
ferent from those of the other member states’ (p. 1098). As a result, the Ad Hoc 
Group could not find agreement until the 19th presidential summit in 
Florianópolis in December, when it had been envisaged that the new protocol 
would be signed (Perotti 2001/2: 4). The Common Market Council therefore 
extended the deadline to June 2001, and created a High-Level Group to build on 
the proposal of the Ad Hoc Group as well as proposals by the national delegations 
in order to come up with a coherent draft protocol (Decision CMC 65/00).
After intense negotiations, the High-Level Group found agreement on two 
additional issues, endorsing some of Uruguay’s demands (Dreyzin de Klor 2003: 
10; Díaz Barrado 2003: 1098): abolishing the mandatory intervention of the 
Common Market Group during the initial negotiation stage of dispute settlement 
(art. 6, Protocol of Olivos); and introducing a preliminary rulings mechanism 
(art. 3, Protocol of Olivos).23 The latter marked an institutional innovation rather 
than a modification of existing rules. Even though Brazil ‘staunchly opposed this 
provision initially’, as an Argentinian government official remarked (cited in 
Arnold and Rittberger  2013: 118), Uruguay’s Foreign Minister Didier Opertti 
explained to his colleagues how this could help the consistent application of 
Mercosur law24—a problem that had surfaced in the three arbitration awards 
issued by ad hoc panels after the system started being used. Even though Uruguay 
initially proposed that consultative opinions be binding, Argentina and Brazil 
only consented to the inclusion of advisory opinions, with details to be worked 
out later.25 These concessions to Mercosur’s smaller member states, and especially 
to Uruguay, can be seen as part of the Cardoso administration’s more general 
interest ‘in maintaining a minimal consensus among Mercosur members’ in view 
of external challenges (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009: 67).
The stickiest issues were only resolved late in the negotiations, with strong 
political guidance. Member states eventually found agreement on Uruguay’s (and 
maybe Paraguay’s) proposal that the parties to a dispute may decide, by consen-
sus, to circumvent the ad hoc arbitration stage and transfer their case directly to 
the Permanent Review Tribunal for adjudication once they have failed to find a 
negotiated settlement (art. 23, Protocol of Olivos). In its quest for a supranational 
court, Uruguay sought that any party could request direct access to the Tribunal 
for a final decision; but Argentina and Brazil insisted that such access had to be 
based on the consent of the two parties to a dispute (see also Arnold and 
23 As an Argentinean policy-maker remarks, the consultative opinions are the ‘child of the mother 
Uruguay’ (interview with Garcia del Rio, Buenos Aires, 11 Aug. 2015).
24 Interview with Didier Opertti, Montevideo, 3 Aug. 2015.
25 Ibid. Elaborated in Decision CMC/37/03 consultative opinions have advisory status only.
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Rittberger 2013: 118–19).26 In this case, the Tribunal judges both the matters of 
fact and the applicable law (Opertti 2004: 153; see also Rey Caro 2004: 199–201). 
Thus, it serves as a ‘proper’ court rather than an appellate body because it rules 
independently on a case, issuing binding rulings that are not subject to further 
appeal.27 In this sense, the Permanent Review Tribunal is more than an appellate 
body; it has characteristics of a single court (see Martínez Puñal 2003: 190–91). 
As Didier Opertti remarks, ‘This arbitration Tribunal is a bit of a compromise 
between those who wanted to stay with pure arbitration and not go any further, 
and those who wanted to advance on this journey towards the establishment of a 
Jurisdictional Tribunal’ (Opertti 2004: 153).
The latest issue to be resolved in the negotiations was the choice of arbitration 
forum.28 Member states eventually agreed on a stipulation that explicitly provides 
them with a choice between settling a dispute through the WTO or other prefer-
ential trade agreements in which they are a member or through the Mercosur 
procedure. However, once states choose one of these forums, they are prohibited 
from using other forums to rule on the same issue (art. 1, Protocol of Olivos).29 
This stipulation is the result of the fourth award issued by an ad hoc panel in 
May 2001, where Brazil filed the same case both with Mercosur and then with 
the WTO.
Uruguay’s ‘fierce insistence’ (Dreyzin de Klor 2003: 10) on allowing private 
actors to access Mercosur’s dispute settlement system directly did not encounter 
agreement among the other member states. The National Sections of the Common 
Market Group continue to serve as the gatekeepers that channelled private com-
plaints into the system (art. 41, Protocol of Olivos). However, due to the novel, 
non-mandatory role of the Common Market Group at the negotiation stage of 
dispute settlement, governments that endorse private complaints may directly 
seek arbitration of these claims, either through the ad hoc system or with the 
Permanent Review Tribunal. In this way, it is easier for private actors to channel 
their claims to arbitration and adjudication, even though the gatekeeping role of 
governments persists.
The negotiations were concluded successfully in February 2002, and the 
Protocol of Olivos was signed by the heads of state and government on 18 February 
2002. In December 2003, the Common Market Council adopted the rules of 
procedure according to article 47 of the Olivos Protocol (Decision CMC/37/03), 
26 Interview with Garcia del Rio, Buenos Aires, 11 Aug. 2015.
27 According to some legal experts, this leads to inconsistencies with other stipulations in the 
proto col due to the dual nature of the Permanent Review Tribunal (see Bergamaschine Mata Diz 
2007: 173).
28 Interview with Garcia del Rio, Buenos Aires, 11 Aug. 2015.
29 In principle, Uruguay rejected the provision until the end, but consented to it as part of a negoti-
ated compromise. As Didier Opertti put it, ‘the best is the enemy of the good’ (interview, Montevideo, 
3 Aug. 2015).
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and the latter entered into force on 1 January 2004. The Permanent Review 
Tribunal took up its work in Asunción on 13 August 2004.
As is the case with most institutional compromises, there is disagreement 
among the parties as to whether key tenets of the institutional outcome reflect 
any specific model. Whereas especially Argentinean and Brazilian negotiators 
perceive the Olivos system as being similar to the WTO system, representatives of 
the smaller member states insist that it has more similarity to the EU system. 
Welber Barral, a Brazilian policy-maker notes, for example, that the Olivos 
Protocol is ‘highly influenced by the WTO system. Some parts of the protocol are 
verbatim taken from the WTO treaty. People involved in the negotiations on the 
Brazilian side had been at the WTO just before.’30 An Argentinian government 
official similarly notes that ‘Brazil and Argentina’s attitude was to look for 
improvements in the system and take the WTO as an example’, while an 
Uruguayan official comments, ‘I think it [the Protocol of Olivos] is more inspired 
by the EU than by WTO’ (cited in Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 122). And in his 
characteristically strong-headed way, Didier Opertti says that ‘there is no doubt 
that the European Union with its system [of dispute settlement] has influenced 
and will continue to have a big influence in the construction of the community 
model’ (Opertti 2004: 153). This quote suggests once again that Uruguay’s institu-
tional strategy regarding dispute settlement was shaped by EU institutions and is 
indeed reflected in the final outcome.
Conclusion
This chapter traced the EU’s passive influence on the establishment of the 
Permanent Review Tribunal in Mercosur. It showed that member states’ institu-
tional preferences and strategies were shaped, in discernible ways, by the institu-
tional experience of the EU. In particular, Uruguay advanced an EU-type dispute 
settlement mechanism in negotiations over a reform of Mercosur’s system in the 
early years of the new millennium, whereas Argentina and Brazil advanced pro-
posals for a WTO-type system. The institutional outcome, adopted with the 
Olivos Protocol in 2002, constitutes a compromise between these two positions, 
with identifiable traces left by Uruguay’s insistence on an EU-type system.
The evidence presented in this chapter strongly suggests that the EU’s passive 
influence, via its effect on Uruguay’s institutional strategy regarding dispute 
settle ment in the organization, played a relevant causal role in understanding 
the establishment of Mercosur’s Permanent Review Tribunal. Counterfactually, the 
negotiation record suggests that both the provision on consultative opinions and 
the opportunity of the two disputing parties to access the Permanent Review 
30 Interview with Welber Barral, Florence, 18 Nov. 2015.
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Tribunal directly—rendering it a de facto single court in this case—would not 
have formed part of the final outcome had Uruguay not pushed for it. This does 
not deny the widespread assessment that the Olivos system is, in its broad outline, 
closer to the WTO system than to the ECJ system. Nevertheless, we can identify 
two specific institutional features that go beyond the WTO system. These are the 
result of Uruguay’s fierce insistence that Mercosur’s dispute settlement system be 
more institutionalized than the WTO system. Given that Uruguay’s institutional 
strategy is directly derived from the model provided by the ECJ, the EU’s passive 
influence made a distinguishable difference in the Olivos reforms.
The fact that member state concerns over national sovereignty pose a difficult 
obstacle to the creation of more independent regional institutions not only con-
cerns Mercosur but is a pervasive phenomenon in the global South and also 
beyond. In Mercosur, this obstacle is further compounded by the fact that power 
asymmetries are enormous, with the member states that hold the most sovereignty- 
preserving preferences also being the largest ones, and that the dominant mem-
ber states have long seen the EU with scepticism. However, this chapter shows 
that even in such inhospitable environments, some local actors find EU institu-
tional models attractive—often for idiosyncratic reasons—and advance them as 
demands in intergovernmental negotiations over institutional change. When this 
happens, the EU often leaves detectable traces in institutional outcomes, as such 
negotiations tend to constitute an institutional compromise among the diverse 
bargaining positions of governments. In organizational contexts in which bar-
gaining power is distributed less in favour of institution averse-governments and 
where governments are less sceptical of EU-type institutional change or even 
desire it, passive EU influence is likely to be more substantial and widespread. 
Therefore, Mercosur’s experience with regard to dispute settlement is unlikely to 
be unique in the world of regional organization, and may in fact be rather common.
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7
The Scope of European Union Influence
The Role of Contractual Open- Endedness
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate the validity of the two pathways of EU influence. 
Direct contacts with EU actors (SADC) and the availability of information on EU 
institutions (Mercosur) shape governments’ institutional strategies in intergov-
ernmental negotiations over institutional change, and thereby leave their imprint 
on institutional outcomes. In these cases, the conditions for EU influence are 
favourable because SADC and Mercosur both rest on an open- ended contract.
However, when the nature of an organization’s contract is fixed, I argue in this 
chapter, the scope for EU influence is limited. This is the case because the EU can 
often not generate, by itself, the conditions on which it depends for it to make a 
distinguishable difference. It relies on local actors to advance demands for EU- 
type institutional change, and on governments to adopt EU institutions as their 
strategies in institutional negotiations. The establishment of the Permanent 
Review Tribunal in Mercosur, analysed in Chapter 6, is a case in point. While it is 
possible to identify, counterfactually, how EU influence shaped the design of 
Mercosur’s judicial body, member states decided to revise the dispute settlement 
system for various idiosyncratic reasons that were unrelated to the EU, and an 
encompassing explanation of the outcome must engage causal factors other than 
EU influence. In this case, as in many others, the influence of the EU on institu-
tional outcomes depends on favourable structural conditions that may enable its 
operation. In other words, the scope of EU influence on institutional change is 
confined, to a large extent, by structural conditions that generate opportunities 
for EU influence. These prerequisites for EU influence are more likely to be met, 
I argue, when ROs are based on open- ended contracts—as in this case. Conversely, 
when ROs rest on a fixed contract, EU influence is less likely to make a difference.
In this chapter, I uncover the operation of the stipulated scope condition of EU 
influence—contractual open- endedness—whose general causal relevance I exam-
ined in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the effect of active and passive EU 
influence on levels of institutionalization in a sample of ROs is particularly pro-
nounced in those that are based on an open- ended contract. In this chapter 
I show—through a paired comparison of ASEAN and NAFTA with regard to the 
parliamentary dimension—that EU- type institutional change is voiced more 
often in ROs based on an open- ended contract because actors find it easier to 
construct analogies with the EU that give legitimacy to such demands.
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The chapter proceeds in three parts. In the first part, I spin out some additional 
observable implications of the argument about contractual open- endedness as a 
scope condition for EU influence at the structural level, and examine them 
empirically. Next, I contrast the establishment of a parliamentary institution in 
ASEAN with its non- establishment in NAFTA to argue that contractual open- 
endedness eventually facilitated the parliamentarization of ASEAN while its absence 
hampered EU influence in NAFTA. The second part justifies a paired comparison 
and the specific cases chosen, while the third presents the empirical evidence.
Demand and supply conditions of EU influence:  
some quantitative evidence
Unless the EU uses its active influence as a lever for institutional change—a situ-
ation analysed in the establishment of the SADC Tribunal in Chapter  5—EU 
influence is dependent on facilitating conditions that enable its operation. 
I theorized in Chapter 3 that contractual open- endedness is an important scope 
condition for EU influence because it provides ROs with an endogenous capacity 
for institutional change due to the open- ended nature of commitments. This, in 
turn, generates conditions conducive to the operation of EU influence on both 
the demand and supply side.
On the demand side, open- endedness facilitates institutional change as institu-
tions require more frequent adaptation when the cooperation problems that they 
address evolve over time, thereby providing more numerous opportunities for EU 
influence. Conversely, when an RO pursues a specific purpose from the start, its 
institutions are more easily designed at the outset and will require less adaptation. 
Does this expectation play out empirically? Is it indeed the case that ROs based 
on open- ended contracts display higher rates of institutional change than those 
with an intermediate and fixed contract, thereby generating more numerous 
opportunities for EU influence?
We saw in Chapter  1 that the number of institutional reforms has steadily 
increased throughout the decades, and examine here whether these institutional 
reforms are distributed unevenly across RO types. I use the measures introduced 
in Chapter 4 to test this implication. Institutional change is the number of times 
that the level of institutionalization in the sample of 35 ROs (excluding the EU) 
changes, both upward and downwards. Institutionalization is an additive index 
that captures the existence and competences of four types of regional institutions 
that are not composed of member states’ representatives: general secretariats, 
parliamentary bodies, other non- state consultative bodies, and judicial bodies. 
Contractual incompleteness, on the other hand, is a trichotomous variable that 
taps the extent to which the commitments that member states engage in are open- 
ended, with regard both to the stipulated organizational objective and to the 
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scope of actors allowed to participate in cooperation. As noted in Chapter 4, 
contractual open- endedness is highly stable over time, with only six organizations 
changing the category by one towards greater open- endedness. This analysis uses 
the dynamic contract scores.
Figure 7.1 displays the number of institutional reforms by category of contrac-
tual open- endedness. In line with the expectation, ROs based on open- ended 
contracts are indeed more likely than those based on intermediate or fixed con-
tracts to adapt their institutions. In short, the distribution is highly skewed. In 
terms of the absolute number of institutional reforms depicted in the left- hand 
panel, ROs based on open- ended contracts represent 53 per cent of the total 
number of institutional reforms; ROs with an intermediate contract represent 
35 per cent of institutional reforms; and ROs based on a fixed contract represent 
12 per cent. If we control for the number of organizations in each contract 
category, the picture is similarly skewed. As shown in the right- hand panel, 
organizations with an open- ended contract change their institutional framework, 
on average, once every decade, whereas ROs with an intermediate contract engage 
in institutional change every 20 years and ROs with a fixed contract only once in 
29  years. The latter number means that some ROs, such as NAFTA, have not 
changed their level of institutionalization even once since their founding nearly 
30 years ago. The two panels thus show clearly that opportunities for EU influ-
ence are much more frequent in ROs based on open- ended contracts and to some 
extent also in ROs with an intermediate contract—which, it should be recalled, 
also rest on an open- ended purpose but restrict the actor scope to governments—
than in those based on fixed contracts.
On the supply side, the ability of social actors to draw credible analogies 











































































Figure 7.1 Institutional reforms in 35 ROs by contractual open- endedness, 1950–2017
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institutional change and makes it more difficult for opponents of such change to 
reject it. This reasoning should affect actors within the EU itself as well as those in 
other ROs. Thus, we would expect EU engagement to vary with the contractual 
open- endedness of other ROs. Chapter 4 shows that the EU’s engagement with 
other ROs is associated with higher levels of institutionalization in those ROs. 
Therefore, open- ended contracts enhance the likelihood that the EU supplies 
financial and technical expertise that shape regional institution building. The reason 
is that contractual open- endedness signals cultural similarity. ROs with an open- 
ended contract are akin to the EU in their aim to engage in regional community- 
building on a broad policy front. When such cultural similarity exists, other ROs 
are more likely to seek engagement with the EU and vice versa. This reasoning 
implies that active EU engagement should cluster in ROs with an open- ended 
contract. Does this expectation bear out empirically?
We saw in Chapter 4 that active EU engagement with other ROs has grown 
over time, and here we examine whether it is distributed unevenly across different 
RO types. EU engagement, operationalized in Chapter 4, is an aggregate index 
that incorporates three components: financial support; interregional cooperation 
agreements; and institutionalized contacts at the level of heads of state and gov-
ernment, parliamentarians, and technical experts. Such engagement exists with 
23 out of the 35 ROs in the sample, and varies strongly in intensity among the 23 
ROs with which the EU is formally engaged. What contracts are these organiza-
tions based on?
Figure 7.2 shows the extent of EU engagement with other ROs by contractual 
open- endedness for two time periods: 1970–90 and 1990–2017.1 We see that the 
EU engages primarily with like organizations whose contracts contain open- ended 
commitments.2 Several developments are notable. First, engagement with other 
ROs has significantly increased over time. While medium levels of EU engagement 
were rare during the Cold War (four instances) and high levels of engagement 
were entirely absent, they have become more frequent after the end of the Cold 
War (15 instances of medium EU engagement and eight instances of high engage-
ment). Second, medium and high levels of EU engagement are almost exclusively 
located in the intermediate and open- ended contract categories. This pattern 
holds perfectly for the Cold War era, and is near- perfect for the period since.3 
Conversely, no engagement is the relatively most frequent category in ROs with a 
fixed contract. While no engagement is the modal category across all engagement 
1 The numbers in this figure do not represent numbers of ROs but instances of a particular level of 
EU engagement. The EU regularly changes its level of engagement with ROs over time, such that there 
may be two or even three instances of different levels of engagement with individual ROs in a spe-
cific period.
2 The overall bivariate correlation between the two variables is 0.302.
3 The single exception to this pattern is the EU’s engagement with the European Free Trade 
Association, primarily in the form of the European Economic Area.
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categories and contract types, when we combine the various levels of EU  engagement 
(low, medium, and high) for each contract category, it remains the modal category 
only in ROs with a fixed contract for the period after the end of the Cold War. 
Third, the EU has massively enhanced its engagement with ROs that rest on an 
intermediate contract since the end of the Cold War. ROs in this category now 






















































































Figure 7.2 EU engagement with 35 ROs by contractual open- endedness, 1970–2017
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and intermediate levels of engagement, while the highest number of instances of 
high levels of engagement can be found among ROs with an open- ended contract.
Taken together, the evidence presented suggests that contractual open- endedness, 
which serves as a proxy for the ambition of ROs to engage in community- building, 
delimits the scope of EU influence in two distinct ways. On the one hand, ROs 
based on an open- ended contract provide more frequent opportunities for EU 
influence to operate because these ROs change their institutions more frequently. 
On the other hand, contracts that contain open- ended commitments are also a 
structural feature of ROs that signals affinities with the EU, which tends to enhance 
the EU’s engagement. Yet how, specifically, does contractual open- endedness 
delimit the scope for EU influence? This is the subject of the next section.
Institutional change and the scope of EU influence: 
a paired comparison
The quantitative evidence presented in the previous section presents some 
 preliminary correlational evidence for the idea that contractual open- endedness 
delimits the scope of EU influence. We can probe the workings of the relationship 
more deeply by developing specific process observations of the argument, and 
testing those in a detailed qualitative analysis of two ROs that sit at opposite ends 
of the spectrum of contractual open- endedness—a paired comparison. I first jus-
tify the selection of cases before specifying some additional process implications 
that guide the comparison.
Case selection
What should an effective test of the scope condition look like? Ideally, we would 
contrast two cases that differ with regard to the hypothesized scope condition and 
the outcome of interest, while trying to keep as many confounders as possible 
constant in order to control for their potential impact by design. This is the logic 
of a paired comparison, which ‘implies minimizing the difference between the 
systems being compared’ (Tarrow  2010: 234). Such a set- up would allow us to 
examine how contractual open- endedness enables EU influence to operate in one 
case, resulting in EU- influenced institutional change, while in the other case the 
different nature of the contract of another RO inhibits EU influence, thereby lead-
ing to no institutional change, or change that is not shaped by EU influence.
I suggest that a comparison of ASEAN and NAFTA on the parliamentary 
dimension provides causal leverage in this sense because this comparison 
ap proxi mates the conditions that have been formulated for the effective use of 
paired comparisons and for useful crucial cases.
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At the most general level, the study of regional parliamentarization is a useful 
analytical focus because we can critique a few prominent existing explanations on 
a priori theoretical grounds. This alleviates the limited- degrees- of- freedom prob-
lem that besets case studies in general (Tarrow 2010: 246–7). Crucially, there is no 
plausible functional reason for the establishment of regional parliamentary insti-
tutions. They provide none of the efficiency- enhancing benefits that rational dele-
ga tion theory attributes to international institutions, such as providing technical 
expertise, solving commitment problems, setting the agenda, or monitoring and 
enforcing agreements. At the same time, such institutions generate potentially 
significant sovereignty costs (see Lenz, Burilkov, and Viola 2019; Schimmelfennig 
et al. 2020). Thus, from the perspective of standard delegation theory, inter nation al 
parliamentary institutions offer a negative balance of costs and benefits. This 
characteristic of the institutional form affords me the opportunity to elim in ate a 
range of potential explanations for international institutional change by design.
A comparison of NAFTA and ASEAN is useful, moreover, because NAFTA 
represents a likely case for the establishment of a regional parliament whereas 
ASEAN represents a least likely case. The key explanation for the establishment of 
international parliaments is democracy. The argument is that international parlia-
mentary institutions are an expression of the prevalence of democratic norms at 
the national level, which actors transfer to the international level (Grigorescu 2015; 
Rittberger 2005; Schimmelfennig 2010; Tallberg, Sommerer, and Squatrito 2016). 
A second well- established argument suggests that actors seek to hold their gov-
ernments accountable, and this is only possible through domestic channels as 
long as IOs operate on the basis of strict intergovernmentalism. Once IOs start to 
gain authority—either by moving from consensus towards majoritarian decision- 
making (pooling) or by empowering independent actors to act on their behalf 
(delegation) (for the conceptual distinction and measurement, see Hooghe, Lenz, 
and Marks 2019: ch. 3)—securing the accountability of executives in international 
cooperation requires additional channels at the international level. The creation 
of international parliamentary institutions is one institutional option for achiev-
ing this goal (Rittberger  2005; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig  2006: 1160; 
Slaughter 2004: 125–9; Verdoes 2020; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker- Ehrhardt 2012).
From the perspective of established theoretical explanations, NAFTA should 
be more likely than ASEAN to establish an international parliamentary institu-
tion, primarily because it is composed of democracies, at least two of which are 
well consolidated (Canada and the United States). Regarding authority, the two 
ROs do not differ substantially: their authority is limited in both cases. In NAFTA, 
decisions in the Free Trade Commission are taken by consensus, and with the 
exception of an (albeit powerful, especially with regard to investments) dispute 
settlement mechanism (Abbott 2000), delegation is absent. Due to the prevalence 
of democratic member states, NAFTA is a likely case for the establishment of a 
parliamentary institution. ASEAN, in contrast, consists mainly of non- democratic 
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states. Its average Freedom House score puts the organization into the autocracy 
category. Moreover, ASEAN’s level of authority is limited. Key decision- making 
bodies, such as the Summit and the various ministerial councils, take decisions by 
consensus, and both the dispute settlement system and the secretariat have 
limit ed competences. Thus, ASEAN starts approaching a least likely case regard-
ing parliamentarization from the perspective of prominent theories (see Lenz, 
Burilkov, and Viola 2019 1: 1103).
Despite these expectations, the outcome is exactly the reverse: whereas ASEAN 
has established a parliamentary institution with consultative functions, NAFTA 
has not.4 What distinguishes these two organizations and accounts in large parts 
for the divergence in parliamentarization, I suggest, is not the nature of their 
membership or authority but their contract, because these differences in contracts 
condition EU influence. ASEAN is based on an intermediate founding contract, 
pursuing an open- ended purpose to ‘promote active collaboration and mutual 
assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, tech-
nical, scientific, and administrative fields’ with a focus on governments as the 
central actors (Bangkok Declaration, Preamble). As Rodolfo Certeza Severino, 
former Secretary General of ASEAN, aptly remarks, the Declaration expressed 
national leaders’ ‘resolve to work together for common purposes, purposes that at 
the time were only vaguely discerned and projected’ (Severino 2006: 3). The 2008 
ASEAN Charter also emphasizes the goal to ‘maintain and enhance peace, se cur-
ity and stability’ (art. 1.1) and widens the contract beyond governments to include 
people and societies. NAFTA, in contrast, rests on a fixed contract, pursuing the 
well- defined objective to ‘establish a free trade area’ (art. 101, NAFTA Agreement). 
The new United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), which is sched-
uled to enter into force on 1 June 2020, has adapted some of the substantive pro-
visions of the old agreement but has not altered the well- specified and narrow 
purpose of establishing a free trade area (art. 1.1).
The ASEAN case provides additional causal leverage on the question of how 
contractual open- endedness may enable EU influence, being one of the few 
organizations in the sample that changes its level of contractual open- endedness 
over time. While ASEAN has an intermediate contract for much of its history, this 
changes with the ASEAN Charter towards an open- ended contract. This change 
goes hand in hand with governments’ objective to create an ASEAN Community 
consisting of a political- security, an economic, and a sociocultural pillar. It was 
this change in contractual open- endedness that enabled par lia men tar ians to push 
for EU- type institutional change. The configuration of the re spect ive variables is 
summarized in Table 7.1.
4 Thus, NAFTA fulfils what Mahoney and Goertz (2004) call the ‘possibility principle’, i.e. a ‘nega-
tive’ case in which the outcome of interest is possible because at least one independent variable is 
conducive to the outcome of interest.
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The counterintuitive distribution of outcomes means that detailed case studies 
of the establishment of a parliamentary institution within ASEAN, on the one 
side, and into its absence in NAFTA, on the other side, provide unique insights 
into the scope of EU influence and the causal processes by which it operates. 
Specifically, it allows me to trace the processes that underlie the positive interaction 
between contractual open- endedness and EU influence detected in Chapter 4.
Specification of observable implications
In view of the focus on the parliamentary dimension of regional organization, we 
can specify the generic causal process implications outlined in Chapter 3.
 • Advocates of the EU ‘model’ advance proposals for EU- type institutional 
change even though structural conditions are unfavourable. Specifically, 
actors who have not internalized democracy as a norm advocate the estab-
lishment of parliamentary institutions even within organizations with little 
authority, perceiving the EU to be both successful and similar to their own 
organization. As a result, references to the EU should be frequent.
 • Conversely, even actors who have internalized democracy as a norm do not 
advocate the establishment of parliamentary institutions, deeming the EU to 
be irrelevant to their own organization due to differences in the contractual 
nature of the organizations. As a result, references to the EU should be rare 
and demands should focus on other institutional solutions to the le git im-
ation problem in ROs.
 • Governments involved in organizations pursuing open- ended commitments 
find it difficult to reject demands for the establishment of a parliamentary 
body even though they have not internalized democracy as a norm, given 
the compelling similarity with the EU. As a result, we see justifications of 
why organizations are not similar to the EU or why governments endorse 
the demands.
Table 7.1. Configurations of variables in NAFTA and ASEAN cases
  NAFTA ASEAN
  Likely case Least likely case
Democratic organization Yes No
International authority Limited Limited
Pooling No No
Delegation Weak Weak
Contract Fixed Intermediate → open- ended
Outcome No parliamentary institution Parliamentary institution
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The parliamentary dimension in ASEAN and NAFTA: 
the empirical record
What does the empirical record of regional parliamentarization in ASEAN and 
NAFTA look like? I argue that, contrary to existing structural conditions in the 
two organizations, contractual open- endedness was a key condition that enabled 
EU influence to operate in the case of ASEAN and hampered EU influence in 
NAFTA. In the latter case, even though some actors raised the idea of a regional 
parliament, it was never seriously considered.
Establishing a parliamentary institution in ASEAN
ASEAN is a general- purpose organization in Southeast Asia that includes ten 
member states. At its establishment in 1967 with the Bangkok Declaration, the 
five founding members sought to stabilize their mutual relations in the face of the 
double threat of communist subversion from the inside and great power dom in-
ation from the outside. Much of the early period in cooperation was dedicated to 
building trust among national leaders who were regularly engaged in militarized 
disputes (Leifer 1989; Glas 2017).
The resulting institutional framework was minimal and purely intergovern-
mental. An annual foreign ministers’ meeting set the agenda and took decisions, 
the ASEAN Secretaries General presided over an ASEAN National Secretariat 
which supervised the Association’s activities, and a Standing Committee of 
national officials was responsible for managing day- to- day business. Since then, 
piecemeal reforms have gradually strengthened the organization’s institutional 
framework, but ASEAN remains an organization that is characterized by ‘peren-
nial under- institutionalization’ (Beeson 2010: 330) when compared to other ROs 
around the world. In 2007, governments adopted the ASEAN Charter, which for 
the first time gave the Association a coherent legal foundation and modestly 
strengthened its institutional framework.
With the ASEAN Charter, the Association’s parliamentary institution—
the ASEAN Interparliamentary Assembly (AIPA) (previously: ASEAN 
Interparliamentary Organization, AIPO)—received formal recognition as an 
Associated Entity according to Article 16. Shortly thereafter, ASEAN leaders 
established regular informal meetings with AIPA representatives, which were for-
malized in 2010 in the form of a joint discussion forum. Termed the ‘ASEAN–
AIPA Leaders’ Interface’, it provides an institutionalized setting for intra- ASEAN 
coordination on AIPA resolutions prior to ASEAN Summits, the organization’s 
highest decision- making body (ASEAN Summit  2010; Deinla  2013: 15). With 
that decision, AIPA has acquired formal consultative status in the Association, 
even though its competences remain circumscribed: the parliamentary institution 
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does not have any legislative competence, and it has no formal leverage to ensure 
that its resolutions are taken into consideration by ASEAN’s leaders. Nevertheless, 
it marks an instance of institutional change that has strengthened ASEAN’s insti-
tutional framework.
AIPO emerged in the 1970s as a forum of deliberation and discussion on mat-
ters of common concern. Following initial contacts in 1973, the Indonesian legis-
lature formally proposed the establishment of a regional parliamentary institution 
to advance cooperation among ASEAN’s national parliaments in 1974. A first 
ASEAN Parliamentary Meeting was held in January 1975 and, after several years 
of debate, parliamentarians adopted the statutes of the ASEAN Interparliamentary 
Organization (AIPO) in September 1977 (AIPA 2013b). Among its purposes was 
to make parliamentary contributions to the attainment of ASEAN’s goals and to 
provide a more direct link between the organization and member state societies 
(AIPO 1977). Despite its name and objectives, AIPO remained formally un associ-
ated with ASEAN’s decision- making structure.
Even though archival and intensive interview work on its formalization is very 
rare, there is evidence that EU influence played a role in the emergence of 
AIPO. Various area studies experts who analysed interregional relations during 
this early period concur that the EU constitutes a model for ASEAN. Mols (1990) 
remarks that ‘Western European efforts at unification were (and still are) seen as 
an important model’ in the region (p. 67), and Drummond (1982) similarly notes: 
‘From the beginning ASEAN had a kind of ideological link with the EC which it 
saw as a model to emulate’ (p. 311). Moreover, the EC was actively involved with 
ASEAN. German Foreign Minister Hans- Dietrich Genscher announced in the 
1980s that the ‘European Community and its member states from the outset have 
considered it an important task to promote this association’ (quoted in Mols 1990: 
67). Direct relations between ASEAN and the European Community started in 
1972, and it was ASEAN member states that actively sought closer links. Indonesia 
not only proposed the creation of AIPO in 1974, but also took the initiative to 
establish direct relations with the European Community (Mols 1990: 67; Drummond 
1982: 311–12). In 1972, the organization established a Special Coordinating 
Committee to manage relations with the European Commission as well as the 
ASEAN Brussels Committee—the first one outside of ASEAN (Drummond 1982: 
311–12). In 1974, the same year that Indonesia proposed AIPO, the two organiza-
tions set up Joint Study Groups to prepare the negotiation of an interregional 
cooperation agreement, which was signed in 1980 in Kuala Lumpur. This was 
complemented by the first ministerial meeting between both sides in November 
1978 (European Commission  1981: 3–4; for an overview, see Harris and 
Bridges 1983).
More specifically, the debate about AIPO’s formalization coincided temporally 
with intensive debates in the European Community about the role of the 
European Parliament in European integration. Jetschke and Rüland (2009) argue, 
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therefore, that the ‘parliamentarization of the European Community, discussed 
and enacted over the course of 1974–76, resonated in ASEAN’, which they inter-
pret as evidence of ‘ritualistic emulation’ (p. 185). At the same time, informal 
contacts between parliamentarians from both sides started in 1976 (Rüland and 
Carrapatoso 2015: 210), at the time when the formalization of AIPO was being 
discussed. Parliamentary ties between both sides were formalized in 1979, the 
year AIPO held its first official General Assembly, and regular meetings have 
taken place since then.5 Partly fostered by these direct contacts, the idea of creat-
ing an ASEAN Parliament along the lines of the European Parliament has regu-
larly come up in AIPO debates. At a preparatory meeting for the creation of 
AIPO, for example, the head of the Malaysian delegation lamented: ‘we still have 
a long way to go before we can become an ASEAN Parliament like that of the 
Parliament of the European Economic Community’ (quoted in Rüland and 
Bechle  2014: 70). And there are many references to the European Community 
and the European Parliament in AIPO’s resolutions at the time. The General 
Assembly meeting in 1991 resolved, for example, that the Thai delegation conduct 
a study on the merits of establishing an ASEAN Parliament, ‘along the lines of the 
European Parliament or other regional parliaments’ (Resolution no. 12GA/1991/
Res/0- 18).
This evidence plausibly suggests that AIPO’s establishment was due, in part, to 
the inspiration provided by the European Parliament, transmitted both actively 
and passively. In the next two decades, the Organization held about one General 
Assembly meeting a year, but it had little influence on the process of regional 
cooperation itself. AIPO also provided the organizational platform to discuss and 
advance proposals for institutionalized participation in regional decision- making. 
In 1980, the Philippine delegation proposed the creation of an ASEAN Parliament 
with modest legislative functions—an idea that parliamentarians declared a 
‘long- term objective’ (AIPA 2013).
Yet, despite recurrent calls and initiatives, little progress was made regarding 
the formalization of AIPO as an integral part of ASEAN over the next 20 years. 
As Rüland and Bechle bluntly note, such proposals ‘never received serious con-
sideration’ by governments (Rüland and Bechle 2014: 73). Why? The reluctance 
to attend to EU- inspired calls for the establishment of a parliamentary institution 
is, at least partially, due to the fact that the intergovernmental mode of co oper-
ation in ASEAN, which rests on the nature of ASEAN’s founding contract, left no 
room for participation by actors other than governmental ones. The Bangkok 
Declaration is open- ended in its purpose, as mentioned above, but does not make 
mention of actors other than governments as the key actors in cooperation. The 
5 For an overview of interparliamentary relations until 2003, see: https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dase20040927_003/dase20040927_003en.pdf (accessed 22 
Feb. 2021).
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entire document only refers to ‘nations’, ‘states’, and ‘countries’; no mention is 
made of ‘people’ or ‘societies’. This focus is also reflected in the name ASEAN. On 
this basis, the Association developed a particular style of cooperation—what 
became known as the ‘ASEAN way’—which is characterized by radical informal-
ity and consensus and relies heavily on small- scale contacts among state leaders 
(for an overview, see Jetschke and Katada 2016; Severino 2006: ch. 1). The idea was 
to build confidence and trust among authoritarian leaders in a difficult geopolitical 
context. At summit meetings, heads of state regularly spent as much time on the 
golf course as they did hammering out deals to advance regional co oper ation 
(Severino 2006: 2). Acharya aptly refers to the style of cooperation as ‘elite- centric 
regional socialization’ (Acharya 2003: 376).
As a result, active voices for the establishment of an EU- type parliamentary 
body were unable to construct a credible case for their demands because the 
nature of ASEAN’s contract, and thus its fundamental social purpose, was dis-
tinct from that of the EU. Cooperation revolved around confidence- building 
among elites; it was not seen as a form of community- building that involved citi-
zens. Despite exceptions6, most governments therefore insisted that ASEAN was 
categorically distinct and generally rejected comparisons to other experiences of 
regional integration, and especially to the EU. For example, Singaporean Foreign 
Minister Suppiah Dhanabalan stated in 1981:
ASEAN is now one of the world’s fastest growing regions. However, there are 
critics, both within and without ASEAN, who lament the lack of progress in 
economic cooperation in ASEAN. They point, for example, to the lack of pro-
gress in the establishment of a preferential trade area and similar arrangement 
which have characterized other cooperative endeavours like the European 
Community. Such critics fail to recognize that ASEAN’s most significant achieve-
ment has been the establishment of good neighborliness among members—a desire 
to cooperate and not confront. (quoted in Yukawa 2018: 330, my emphasis)
In a systematic study of ASEAN’s perceptions of the EU, Yukawa shows that such 
quotes stand for a broader pattern. He argues that ‘at least until the 1980s, the 
relevant actors in ASEAN had not viewed the EU as a model to any significant 
extent’ (Yukawa 2018: 330).7 Perceptions of relevant political actors that ASEAN 
and the EU were two fundamentally different regional organizations with distinct 
purposes meant that demands for EU- type institutional change stood little chance 
of being taken up by governments.
6 For example, former Thai foreign minister and Deputy Prime Minister Thanat Khoman notes, 
albeit retrospectively: ‘It should be put on record that, for many of us and for me in particular, our 
model has been and is still, the European Community’ (Khoman 1992, xix).
7 In an elaborate section in his book, former Secretary General Severino justifies why ‘Southeast 
Asia is not Western Europe’ (Severino 2006: 4).
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This situation changed with two major exogenous shocks: the end of the Cold 
War and, more immediately, the Asian financial crisis that plunged the region 
into economic recession. Criticism of ASEAN started growing in the immediate 
post- Cold War era on several fronts. For one, the region’s human rights record 
became subject to serious external criticism. The EU eventually abandoned the 
scheduled renegotiation of the 1980 EC–ASEAN cooperation agreement due to 
ASEAN’s rejection to accept human rights conditionality. As Manea (2008) notes, 
‘ASEAN realized that the European Community would become more intrusive 
about human rights violations and the lack of democracy within its territory’ 
(p.  375). More broadly, criticism surged regarding the state- and elite- centric 
nature of regional cooperation in ASEAN, thereby challenging a key practice of 
the organization (Ba 2013: 139–40). Even though the ASEAN way was an important 
ingredient in the success of the organization during the first few decades, the 
‘time change’ brought about by the end of the Cold War rendered ASEAN’s 
modus operandi increasingly less acceptable to a variety of actors inside and 
outside the organization, including academics, civil society groups, and popular 
commentators. Advocates of more societal involvement grew during the 1990s 
(see e.g. Caballero- Anthony 2004).
The 1997/8 Asian financial crisis seemed to confirm these criticisms. ASEAN’s 
failure to orchestrate a coordinated reaction ‘shattered ASEAN’s credibility as a 
regional leader and an economic regime’ (Narine 2002: 139). As a result, earlier 
criticism deepened and new criticism appeared. In this vein, Rüland argues that 
‘increasingly vociferous demands [emerged] to transcend ASEAN’s elitist and 
state- centric nature [. . .] and to democratize regional governance by creating 
more participatory channels’ (Rüland 2014: 251). In the late 1990s, ASEAN gov-
ernments faced unprecedented criticism from a variety of important actors inside 
and outside the organization. Rejection and non- response increasingly appeared 
like inadequate strategies to deal with the situation; institutional change became 
more pressing.
In the early 2000s, governments started addressing these criticisms in two 
ways, and I argue that one facilitated the other. On the one side, governments 
extended the purpose of ASEAN to be less government- centric. Ali Alatas, 
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister at the time, puts it as follows: ‘ASEAN must strive for 
relevance. To succeed at this, ASEAN must be able to get the people of ASEAN to 
be more directly and deeply involved in its activities’ (Alatas 2001: 7). The ‘Vision 
2020’, which heads of state and government adopted at the beginning of the finan-
cial crisis in 1997, reiterates the ambition to ‘foster a strong sense of community’, 
and speaks of the vision of creating a ‘community of caring societies’, ‘conscious of 
its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional 
identity’ (ASEAN Heads of State and Government  1997). In an important 
ASEAN document, references to people and societies start to appear. Subsequent 
documents echo the community- building idea and relate it explicitly to the notion 
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of ‘people- centredness’, which becomes a new buzzword for the organization. The 
Bali Concord II, which ASEAN leaders adopted in October 2003, mentions the 
term ‘people/s’ seven times, and formulates the goal that ASEAN remains 
‘a dynamic, resilient, and cohesive regional association for the well being of its 
member states and people’ (ASEAN Heads of State and Government  2003). 
Finally, the Charter codifies this community- building discourse by committing 
the organization ‘to intensifying community building through enhanced regional 
cooperation and integration, in particular by establishing an ASEAN Community 
comprising the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community 
and the ASEAN Socio- Cultural Community’ (Preamble), and promoting 
‘a people- oriented ASEAN in which all sector of society are encouraged to par-
ticipate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community 
building’ (art. 1.12). These shifts mark a change in the contractual nature of 
ASEAN, from an intermediate towards an open- ended contract.
At the same time, these contractual changes enabled long- standing demands 
on the establishment of an EU- type parliamentary institution to become more 
compelling. When ASEAN started to embark upon the Charter- making process, 
EU- inspired calls received a new impetus. Several parliamentarians from the 
region visited the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe in Strasburg in 2005, and this ‘stiffened their resolve to “work 
toward the Asian Parliamentary Assembly,” ’ including carving out a stronger role 
for AIPO (Decker 2008: 327).8 AIPO transformed itself into the ASEAN Inter- 
Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) in preparation for the Charter- making process. 
Various interview partners voiced their impression that these renewed demands 
were strongly influenced by inspiration from the European Parliament. A 
Singaporean AIPO/AIPA delegate stated that advocates of an ASEAN parliamen-
tary institution ‘saw the European Parliament, which is a supranational body 
powerful enough to legislate for the whole region, and that’s what they saw them-
selves doing.’9 A government official similarly mentioned that ‘they saw that the 
EU has a parliament, and thought: “Why not us?” ’10
One of the most active and long- standing advocates of a parliamentary institu-
tion in ASEAN is Jose de Venecia, former Speaker of the Philippine House of 
Representatives and former president of AIPO. In 2003, de Venecia co- drafted a 
Philippine report that reinvigorated interest in the idea of establishing an ASEAN 
parliamentary institution (AIPA 2013a). In January 2007, he gave a speech to the 
ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in order to make the case for the establishment of a 
regional parliamentary institution. The speech is worth quoting at length 
8 Interview with Jose de Venecia, Manila, Oct. 2015. 9 Interview, Singapore, Sept. 2009.
10 Interview with Singaporean government official, Singapore, Aug. 2009.
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because it contains reference both to EU influence and to the role of contractual 
open- endedness:
To keep pace with ASEAN’s progress toward community, AIPO (now called 
AIPA) itself is moving toward an ASEAN Interparliamentary Assembly 
(AIPA)—on the model of continental legislatures: the European Parliament, 
born in 1962; the Latin- American Parliament, born in 1964; and the African 
Parliament, born in 2004, that are already well established.
Indeed, Asia—cradle of the great civilizations, cradle of the great religions, and 
cradle of the great cultures—lags far behind the other continents in this global 
movement toward the establishment of regional parliaments [. . .]
Given these precedents, we expect that our ASEAN regional parliament 
would have a key role [. . .] in the historic process of Southeast Asian 
 integration . . . (De Venecia 2007: 5–6)
De Venecia’s speech is interesting because it uses the fact that other ROs have 
established parliamentary institutions as an argument in favour of parliamentari-
zation in ASEAN, also mentioning the European Parliament. At the same time, 
the speech alludes to the fact that ASEAN’s move towards community- building 
justifies changes in ASEAN’s institutions.
These demands made their way into the ASEAN Charter and eventually 
resulted in the formalized recognition of AIPA as the parliamentary arm of 
ASEAN. The Eminent Persons Group, nominated by governments to make 
re com menda tions on the Charter, undertook a study visit to the EU during their 
consultations, where their counterparts emphasized that granting par lia men tar-
ians formalized access to regional decision- making was a crucial ingredient in 
rendering an organization more people- oriented.11 Subsequently, the group 
re com mend ed ‘cultivat[ing] ASEAN as a people- centered organization and 
[strengthening] the sense of ownership and belonging among its people, includ-
ing enhancing the participation of [. . .] AIPA’ (Eminent Persons Group 2006: 6). 
This proposal was taken up by the High Level Task Force, which was created by 
governments to draft the final Charter. Negotiation documents and interviews 
suggest that the idea of more structured participation by parliamentarians was 
largely consensual among governments during the final Charter negotiations (see 
the accounts in Koh, Manalo, and Woon 2009). Yet legal complications resulting 
from the fact that not all ASEAN member states were also members of AIPA pre-
vented AIPA’s full integration into the organization’s decision- making structure.12 
11 Interview with Fidel Ramos, Sept. 2009.
12 Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Jakarta, Aug. 2009. See also ‘Weaknesses in 
Legislative Systems Stall ASEAN Parliament’, Malaysia General News, 5 July 2007.
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Alternative mechanisms had to be found. The formal establishment of regular 
meetings prior to ASEAN summits reflects this particular need.
Why were governments more willing to accept parliamentary demands for the 
creation of an ASEAN parliamentary institution this time around? Any ex plan-
ation for its establishment is certainly multi- causal, and government’s willingness 
to re- establish the credibility and legitimacy of ASEAN in the eyes of important 
stakeholders of the organization plays a key role, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Lenz, Burilkov, and Viola 2019). Yet changes in the contractual nature of ASEAN 
made it easier for parliamentarians to make their voice heard because analogies 
to the EU appeared more relevant than ever. Even those policy- makers who had 
previously strictly rejected any comparisons with the EU now endorsed them in 
public. For example, Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (2002) argued 
for the creation of an ASEAN economic community in a speech at the World 
Economic Forum East Asia Economic Summit in 2002, which he described as 
‘not unlike the European Economic Community of the 1950s’. In a 2007 speech, 
Secretary- General Ong Keng Yong (2007) remarked: ‘It is no accident that 
ASEAN has been looking at the European Union’s rich experience as we map out 
our own plans for becoming a Community by 2015.’ To actors focused on the 
building of their own ASEAN community, analogies with the EU as a prime 
example of successful community- building ‘made sense’.
More systematic evidence lies in the fact that in the accounts given by the 
members of the High- Level Task Force that drafted the ASEAN Charter, almost 
half indicated that the EU served as a useful reference in their endeavours (Koh, 
Manalo, and Woon 2009). This sense is widely shared among academic observers. 
Wong, for example, interprets the EU’s ‘disproportionate influence on the institu-
tional design and evolution’ of ASEAN as that of forming a ‘passive reference 
point’ (Wong  2012: 671). In the most systematic analysis of the perception of 
ASEAN’s policy- makers of the EU, Yukawa finds a connection between the inci-
dence of references to the EU in ASEAN policy- makers’ public statements and 
the emergence of (economic) community- building. He concludes:
In summary, starting in the 2000s, ASEAN has frequently framed the EU as a 
model and has actually come to receive support from the EU. Yet this basically 
applies only to the area of functional cooperation, centering on economic inte-
gration, with remarks about ‘the EU as a model’ appearing after ASEAN itself 
had come to promote the idea of community. (Yukawa 2018: 334)
This analysis confirms the stipulated link between positive references to the 
EU and the community- building idea. I interpret this empirical finding as evi-
dence that changes in the nature of ASEAN’s contract have made analogies 
with the EU more plausible and have thereby facilitated the materialization of 
EU influence.
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In fact, such considerations have been voiced publicly. Hadi Soesastro, a 
member of the influential ASEAN–ISIS network and a participant in discussions 
regarding the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), laid out 
relevant considerations in a 2008 research report:
The Blueprint is not a detailed agreement with clearly defined targets based on 
lengthy up- front negotiations unlike that of the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA). NAFTA is a narrow, yet, a deep integration project and is also 
not about ‘community- building’ [. . .] In a sense, the ASEAN process towards 
realizing the AEC is more like that of the European Union’s (EU) rather than 
that of NAFTA. (Soesastro 2008: 49)
This statement captures well the idea that broad similarities in purpose make 
influence from certain types of organizations more palatable than that from 
 others. NAFTA, he suggests, has a narrow focus and is not about community- 
building, which means that it is less useful as a referent than is the EU, which, by 
implication, is an open- ended integration project that aims to build a community.
Additional evidence for this claim comes from the fact that following the 
financial crisis, while a variety of non- state actors, not only parliamentarians, 
have sought to establish closer links with ASEAN, parliamentarians have been 
most successful in establishing institutionalized links to participate in ASEAN’s 
decision- making process. Various civil society groups similarly have pressed to be 
recognized by ASEAN and to make their voice heard in ASEAN decision- making. 
In fact, some of these civil society groups may have been more vocal than par lia-
men tar ians in the region in advancing their demands. Yet their efforts have fallen 
short. Gerard argues that civil society organizations have been unable to shape 
policy despite ASEAN’s commitment to creating a ‘people- centred’ organization 
because ‘ASEAN’s “people- oriented” shift serves to legitimate its reform agenda’ 
(Gerard 2014: 267). Legitimation is most successful when it signals to important 
stakeholders that an organization is ‘desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman 
1995: 574). Rendering AIPA rather than other non- state actors ‘the key partner in 
government’, as stated by a media release on the Summit following the adoption 
of the Charter (ASEAN Summit 2007, my emphasis), promises greater legitimacy 
benefits because this institutional form is more recognizable among ROs that are 
engaged in open- ended cooperation.
The contractual nature of an RO thereby conditions the diffusion pressure that 
other organizations may exert. The functional and normative arguments for why 
a parliamentary institution may or may not be a ‘good’ institution to have in an 
RO are generally well known. Yet they are not equally compelling in all ROs. In 
particular, these arguments are more compelling when the basic purpose of an 
organization, as expressed in the nature of its contract, are similar across the EU 
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and other ROs. The establishment of AIPA as an institution of ASEAN is a per tin ent 
illustration of this logic—a logic that operates similarly in the absence of such 
similarities between the EU and other ROs, as we see in the next section.
The non- establishment of a parliamentary institution in NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a regional economic 
agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States that aims to create a 
free trade area in goods, services, and investment. The agreement was adopted in 
1991 and entered into force in January 1994. It has gradually eliminated tariffs, 
reduced non- tariff barriers, liberalized capital movement, and opened up trade in 
selected services; however, its institutional frameworks remain thin (Duina 2015). 
Implementation of the agreement has proceeded smoothly and largely according 
to schedule, with the last of its provisions implemented in January 2008.
NAFTA is rooted in prior economic agreements between the two northern 
neighbours, the United States and Canada, who had signed a bilateral economic 
agreement in 1988. Mexico, for its part, reversing decades of inward- oriented 
economic policies, then sought a free trade agreement with the United States in 
1990, through then- President Carlos Salinas. Mexico suffered harshly from the 
economic crisis that rippled through Latin America in the 1980s, which Salinas 
sought to remedy through more liberal economic policies and, in order to lock 
these in, external agreements. Recognizing that ‘the moment was ripe for a his-
toric political reconciliation’, the Bush (senior) administration consented, while 
Canada could ‘not afford to be absent from the negotiation table’ even though it 
already had a functioning agreement with the United States (Baer 1991: 132, 141). 
NAFTA essentially extends the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement to Mexico, 
with two supplementary agreements—the North American Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation—
which largely reflect the concerns of labour unions and en vir on mentalists in the 
United States (Duina 2015).
NAFTA is a thinly institutionalized RO without a parliamentary institution. 
Besides various intergovernmental bodies that are responsible for monitoring 
the implementation of and further developing liberalization commitments,13 the 
organization’s daily business is managed by the three national sections of the 
secretariat (art. 2002.1, NAFTA 1991). The most elaborate institutional structure in 
NAFTA is the dispute settlement mechanism. A general procedure according 
to article 20 of the agreement is supplemented by independent mechanisms 
on  investment disputes (art. 11) and on countervailing duty and antidumping 
13 http://archive.vn/elIRj (last accessed on 22 Feb. 2021).
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measures (art. 19). While all three are based on independent rulings by ad hoc 
panels, the latter two provide for a higher degree of bindingness regarding rulings 
and retaliatory sanctions in cases of non- compliance. The investment dispute 
mech an ism also provides for the access of private investors to the procedure 
(Abbott 2000). Besides the dispute settlement mechanism, NAFTA does not dis-
pose of any other delegated institutions. Unlike in many other ROs around the 
world, not even a single EU- type institutional proposal has ever been proposed 
and ser ious ly considered in NAFTA. As Bow and Anderson bluntly state, ‘No one 
argued that North America would be, could be, or should be like Europe’ (Bow 
and Anderson  2015: 2). Or, in Abbott’s unpretentious words, ‘An approach to 
dele ga tion modeled on the EU was not politically feasible’ (Abbott  2000: 535). 
The organization is a prominent case of an RO without a parliament. In a world in 
which the incidence of parliamentary bodies has grown rapidly even in ROs com-
posed of non- democratic member states, NAFTA increasingly looks like an out-
lier. This organization, I argue, is instructive in order to study the broader 
structural conditions that facilitate, or hamper, EU influence.
Alas, why does NAFTA not have a parliamentary institution? It is more diffi-
cult to explain the absence of an institution than its presence. Many factors may 
reasonably account for NAFTA’s ‘parliament- lessness’, but I seek to show that one 
major reason why such an institution has never been seriously considered is 
related to the nature of NAFTA’s founding contract. The contract, I argue, heavily 
constrains the potential for EU influence because it sets member states on a fun-
damentally different track regarding regional cooperation, compared with their 
counterparts in Europe. As a result, an EU- type parliamentary institution has 
rarely been proposed by relevant social groups, even less considered seriously by 
governments. This stands in marked contrast to the ASEAN experience, where 
the creation of an EU- type parliamentary institution has been a core part of an 
ongoing debate about institutional reform in the organization. Below, I review 
several critical junctures in the evolution of NAFTA where such proposals have 
been, or reasonably could have been, tabled.
The first critical juncture is the negotiation of NAFTA itself. Formal ne go ti-
ations began in June 1991 and were conducted in relative secrecy. While co ord in-
ation with economic interest groups was smooth in all three countries, negotiators 
tried to avoid wider public debate, since the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement 
almost faltered over it becoming a major rallying point in the 1988 Canadian 
elections. Given the detail of NAFTA and the far reach of its provisions—on many 
fronts, NAFTA trod entirely new ground—negotiations were concluded in record 
time. Even detailed negotiation histories are entirely silent on a proposal to 
include a parliamentary institution—such a proposal simply did not exist 
(Cameron and Tomlin 2001; Boskin 2014). The only institution envisaged from 
the beginning is a dispute settlement mechanism. This is not surprising, given 
that negotiators saw their task as negotiating a free trade agreement and ensuring 
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its implementation. As Jaime Serra Puche, the Mexican lead negotiator of 
NAFTA, recalls:
The negotiation under Bush was a complicated negotiation but, in a way, it was 
simple because we had an agreement on where we wanted to get to. We knew 
that we wanted a free trade agreement with no tariffs, with no obstacles to trade, 
with investment chapters, with intellectual property, with dispute settlement. 
(quoted in Boskin 2014: 22)
The more specific the purpose of an organization and the more detailed the sub-
stantive stipulations of an agreement, the less need there is for the design of an 
elaborate institutional framework that can assist policy- makers in ‘discovering 
cooperation’ (Marks et al.  2014). As the above quotation indicates, negotiators 
shared a clear understanding of this narrow purpose from the start. As a result, 
NAFTA eventually emerged as a fairly complete contract. As Abbott notes:
NAFTA is among the most highly detailed international agreements ever nego-
tiated between governments. [. . .] NAFTA was drafted at a level of detail sub-
stantially higher than the EC treaty, bearing in mind that NAFTA does not 
envision the adoption of secondary legislation in the sense of the EC treaty. 
(Abbott 2000: 524)
As a result of the narrow goal- and government- oriented character of NAFTA, 
displayed in its founding contract, the institutional structure is light. A Free Trade 
Commission, a secretariat, around 30 working groups and committees, and the 
dispute settlement mechanism are ‘exclusively designed for the implementation 
of the agreement’ (Duina 2015: 179). A parliamentary institution is simply irrele-
vant in such a context, as are even standing intergovernmental bodies that adopt 
secondary legislation (Bélanger 2007).
A second critical juncture is the ‘renegotiation’ of NAFTA under the Clinton 
administration. Once the agreement was adopted in August 1992, politicization 
skyrocketed. During the 1992 presidential election campaign, Bill Clinton prom-
ised a renegotiation of the agreement to accommodate the demands of en vir on-
mental and labour groups that heavily criticized the agreement. These groups 
mobilized against what they perceived to be a deal focusing exclusively on economic 
efficiency gains while neglecting social, welfare, and environmental concerns. 
Afraid of major job losses and environmental degradation,14 they demanded 
more stringent regulations on labour rights and environmental protection. 
Renegotiations then began soon after Bill Clinton ousted George W. Bush as 
14 An independent in the 1992 presidential race, Ross Perrot famously warned of a ‘giant sucking 
sound going South’.
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President of the United States in January 1993. Clinton was keen to secure 
 supplemental agreements on labour and the environment, but also made clear 
that the negotiated text itself would not be touched (Boskin 2014: 22). Concluded 
in September 1993, the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation 
(NAFTA 1993a) and the North American Agreement on Environmental Protection 
(NAFTA 1993b) primarily commit member states to enforcing their own domestic 
laws on these matters. These agreements were mainly directed at Mexico, where 
the enforcement of domestic labour and environmental laws had been historically 
poor (Wold  2008: 210–11). Both agreements also set up a thin institutional 
infrastructure to monitor implementation, with the latter containing a more 
robust institutional framework than the former.
Yet, again, there was no debate about any form of parliamentary institution. 
Both demands by interest groups as well as the negotiation itself were concerned 
with regulatory issues regarding labour rights and the environment, and institu-
tional debate centred on how to enforce these regulations (see Nolan García 
2011). The main purpose was to mitigate the anticipated negative fallout from the 
trade agreement, the specific details of which had been agreed upon. And even 
the few NAFTA critics who did make reference to the EU used the Community as 
a prominent example of a regulatory regime that provides for progressive social 
policies. Sheldon Friedman, influential economist at the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL- CIO) at the time, notes, for 
example, ‘In contrast to the care which has been taken in the EC to undertake 
economic integration in a manner which avoids “social dumping”, the Bush- Salinas 
NAFTA will be an open invitation to continue and intensify this already- rampant 
practice’ (Friedman 1992: 27). It is striking to note the difference in the ways in 
which the EU is used to legitimize political demands in the two organizations. 
Whereas the proponents of parliamentarization in ASEAN used the EU as an 
example of community- building, to which a parliamentary body contributes in 
important ways, in NAFTA, critics use the EU as an example of a progressive 
regulatory regime that ‘requires’ certain regulatory policies in order to be con-
sidered fair. As Schimmelfennig et al. note:
The strategies pursued by the supporters were tailored to the objections raised 
by the opponents. As opposition focused on substantive policy concerns, pro-
pon ents sought to address these concerns not by institutional reform but rather 
by offering additional guarantees to attenuate fears of negative effects on the 
environment and working standards. (Schimmelfennig et al. 2020: 183)
A parliamentary body, with its purpose to enable participation by par lia men tar-
ians and its concomitant potential to enhance the legitimacy of an organization, 
was simply not needed, given the particular pattern of contestation that emerged 
around NAFTA during this early period.
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Since the entry into force of NAFTA and its side agreements in 1994, institutional 
evolution has been minimal, and few additional critical junctures emerged until 
the recent renegotiation of NAFTA under the Trump administration. With the 
exception of minor technical matters, such as adjustments in the rules of origin, 
the substantive stipulations as well as the institutional framework have remained 
unaltered until the negotiation of the new United States–Mexico–Canada 
Agreement (USMCA). What is more, even debate about a reform of NAFTA has 
been relatively limited. For much of the following 20 years, the agreement oper-
ated fairly smoothly, and criticism of the agreement has been overwhelmingly 
directed at its regulatory detail and not at its institutional framework (Bélanger 
2007).15 During his election campaign in 2008 Barack Obama promised to 
renegotiate NAFTA to enhance the essentially unenforceable labour and environ-
mental regulations from the side agreements, but no progress was made on this 
front (Jacobs 2010). Instead, Obama shifted his focus to the negotiations of the 
Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the context of his strategic ‘pivot to Asia’. 
According to well- informed accounts, he succeeded in updating many of the 
NAFTA provisions, including on labour protection and the environment, in this 
context (Grunwald 2017), but institutional change in NAFTA itself was therefore 
off the table.
NAFTA became subject to public debate, once again, when President Donald 
Trump announced during his election campaign that he would renegotiate the 
agreement, which he saw as ‘the worst trade deal ever made’16 and ‘unfair to 
Americans’.17 Fulfilling a pledge of his election campaign, President Trump 
sought to make the agreement more reciprocal between the parties. Renegotiations 
started in June 2017 and were concluded, after more than a year of intense ne go ti-
ations, on 1 October 2018. The new agreement was signed by the presidents of the 
three countries in November 2018, and has been approved by all three parlia-
ments. It entered into force on 1 July 2020. While the new agreement contains 
some changes in substantive provisions, especially when it comes to car manufac-
turing, trade in agricultural products (especially dairy), and intellectual property 
protection, the already thin institutional framework from NAFTA was further 
thinned out (for an overview, see Hufbauer and Globerman 2018). In fact, ne go ti-
ations over the maintenance of the existing dispute settlement procedures were 
15 When Vicente Fox became president of Mexico in 2000, he proposed to transform NAFTA into 
an economic union (‘North American Union proposal’) along the lines of the EU, a proposal which 
US President George W. Bush harshly rejected (Fox 2007: 101). However, it is unclear whether the 
proposal was ever a serious suggestion. In 2002, the Canadian Parliament completed a consultation 
process on the future of North America after 9/11, and proposed a more institutionalized NAFTA 
that would involve interparliamentary cooperation and, eventually, even a standing court of justice 
(Bélanger 2007: 210).
16 https://www.bbc.com/news/business- 45711595 (accessed 22 Feb. 2021).
17 https://qz.com/1185878/nafta- negotiations- the- consequences- of- trumps- positions/ (accessed 
22 Feb. 2021).
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intense because the United States intended to significantly weaken or scrap 
al together the three NAFTA procedures. Upon fierce Canadian and Mexican 
insistence, however, only the investment dispute settlement mechanism (old art. 11) 
was ‘severely curtailed’ (Hufbauer and Globerman  2018: 4). After a three- year 
transition period, the mechanism is scrapped concerning investment disputes 
between Canada and the United States and limited to certain sectors for invest-
ment disputes between the United States and Mexico (see also Gantz  2018). 
Overall, institutional change in the new agreement is limited.
In sum, there has been surprisingly little debate about the establishment of a 
parliamentary institution in NAFTA, even though its membership is fully demo-
cratic. What are the reasons for this state of affairs? The evidence presented above 
indicates that most of the contestation around NAFTA focused on substantive issues 
related to trade liberalization—labour rights, environmental protection, job loss/
gain, industrial development, etc.—rather than the agreement’s institutions. While 
there was some contestation, including among negotiators themselves, regarding the 
specifics of the dispute settlement procedures, there is little indication that serious 
proposals were put forward that included an extensive EU- type institutionalization 
of the agreement. Instead, early proposals in particular which reference the EU 
construe it as a progressive regulatory regime that avoids ‘social dumping’ through 
‘upward social harmonization’, in an attempt to make the analogy resonate with 
the concerns of a fundamentally different or gan iza tion al type (see Friedman 1992). 
The rare proposals that do depict the EU more encompassingly as an open- ended 
community- building process that would fundamentally change the character of 
NAFTA never stood a serious chance of being adopted.18 As Bow and Anderson 
argue, ‘those that hoped North America could be more than just a preferential trade 
agreement—and even some that hoped otherwise—could not help but be influenced 
in their thinking by the European “model” and European- inspired ideas about 
regions and regionalism’ (Bow and Anderson  2015: 2). In other words, EU- type 
institutions only ‘make sense’ to political actors when international cooperation is 
directed at achieving an open- ended purpose. When cooperation serves more 
narrow purposes, analogies with the EU tend to be far- fetched and serious political 
discussion tends to revolve around more substantive issues.
Conclusion
This chapter seeks to determine the limits of EU influence, and argues that 
 contractual open- endedness is a key factor in conditioning its scope. Whereas EU 
18 See e.g. a press conference by the three heads of state in 2007 where President George W. Bush 
dismissively likens proposals for a North American Union along the lines of the EU as ‘the difference 
between reality and what some people are talking on TV about’ (White House 2007).
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influence is able to operate in ROs that rest on an open- ended contract, it is highly 
constrained in those ROs whose contract is fixed. This is due to both demand- 
and supply- side reasons.
On the demand side, ROs that rest on an open- ended contract encounter a 
higher demand for institutional change because the transnational cooperation 
problems they engage are likely to evolve over time, which in turn multiplies 
opportunities for EU influence to make a difference to the institutions chosen. 
The chapter shows that the frequency of institutional change is distributed highly 
unevenly across the three categories of contractual open- endedness, with ROs 
based on an open- ended contract changing their institutions almost three times 
more frequently than do those ROs that rest on a fixed contract. The paired com-
parison in the parliamentary dimension of ASEAN and NAFTA also shows that 
the absence of institutional reform in the latter organization (up to the recent 
renegotiation of the agreement) has posed a serious constraint on the few advo-
cates of EU- type institutional change who seek to affect its institutional set- up.
On the supply side, proposals for EU- type institutional change are more likely 
to emerge and to be seriously considered in some organizational contexts than in 
others. Specifically, actors are more likely to seriously advance such proposals 
when the organization in question is similar to the EU in terms of the open- ended 
nature of the contract. The chapter presents quantitative evidence indicating that 
the EU is more likely to engage actively with those ROs that rest on contracts 
containing open- ended commitments and thus pursue organizational goals simi-
lar to itself. Moreover, the paired comparison between ASEAN and NAFTA 
shows that local proponents of EU- type institutional change seek to construct 
analogies between their organization and the EU in order to bolster their claims 
for EU- type institutional change. Such analogies, however, are more likely to res-
onate where the basic social purposes of cooperation are plausibly similar, and 
the nature of an RO’s contract is a key organizational characteristic that actors 
consider when assessing similarity.
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European Union Diffusion and Other 
Regional Organizations
Conclusions
Regionalism may be a European invention, but it is not protected by 
copyright law!
Pascal Lamy (2001), former Commissioner of Trade
This book seeks to explain the European Union’s influence on the process of 
 institution building in other ROs. To what extent, in what ways, and under what 
conditions have policy- makers elsewhere heeded Lamy’s not- so- subtle piece of 
advice to emulate or learn from the European experience? The literature on 
regional organization is replete with references to influence from Europe’s 
 foremost RO, but few theoretical works have considered it worthy of careful 
study. If the detailed knowledge of area study specialists and students of 
 comparative regional organization is an indication of the potential worth of a 
research topic, it is surprising that the topic has received so little attention from 
International Relations theorists. Despite recent crises, both scholars and 
 policy- makers widely see the EU as the most successful exemplar of regional 
 economic cooperation in the modern era. Debates about regional cooperation in 
other parts of the world are regularly accompanied by reference to, and compari-
sons with, the European integration experience. What is more, the EU is the most 
active supporter of regional organization around the world, dedicating millions of 
euros and providing sought- after technical expertise for the task. Do these 
 well- known observations have systematic consequences for institutional design 
outcomes?
This book answers this question in the affirmative. The main argument is that 
the existence of the EU has made an identifiable and substantive difference to the 
institutional design of ROs in other parts of the world—counterfactually, ROs 
would be significantly less institutionalized in the absence of the EU. This is due 
both to its active influence, through direct engagement with many ROs around 
the world, and to its passive influence, stemming from the information it provides 
on institutional effects and from the legitimacy it gives to those institutional 
forms which it has successfully championed. However, the nature of an RO’s con-
tract delimits the causal role of the EU. Its influence is mainly detectable in ROs 
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that, like the EU itself, rest on an open- ended contract in which the purpose of 
cooperation is not only to collectively solve transnational problems but also to 
build and strengthen a regional community. A variety of methods and data, which 
are unique in their breadth and depth to the study of regional organization, 
strongly support these arguments.
This final chapter begins by summarizing the main empirical findings on active 
and passive EU influence as well as on the scope of these pathways. It then con-
siders the theoretical implications of the book’s arguments for the literatures on 
regional organization, international institutional design, and diffusion, and men-
tions some avenues for future research.
Conditions and pathways of EU influence on  
regional institution building
Here the main results regarding the conditions and pathways of EU influence and 
the scope of their operation are briefly sketched.
Active EU influence
As a pioneer in the realm of regional organization, the EU has an incentive to 
promote adoption of its institutional forms beyond its own borders. Institutional 
pioneers suffer legitimacy costs because the institutional forms they display do 
not align with recognized organizational patterns. Therefore, such pioneers 
face  incentives to enhance their legitimacy by inducing others to adopt their 
 institutional forms, rendering them less unique (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer 
2000). EU external action closely conforms to this idea of organizational entre-
preneurship. The EU has actively supported regional institution building since 
the 1960s, starting with its former colonies in Africa and the Caribbean. Initially, 
the European Commission provided development aid to regional projects and 
organizations. Later, this support was integrated into formal cooperation agree-
ments with ROs that also involved interregional meetings between representa-
tives of Community bodies and their counterparts, and political cooperation 
across a wide range of issues. Following the Cold War, the EU started allocating 
financial and technical resources directly to the strengthening of regional institu-
tions, and increasingly sought free trade agreements with other ROs as a means to 
export its regulatory standards. Today the EU continues to engage closely with 
many ROs around the world, even though the enthusiasm for interregionalism 
may be vanishing. Especially in trade, the EU has turned towards trade bilateralism 
in various of the EU’s long- standing interregional relationships (Meißner 2019a; 
2019b), and its ambitious agenda of regulatory convergence through interregional 
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trade agreements also appears to be in decline (Young 2015). Nevertheless, the 
interregional trade agreement with Mercosur that was signed on 29 June 2019 
shows that EU interregionalism is all but dead.
What difference have these activities made? The evidence presented in 
this  book shows that the EU’s active support for regional organization has 
 contributed—as intended—towards building stronger institutions elsewhere. 
A quantitative analysis of a sample of 35 of the most important ROs around 
the  world in the period from 1950 to 2017 shows that the level of regional 
institutionalization varies systematically with the EU’s active engagement with 
other ROs, measured for each RO as a well- integrated index that includes the 
amount of financial aid given, the extent of interregional contacts between 
representatives from both sides, and the nature of interregional cooperation 
agreements. Organizations that engage more closely with the EU are more 
likely than those that engage sparsely or not at all to have high levels of regional 
institutionalization, controlling for a host of other explanations that have been 
advanced to explain the design of inter nation al institutions. In sum, active EU influ-
ence further strengthens the general trend towards stronger regional institutions 
since the mid- 1980s; counterfactually, this trend would have been less pronounced 
in the absence of the EU’s active engagement with ROs around the world.
How does the EU actively shape regional institution building? I argue that the 
EU shapes outcomes by affecting governments’ institutional preferences and 
strategies through the provision of financial incentives and new information, 
which in turn affect the outcome in intergovernmental negotiations. A detailed 
case study of the establishment of the Tribunal in SADC in 2005—a substantively 
important case—provides causal leverage in tracing active EU influence because 
it approximates a least likely case from the perspective of existing theoretical 
explanations of dispute settlement design. At the same time, the EU has actively 
engaged with SADC from its inception and the hypothesized scope condition—
an open- ended contract—is present during the relevant period.
The case study shows how the EU, through its control over financial resources 
on which the organization is heavily dependent, shaped governments’ strategy 
over how to balance their two primary collective preferences: attracting inter-
nation al support for regional cooperation and protecting national sovereignty 
when building regional institutions. During the first decade of the organization’s 
existence, member states were able to pursue these preferences simultaneously as 
international donors viewed the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference, SADC’s predecessor, as an important ‘stronghold’ in the fight against 
apartheid in South Africa. Thus, they were willing to provide financial and tech-
nical support independent of the organization’s institutional framework, which 
reflected member states’ collective preference for sovereignty- preserving forms of 
cooperation. Global and regional transformations in the early 1990s as well as the 
EU’s growing dissatisfaction with the organization’s performance changed this 
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‘harmonious’ state of affairs. When the EU, which had become the region’s most 
important donor in the meantime, threatened to withdraw funding from the 
organization in the early 1990s member states were forced to prioritize their pref-
erence to attract donor funding over their preference for sovereignty- preserving 
regional institutions. The codification of the Tribunal in the Windhoek Treaty 
thereby reflects their strategy to retain donor support in a situation in which the 
two had come into conflict. Nevertheless, member states’ institutional preferences 
were stacked against the actual implementation of this provision because they 
weighted their concern for retaining national sovereignty more highly than the 
effective enforcement of collective decisions, and the SADC Trade Protocol, the 
most important instrument for advancing regional economic integration that was 
adopted in 1996, already contained a dispute settlement mechanism. In the late 
1990s, however, the external constraints on their preference ordering rose once 
more. The EU again threatened to withdraw its financial support, changing SADC 
member state’s collective institutional strategy towards the establishment of the 
Tribunal in order to retain EU support. Given the organization’s collective prefer-
ence for attracting donor support and the fact that the EU’s threat to withdraw 
funding posed a danger to the organization as a whole, the outcome of EU diffu-
sion is a high degree of institutional similarity between the EU and SADC: the 
SADC Tribunal is a fully- fledged EU- type court.
The case study also shows the dangers associated with the EU being overly 
assertive when advancing its institution building agenda. After only five years of 
operation, the SADC Tribunal was disbanded and has been replaced by a less 
intrusive mechanism. While the fate of the SADC Tribunal is unique among ROs, 
the way in which the EU contributed to its establishment is not. What is more, 
even though the EU is generally less assertive in the distribution of its financial 
support to other ROs, there are other cases in which such behaviour has been 
reported, such as in Central America.
Passive EU influence
The EU has acted as the most important institutional innovator in regional 
co oper ation in the post- Second World War era. When the organization was 
founded in 1951, policy- makers in Western Europe deliberately broke with the 
traditional model of strictly intergovernmental cooperation to develop a hitherto 
unprecedented, quasi- constitutional institutional framework that involved exten-
sive delegation to supranational bodies. Supranationalism grew further in the fol-
lowing decades, and today the EU is the most supranational among regional and 
global organizations. The signature institutions of Europe’s supranationalism are 
the European Commission, with its exclusive right to propose legislation and its 
ability to bring non- compliance cases to the regional court; the European Court 
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of Justice, whose rulings have direct effect in member states and which is embedded 
within national legal systems through a system of preliminary rulings; and the 
directly elected European Parliament, the second legislator alongside the Council of 
Ministers. Again, institutional innovators bear considerable costs in terms of 
legitimacy because they break with established institutional forms and routines, 
and therefore have an incentive to put their institutional innovations forward for 
general emulation (Meyer 2000)—an idea that is well captured in Pascal Lamy’s 
catchy plea, cited at the beginning of this chapter. Numerous policy- makers the 
world over have expressed their admiration for the process of European integration, 
and many academic observers advance anecdotal claims about learning and emula-
tion processes from the EU. Do these stand up to systematic scrutiny?
This book demonstrates that the EU has indeed passively shaped processes of 
regional institution building. A quantitative analysis of 35 important ROs span-
ning all world regions in the period from 1950 to 2017 shows that the in sti tu tion-
al iza tion of other ROs evolves in line with the EU’s own institutional development. 
The Community’s level of institutionalization has a statistically significant and 
substantively sizeable impact on the levels of institutionalization in other ROs, 
controlling for a host of other potential causes. This finding indicates that the EU 
systematically serves as a reference point in negotiations over institutional change 
in other ROs, thereby nudging institutions towards higher levels of in sti tu tion al-
iza tion than would otherwise be the case.
This substantial effect notwithstanding, I suspect that my measure seriously 
underestimates the EU’s passive influence, for two reasons. First, a more fine- 
grained measure would capture the EU’s differential reception in other ROs and 
would thereby seek to tap other sources of such influence that are currently not 
captured in the measure. The case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 show, for example, 
that governments and other actors may use EU institutions to legitimize their 
demands independently of high- profile institutional change in the EU itself. In 
other words, governments may also enhance regional institutions during periods 
of relative stagnation in the European integration process, and this likely effect is 
not captured in the quantitative measure. Second, it may well be that the nature of 
an RO’s founding contract, which I take as an exogenous influence on regional 
institution building, is, at least in some cases, endogenous to passive EU influ-
ence. One may believe that the success of community- building in Europe inspired 
policy- makers elsewhere to embark on similar undertakings, and that this is 
reflected in their founding contracts. Taken together, these reasons suggest that the 
effects of passive EU influence, which I identify in the book, are overly conservative.
What is the causal process underlying passive EU influence? As with active 
influence, I argue that passive influence operates through its impact on the defi n-
ition of governments’ institutional preferences and strategies by providing new 
information on cause–effect relationships, by enabling learning, and by le git im-
iz ing certain institutional forms, facilitating emulation. To the extent that such 
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preferences and strategies, shaped by learning from and emulating the EU’s 
 institutions, exert an identifiable effect on the final outcome, we may say that the 
EU had an independent impact. This impact certainly varies with the power of 
the government, or group of governments, that adopt EU- type institutions as 
their bargaining positions in institutional negotiations; but under the long 
shadow of the future that characterizes regional cooperation, the influence of 
even nom in al ly weak governments is often detectable.
The establishment of the Permanent Review Tribunal in Mercosur is a per tin ent 
example. Not only is it a typical case in view of the results obtained in the regression 
analysis, it is also an unlikely case from the perspective of existing explanations of 
dispute settlement design. The nominally weak government of Uruguay, and to 
some extent also of Paraguay, adopted the creation of an EU- type tribunal as their 
bargaining positions in negotiations over a reform of Mercosur’s dispute settlement 
system. The design of the Permanent Review Tribunal, codified with the Olivos 
Protocol in 2002 and operationalized in 2004, is closer to Argentina and Brazil’s 
position in establishing a WTO- type dispute settlement system, although Uruguay’s 
insistence on an EU- type system left identifiable traces. In particular, I suggest that 
the provisions both on consultative opinions and on the possibility of the two dis-
puting parties accessing the Permanent Review Tribunal directly—rendering it a de 
facto single court in this case—would not have formed part of the final outcome 
had Uruguay not pushed for it. Inclusion of these two institutional features is, there-
fore, the substantive difference that passive EU influence made to the final outcome, 
because Uruguay’s institutional strategy in these negotiations is directly derived 
from the model provided by the European Court of Justice. Due to the strong power 
asymmetries in favour of governments that are highly sceptical concerning inde-
pendent regional institutions in Mercosur, passive EU influence is detectable but 
limited. In or gan iza tion al contexts in which bargaining power is distributed less in 
favour of institution- averse governments and where governments are less sceptical 
about EU- type institutional change or even desire it, passive EU influence is likely 
to be more substantial and widespread.
Scope of EU influence
My claim that the EU systematically shapes the process of building institutions in 
other ROs does not imply that EU influence matters always and everywhere. 
I  submit that the operation of the active and passive EU influence pathways is 
conditional on the nature of the constitutional contracts upon which an RO rests. 
Such founding or amendment contracts are not all carved of the same wood, 
establishing institutions and rules in order to advance regional cooperation, but 
they vary enormously in the extent to which they contain open- ended commit-
ments. Some organizations specify the purpose of cooperation at the outset, 
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clearly naming the specific cooperation problems they aim to address; these 
organizations are based on fixed contracts. Other organizations leave the purpose 
of cooperation vague and unspecified. They seek to build regional communities 
and ever closer unions not only among governments but also among the member 
states’ citizens. They also address transnational cooperation problems as they emerge 
over time, and problem- solving goes hand in hand with community building 
(Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019; Lenz et al. 2015). I call the contracts upon which 
such organizations rest ‘open- ended contracts’.
On this basis, I argue that in organizations that are based on open- ended con-
tracts similar to the EU’s contractual basis, EU influence is likely to be extensive. 
Conversely, organizations that rest on fixed or intermediate contracts severely 
constrain the potential for both pathways of EU influence. The reason is that, with 
the exception of outright coercion or conditionality—a situation that is exceed-
ingly rare in the EU’s support for regional organization—the EU cannot, by itself, 
generate the conditions upon which it depends for its institutions to make a dif-
ference in negotiations over institutional change. Such negotiations may become 
necessary, for example, when existing institutions do not operate in the manner 
initially intended by their creators, or when the emergence of new cooperation 
problems requires adjustments to the existing institutional framework. In this 
sense, the EU’s influence on regional institution building elsewhere is often what 
Dill (2015) calls ‘causally dependent.’
Even though the specific causes of particular negotiations over institutional 
change may be diverse, I contend that opportunities for EU influence are more 
numerous in certain types of ROs, namely those with an open- ended contract. 
This claim rests on two theoretical considerations. First, organizations with 
open- ended contracts are more likely to undergo regular institutional change, 
thereby multiplying the opportunities for EU influence. When an organization is 
institutionally static, EU institutions may only shape regional institution building 
once—at the moment of founding. When an organization changes more fre-
quently, opportunities for EU influence multiply. Second, actors who aim to pro-
mote EU- type institutional change within an RO find it easier to do so when their 
organization displays similarity with the EU in a fundamental organizational 
characteristic, such as the nature of its contract. Such similarities make it easier 
for proponents of EU- type institutional change to draw credible analogies with 
the process of European integration, bolstering their institutional demands, while 
at the same time making it harder for opponents of EU- type institutional change 
to reject them. The legitimacy of EU- type institutional change, in short, hinges on 
the relevance of the EU experience to other organizations. Similarity in contrac-
tual open- endedness, I argue, proxies such relevance.
What empirical evidence is there for these theoretical claims? A statistical 
analysis of 35 ROs from around the world in the period from 1950 to 2017 
shows that the direct effects of active and passive EU influence are indeed 
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statistically stronger and substantively larger in organizations that are based on 
open- ended contracts. Specifically, I find that active and passive EU influence are 
consistently strongest in organizations with open- ended contracts, mixed in the 
case of intermediate contracts, and indistinguishable from the null hypothesis of 
no influence in organizations with fixed contracts. The data also show clearly that 
the incidence of institutional change is distributed highly unevenly across the 
three types of RO, with open- ended organizations reforming their institutions 
much more frequently than those based on intermediate and fixed contracts. 
Specifically, whereas the former type engages in institutional reform roughly once 
in a decade, on average, ROs with an intermediate contract reform their institu-
tions once every two decades and those with a fixed contract only every three 
decades. Thus, opportunities for EU influence are significantly reduced in or gan-
iza tions that rest on a fixed contract compared to the other two categories. I also 
show quantitatively that affinities between the EU and other ROs shape active EU 
engagement. The EU supports those ROs that are based on open- ended and 
intermediate contracts much more frequently than those based on fixed con-
tracts—a trend that has strengthened with the end of the Cold War. Today, it 
actively engages the majority of ROs based on open- ended contracts, while this is 
not the case for the other two RO types.
A detailed comparison of the parliamentary dimension in ASEAN and NAFTA 
shows how, specifically, contractual affinities between organizations delimit the 
causal role of EU influence. This paired comparison has the virtue that, given 
explanations for parliamentarization in the existing literature, NAFTA is expected 
to be more likely than ASEAN to create a regional parliamentary institution 
because its membership is composed of established democracies; but the opposite 
actually happened. Whereas ASEAN, an organization composed mainly of autoc-
racies and with limited authority, granted consultative rights to the ASEAN 
Interparliamentary Assembly in 2010, NAFTA does not even have an unaffiliated 
parliamentary body, nor has the creation of a parliamentary institution as an offi-
cial institution of NAFTA ever been seriously entertained by governments. 
Process- tracing the debates over institutional change at critical junctures of the 
organization’s lifetime, I find that references to the EU are much more frequent in 
ASEAN than they are in NAFTA. When the EU is nevertheless invoked in debates 
over institutional change in NAFTA, similarities are constructed not around 
community- building and contractual open- endedness but around regulatory 
politics, seeking to make the EU relevant to NAFTA’s specific and narrow pur-
pose—a move that ultimately fails. When proposals do emerge for a reconstruc-
tion of NAFTA along EU lines, these are outright rejected by key decision- makers 
as utterly irrelevant.
In ASEAN, references to the EU have occurred frequently throughout ASEAN’s 
existence and form a key element of the politics surrounding regional parliamen-
tarization. From the mid- 1970s onwards, parliamentary actors in ASEAN 
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promoted the establishment of a parliamentary institution with a formal affiliation 
to the organization, primarily by reference to the European Parliament. At the 
same time, they established regular contact with their counterparts in the EU in 
order to legitimize their efforts. During most of this period, governments did not 
ser ious ly consider these demands—and indeed rejected analogies to the EU with 
reference to ASEAN’s distinct purpose. Strikingly, however, this changed when 
 governments started debating a major reform of the association that aimed to 
construct an ASEAN community. Ultimately culminating in the adoption of the 
ASEAN Charter, parliamentary demands for institutionalized participation were 
taken more seriously by policy- makers and ultimately accepted. When the Charter 
was adopted, even policy- makers from countries that had long rejected any com-
parison with the EU started referring to it as inspirational—and relevant. A tightly 
controlled comparison of two cases with contrasting and—in light of the existing 
literature—anomalous outcomes suggests that the ability of actors to draw credible 
analogies with the EU to legitimize their own demands for EU- type institutional 
change is indeed a relevant factor delimiting the causal role of EU influence.
Theoretical implications
In this section I develop the implications of the book’s main findings for the 
 lit era tures on regional organization, international institutional design, and diffusion, 
and sketch some promising avenues for future research.
Regional organization, in Europe and beyond
The first and perhaps most important implication of the argument advanced in 
this book is that existing theories of regional organization are seriously incom-
plete because they emphasize causal factors at the intraregional and global levels 
of analysis and neglect interorganizational influences.1 As detailed in Chapter 2, 
such accounts explain the emergence and evolution of ROs as the result of intrare-
gional constellations of preferences, institutions, or identities or of global influ-
ences that stem from globalization or external security threats (an overview is 
provided in Börzel 2016). In so doing, they conceive of ROs as atomistic entities 
that develop independently of each other. Indeed, the existing literature in large 
part fails to recognize that institutional choices are, rather than independent, 
regularly interdependent between organizations, and specifically between the EU 
and other ROs. This book demonstrates that the EU systematically shapes 
1 I discuss my contribution in relation to the growing literature on diffusion, including between 
ROs, below.
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 processes of regional institution building both actively, by providing financial 
support, engaging their counterparts in other organizations, and concluding 
interregional agreements, and passively, by serving as a reference point that  others 
learn from and emulate. This is not to deny that other factors crucially shape the 
process of regional institution building; they do. However, the analysis in this 
book suggests that any account of the phenomenon is seriously incomplete unless 
it takes into account the influence of the EU, both as an active promoter of 
regional institution building and as a successful pioneer. The EU makes an identi-
fiable difference.
The neglect of interdependent decision- making is one reason why integration 
theories developed in the European context are difficult to transfer to other parts 
of the world. In the 1970s, neofunctionalists abandoned their endeavour to 
develop a general theory of regional integration, while liberal intergovernmen-
talism has barely been applied outside of Europe. It is well known in diffusion 
research that explanations for institutional innovations differ fundamentally from 
explanations for subsequent institutional adoption (Finnemore 1993). Institutional 
innovations deviate from established institutional forms and practices, and their 
explanation therefore requires a theoretical focus on endogenous conditions that 
can account for such deviation. As a result, it may be apt for the or ies of European 
integration to set aside diffusion explanations a priori.2 For example, Moravcsik 
(1998) notes in passing, citing Perry Anderson, that European institutions ‘emerged 
for the most part not through inattention, emulation, or revolution’ (p. 68), and 
then moves on to develop his liberal intergovernmentalist theory of integration. 
However, if we aim to explain regional cooperation and integration beyond 
Europe, the neglect of diffusion explanations constitutes a serious omission; 
beyond the explanation of an institutional in nov ation or innovator, diffusion has 
to be taken seriously as an explanation, for the reasons developed in this book. 
In  line with this observation, one of the most successful theories of regional 
 integration—Walter Mattli’s (1999) The Logic of Regional Integration—is deliber-
ately not derived from the European experience, and takes diffusion in the form 
of competition between ROs seriously.
Recent research shows that contractual incompleteness is a key determinant of 
the institutional evolution of international organization because it provides an 
endogenous capacity for institutional change (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019). 
I build on this literature to suggest that what I term ‘contractual open- endedness’3 
delimits the causal role of EU influence. Out of the contract literature has emerged 
a productive research programme in many fields of social sciences, including 
2 There is some debate, however, especially among historians, as to whether the EU has not also 
extensively emulated institutional models from elsewhere (see Patel 2013; Patel and Calligaro 2017).
3 I find this term more apt than ‘contractual incompleteness’ because incompleteness generally 
focuses on the specificity of individual provisions, whereas open- endedness gauges the nature of the 
purpose of an RO.
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political science and International Relations (see e.g. Lake  1996; Cooley and 
Spruyt 2009; Keohane 1984; Diez 2014), but it has been completely ignored in the 
study of regional organization. I seek to reconnect the study of contracts and of 
regional organization. Open- ended contracts provide more numerous op por tun-
ities for EU influence to make a difference because they require more frequent 
institutional adaptation, and they also make it easier for actors to draw credible 
analogies with the EU, which is also based on an open- ended contract, thereby 
legitimizing demands for EU- type institutional change. Thusly interpreted, 
 contractual open- endedness is a fundamental organizational characteristic that 
creates ‘cultural’ similarities and differences between organizations and thereby 
shapes the nature of their relationship. It is compatible with the relational ontol-
ogy that underlies the analysis in this book.
How do the book’s findings speak to recent research that highlights the fact 
that regional organizations in the global South operate in different ways and are 
less successful than in Europe (Gray 2018; Gray and Slapin 2012; Vinokurov and 
Libman 2017)? I have not examined specifically the consequences of EU diffu-
sion, even though the case of the disbanding of the SADC Tribunal, discussed in 
Chapter 5, indicates that it may sometimes lead to institutional ‘backlash’. In any 
case, this book’s findings are not to be interpreted as suggesting that EU- type 
institutions will lead to EU- type outcomes in other ROs (see also below). 
Institutional functioning and other outcomes of regional organization are not a 
function of institutions alone but of complex interactions between institutions 
and the wider social, cultural, and material context in which they operate. If these 
contexts differ, so will the functioning of institutions that are similar in terms of 
their design (Lenz 2013; see also Alter and Helfer 2010). It is inherent in diffusion 
processes that the ideas, institutions, or polices that travel to places other than the 
ones where they originated will display a worse ‘fit’ with local conditions—they are 
‘decoupled’ to some extent, at least initially. This implies that they will generally not 
display the same type or degree of functionality as they do in their ‘home’ setting. 
Whether diffusion, from the EU or other sources, is a relevant cause of the com-
paratively worse performance of ROs in the global South merits further research.
Nevertheless, diffusion research also suggests that actors regularly adopt 
external institutions not primarily to enhance the functionality of organizations 
but for purposes of recognition and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan  1977). This 
suggests that we may be applying the wrong measuring rod to assess their success; 
rather than measuring them purely by their functionality, we should also assess 
whether anticipated legitimacy benefits materialize. The difficulty is that these 
two important goals of policy- making tend to exist in tension. Whereas le git im-
acy gains often stem from the familiarity of institutional forms, efficiency tends to 
necessitate institutions that are tailor- made to fit specific local conditions, push-
ing them towards ‘uniqueness’. How actors in other ROs generally weigh the bal-
ance between the legitimacy gains that they anticipate by emulating institutions 
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from the EU or elsewhere, and the loss of efficiency that this may entail, provides 
a promising area for future research.
The findings of this book also contribute to the large literature on the external 
relations of ROs and, above all, that of the EU. This literature has analysed in 
detail how ROs conduct their foreign policy, the determinants of their activism in 
international forums, and the nature of their ‘actorness’ (Smith 2014; Hulse 2014; 
Panke, Lang, and Wiedemann 2018). However, much less research attention has 
been given to the actual effects of EU foreign policy outside of the enlargement 
context and its direct neighbourhood (Ademmer and Börzel 2013; Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2005). This holds also for the literature on the EU’s interregional 
relations (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove  2005; Hardacre  2009). Relatedly, 
while the notion of EU normative power centres squarely on the EU’s ability to 
spread its ideas by constituting a model of regional cooperation, whether such 
indirect influence has actually materialized is largely unknown (Manners 2002; 
Lenz 2013). This book adduces extensive evidence to lend empirical support to 
many of these claims. It shows that several decades of actively promoting regional 
cooperation around the world and developing relations with other ROs has 
affected processes of regional institution building elsewhere. The findings thus 
suggest that the EU can exert significant influence even in contexts beyond its 
immediate neighbourhood, where interdependence is lower and the EU’s material 
power diminishes. However, it also shows that its influence is dependent on 
facilitating conditions over which the EU has little direct control, such as the 
nature of another RO’s founding contract. To what extent other ROs shape their 
peers along the lines of the EU through ideational attraction and direct engagement 
is a prominent route for future research (for a pioneering study in this respect, see 
Reiss 2022).
International institutional design
The book examines the conditions and causal processes that shape the design of 
international institutions—a vibrant field of research in International Relations. 
The dominant rational design literature interprets international institutions as 
responding to functional demands emerging from the specific cooperation prob-
lems that states encounter (Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; 
Tallberg et al. 2013). It shares with a large body of literature on regional organiza-
tion the analytical focus on internal, especially functional, causal factors. Recent 
work has rightly criticized this approach for neglecting the contextual nature of 
institutional design. The latter does not occur in a ‘bargaining vacuum’; it is 
affected by the institutional or organizational context in which a design decision 
is being negotiated. Yet, whereas these critiques have focused on the presence or 
absence of existing and prior agreements between prospective partners in ‘new’ 
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cooperation (Copelovitch and Putnam  2014), institutional alternatives in the 
wider policy regime (Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal  2013), and the role of inter-
nation al bureaucrats in design negotiations (Johnson 2013), this book focuses on 
the diffusion of institutions between ROs. The book demonstrates that interor-
gan iza tion al dynamics matter, especially those that emanate from prominent 
organizational pioneers. From this perspective, the context that is relevant to our 
understanding of international institutional design encompasses not only the 
institutional status quo, prior institutional experience, and the interests of non- state 
actors in the design process but also the institutional activities of other, related 
organizations.
This book suggests that a major shortcoming of the existing literature on 
rational design is its failure to consider how the emergence of successful institu-
tional designs in other organizations alters the context in which institutional 
design choices are made subsequently. With its broad focus on efficiency consid-
erations, the bulk of this scholarship downplays the bargaining dynamics that 
shape negotiations over institutional design between governments. In other 
words, these broadly functional explanations are surprisingly ‘politics- free’ (see 
Duffield 2003: 417–18). In line with recent calls for an examination of the process 
of institutional design, and not merely its outcomes (Thompson 2010), the pre-
sent book offers extensive evidence on the underlying bargaining dynamics that 
shape design decisions. In so doing, it helps reconnect the rational design litera-
ture with its focus on overall efficiency with a key concern of political science and 
International Relations, which is to understand how actors come to adopt certain 
positions in political negotiations and how strategic interactions among them 
produce negotiated outcomes.
How does the argument presented in this book generalize beyond the realm of 
regional organization? For one, my argument implies that EU influence is likely 
to be limited among global organizations because the overwhelming majority of 
these organizations rest on a fixed contract (Lenz et al. 2015). Global or gan iza-
tions should take inspiration from organizations that are more similar to them-
selves in terms of the social purpose they serve because diffusion, I argue, is 
bounded by the plausible construction of ‘cultural’ similarity. The great majority 
of these organizations pursues a well- specified purpose, and they tend to be 
limit ed to governments as the relevant actors—community- building is generally 
not part of their mandate. This means that EU institutions are less likely to shape 
the design of institutions in task-specific global organizations. This may suggest that 
the ‘regimes of diffusion’, when it comes to global rather than regional organizations, 
are task- specific and revolve around prominent organizations in specific issue areas. 
While the UN may be a relevant focal organization in the realm of inter nation al 
security, the WTO may be the reference point in international trade governance and 
the World Health Organization in the international governance of health. In line 
with this argument, Heldt and Schmidtke (2019) have recently proposed that the 
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World Bank serves as a focal organization in the field of multilateral development 
finance (on focal organizations in international relations, see Jupille, Mattli, and 
Snidal 2013). Tackling questions about the ways in which task- specific organizations 
serve as focal organizations for their peers and which organizations have such a 
status offers a fruitful avenue for future research.
More broadly, this study emphasizes a neglected reason for why political insti-
tutions regularly change. A large literature in political science, sociology, and 
cognate disciplines has identified the dynamics that stabilize institutional 
arrangements and make departure from the status quo difficult. One reason for 
the stickiness of institutions is their taken- for- granted nature. North (1990), for 
example, stresses how institutional adaptation is constrained by ‘routines, cus-
toms, traditions, and conventions’ which have ‘tenacious survival ability because 
they have become part of habitual behavior’ (p. 83). Such taken- for- grantedness 
rests, at its core, on an inability of political actors to imagine alternative institu-
tional arrangements. This inability is undermined by available models that dis-
play successful alternatives. Akin to a role model in sports that drives admirers to 
continuously seek to develop and learn, institutional ‘role models’ both free 
organizational actor’s imagination of institutional alternatives and legitimize 
these alternatives, thereby facilitating institutional change. The EU has regularly 
assumed such a role in the development of regional institutions, capturing local 
actors’ imagination concerning potentially viable institutional alternatives to the 
status quo. The existence of such successful institutions elsewhere is one reason 
why ‘there is nothing automatic, self- perpetuating, or self- reinforcing about insti-
tutional arrangements’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 8). Successful organizational 
pioneers and the institutional models they advance contribute to undermining 
the reproduction of institutions because such pioneers regularly induce new insti-
tutional preferences and strategies that pose a threat to existing institutional com-
promises. The vociferous debate about the ‘China model’ as a potential alternative 
to liberal democracy prominently attests to this dynamic.
Diffusion
The literature on diffusion has accumulated large amounts of evidence to suggest 
that institutional or policy choices are regularly interdependent across units of 
analysis; they cannot be understood in isolation (for overviews, see Gilardi 2012; 
Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). However, the overwhelming focus of these 
studies concerns diffusion between national polities and other hierarchically 
organized units of political organization (federal states, cities, etc.). Diffusion 
between IOs has almost been completely neglected.4 Moreover, the literature 
4 To the extent that international organizations figure at all, they serve as promoters or channels of 
cross- national diffusion (see e.g., Fink 2013; Finnemore 1993; but see Sommerer and Tallberg 2019).
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 displays a style of theorizing and analysis that emphasizes broad structural 
 arguments about convergence and increasing similarity in outcomes, but largely 
fails to analyse actors and the dynamics of their interactions. As a result, it is often 
unclear how diffusion arguments connect to a key concern in international rela-
tions, namely to understand the dynamics of decentralized bargaining among 
sovereign governments.
The present study suggests that analysing diffusion between IOs constitutes 
fertile ground for developing a more actor- oriented understanding of diffusion 
that takes seriously the basic insight that explanations in political science should 
also delineate how environmental incentives and constraints shape the purposive 
choices of actors (Lake and Powell  1999). The reason is that, unlike diffusion 
between the hierarchically organized units that have dominated the literature, 
IOs are decentralized settings in which outcomes are the result of bargaining 
between sovereign governments with heterogeneous preferences. It is difficult to 
understand diffusion between IOs without taking this difference in context ser-
ious ly. This book proposes a heuristic model that reconnects these two concerns. 
It shows how institutional innovations in some organizations affect institutional 
outcomes in other organizations through their influence on governments’ institu-
tional preferences and strategies, which, in turn, shape international intergovern-
mental negotiations. The model implies that institutional innovations in one 
organization may affect the institutional preferences of governments in other 
organizations in different ways, thereby leading to various degrees of institutional 
adaptation rather than the simple adoption of foreign institutional  models. In 
short, the diffusion effects are likely to be smaller in the hard- fought world of 
international politics, and are only rarely expected to lead to convergence with 
individual institutional models.
The analysis also shows that organizational pioneers, such as the EU, are 
important providers of institutional designs for other ROs, thereby answering the 
seemingly simple question of where the diffused institutional designs actually 
come from. Quantitative studies of diffusion in particular have had a hard time 
answering this question because they generally conceptualize diffusion in terms 
of horizontal connections between units of analysis that are modelled through 
spatial lags, sometimes in a strictly dyadic set- up. The analytical concern is with 
identifying relevant connections through which diffusion occurs. This approach 
has been powerful in terms not only of establishing that policy- making is regu-
larly interdependent between organizations but also of identifying relevant ‘refer-
ence groups’ that facilitate diffusion. However, this book suggests that such 
studies tend to misconceive international diffusion processes as overly decentral-
ized and uncoordinated, with no identifiable ‘centre’. Instead, the book indicates 
that institutional diffusion can be an asymmetrical process in which influence 
primarily flows outwards from important institutional pioneers. In this sense, the 
present study reminds scholars that diffusion processes may well be structured in 
a centralized way, in which one node is much more central than others in the 
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network of certain organizations. Recent research on network topography 
 confirms that ‘complex systems [tend] to produce asymmetric network struc-
tures, in which some nodes are “hubs”, and are far more connected than others’ 
(Farrell and Newman 2019: 45). Given the EU’s economic power and its manifold 
connections with other regional organizations, interorganizational diffusion in 
this field may well remain characterized by a ‘hub- and- spokes’ pattern centring 
on the EU. This supposition bears further scrutiny in future research.
A natural starting point is to focus on the most central node in a network—the 
most prominent organizational pioneer—in analysing the diffusion of institu-
tional forms across IOs. However, there are various potential sources of diffusion, 
and further research may investigate the conditions under which one source of 
diffusion is chosen over another (see Baccini, Dür, and Haftel 2015; Reiss 2022). 
An implication of my argument about the role of contractual open- endedness in 
delimiting the causal role of EU influence is that, whereas the EU is the central 
reference point for organizations that pursue a community- building purpose, 
other reference points are more relevant in other types of organization. Task- 
specific IOs, such as NAFTA, may draw more systematically on organizations that 
pursue similar purposes of trade liberalization, such as the WTO. However, the 
case study on the establishment of the Permanent Review Tribunal shows that 
even in IOs based on an open- ended contract, several institutional models may 
compete for influence: Uruguay and to some extent also Paraguay favoured an 
EU- type court, whereas Argentina and also Brazil promoted a WTO- type tribu-
nal. So, there is discernible variation in reference points even within ROs based 
on open- ended contracts. Future research may theorize such variation below the 
structural organizational level at which I theorize the scope condition of EU 
influence. Why do states turn to a specific reference point, and not others, in 
defining their institutional preferences and strategies? Future research may also 
examine the conditions under which the members of an organization do not sim-
ply draw on diverse institutional models—maybe those that are most suitable to 
advancing their individual preferences—but develop a common understanding 
about the most appropriate model that best enhances their collective interest.
Understanding the complex politics of diffusion in International Relations is of 
growing importance because the relevance of diffusion as a factor shaping inter-
nation al institutional design is bound to increase. Due to the growing complexity 
of the global governance architecture and growth in the overlap of international 
institutions (Alter and Raustalia  2018; Haftel and Lenz 2021), interactions 
between organizations will multiply, and this provides fertile ground for the diffu-
sion of institutional and policy models. Recent research shows that connectivity 
between IOs facilitates diffusion, and may even lead to institutional convergence 
(Sommerer and Tallberg 2019). The relevance of diffusion is here to stay.
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APPENDIX A
The Dependent Variable  
‘RO institutionalization’
The dependent variable ‘RO institutionalization’ consists of four components that are 
detailed below. It draws on, and re- arranges, the ‘delegation’ measure in the Measure of 
International Authority (MIA) dataset (Hooghe et al. 2017).
I.  Institutionalization of a general secretariat
Every RO in the dataset has a secretariat with infrastructural functions such as running the 
headquarters, organizing meetings, and maintaining records. However, the extent to which 
the secretariat carries out executive functions, monitors compliance, and facilitates 
member- state bargaining varies considerably. A general secretariat cannot reasonably be 
expected to be a final decision- maker, and so the coding assesses the extent to which the 
secretariat can go beyond the infrastructural functions to be an agenda setter.
• GS1: Existence. Does the organization have an independent secretariat with adminis-
trative functions (0, 1)?
• GS2: Membership accession. Is the secretariat authorized to vet, solicit, or negotiate 
membership of the RO (0, 1)?
• GS3: Membership suspension. Is the secretariat authorized to initiate the suspension 
of membership (0, 1)?
• GS4: Constitutional amendments. Is the secretariat authorized to initiate or negotiate 
constitutional amendments (0, 1)?
• GS5: Substantive non- compliance. Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal 
proceeding against a member state in non- compliance with RO rules (0, 1)?
• GS6: Financial non- compliance. Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal pro-
ceeding against a member state in financial arrears (0, 1)?
• GS7: Drafting the budget. Is the secretariat authorized to (co-)draft the annual budget 
of the RO (0, 1)?
• GS8: Policy initiation. Is the secretariat authorized to propose one or more of the fol-
lowing: recommendations, resolutions, or declarations; programmes or projects; 
laws, regulations, decisions, or directives; protocols or conventions (0, 1)?
• GS9: Monopoly of policy initiation. Is the role of the secretariat in initiating policy (a) 
not mandated; (b) mandated by the RO’s founding document and shared with other 
bodies; (c) anchored in the RO’s founding document and exclusive (0, 0.5, 1)?
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• GS10: Executive powers. Is the secretariat of the RO authorized to carry out executive 
functions, such as framing multi- year strategic plans, drafting policy, or turning gen-
eral legislation into directives or executive orders (0, 1)?
• GS11: Monopoly of executive powers. Does the secretariat monopolize these powers 
or does it share them with another body (0, 1)?
GS_Institutionalization  is calculated as a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no 
institutionalization) to 11 (maximum institutionalization) and rescaled from 0 to 1.
II.  Institutionalization of a parliamentary body
Parliamentary bodies are bodies composed of elected parliamentarians that are either 
directly elected or nominated by national parliaments.
• PB1: Existence. Is there a parliamentary body in the organization (0, 1)?
• PB2: Formal status. Does the parliamentary body have some formal status, e.g. (a) is 
it incorporated in the treaty or convention, in a separate protocol, or in the RO’s 
organogram or website as a formal consultative body; (b) does it possesses formal 
rights of consultation on a regular, predictable basis (0, 1)?
• PB3: Direct election. Is the parliamentary body directly elected (in more than half of 
the member states) (0, 1)?
• PB4: Membership accession. Does the parliamentary body have a right to initiative 
(0.5) or legislative competence (1)?
• PB5: Membership suspension. Does the parliamentary body have a right to initiative 
(0.5) or legislative competence (1)?
• PB6: Constitutional amendment. Does the parliamentary body have a right to initia-
tive (0.5) or legislative competence (1)?
• PB7: Budgetary allocation. Does the parliamentary body have a right to initiative 
(0.5) or legislative competence (1)?
• PB8: Budgetary non- compliance. Does the parliamentary body have a right to initia-
tive (0.5) or legislative competence (1)?
• PB9: Policy making. Does the parliamentary body have a right to initiative (0.5) or 
legislative competence (1)?
PB_Institutionalization  is calculated as a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no 
institutionalization) to 9 (maximum institutionalization) and rescaled from 0 to 1.
III.  Institutionalization of other non- state bodies
ROs may also engage other bodies composed of non- state actors, such as those composed 
of labour and business representatives, of representatives from subnational units, of in di-
gen ous people, or of representatives from non- governmental organizations. These bodies 
are, at the most, consultative in nature; they do not have legislative competences. But they 
vary in the extent to which they exist, are formalized, and have a right to initiate policy 
across six decision areas. A non- state body is coded as existing when there is a formal 
regional body that has among its objectives to contribute to regional cooperation under 
the respective RO. I code up to two consultative bodies. A few organizations feature 
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sep ar ate labour and business councils, but those are coded as one because they tend to be 
integrated in most organizations.
• NS1: Existence. Does the organization have a body composed of non- state actors (0, 1)?
• NS2: Consultative status. Does this body have some formal status, e.g. (a) is it in corp-
or ated in the treaty or convention, in a separate protocol, or in the RO’s organogram 
or website as a formal consultative body; (b) does it possesses formal rights of con-
sultation on a regular, predictable basis (0, 1)?
• NS3: Right to initiative. Does this body have a right to initiate policy in membership 
accession, membership suspension, constitutional amendments, budgetary alloca-
tion, budgetary non- compliance and policy (0–3)? Agenda- setting competences in 
each decision area score 0.5.
NS_Institutionalization  is calculated as a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no insti-
tutionalization) to 10 (5 points for each of up to two bodies) (maximum in sti tu tion al iza-
tion) and rescaled from 0 to 1.
IV.  Institutionalization of judicial bodies
This component conceives legal dispute settlement as a continuum from low to high le gal-
iza tion that is assessed using seven dimensions. Variation on each dimension is com-
pressed into two or three categories that can be reliably scored. All but the first and last of 
these dimensions are based on James McCall Smith’s (2000) measure of dispute settlement 
in regional economic agreements. When there are two separate dispute settlement streams, 
I code the more authoritative one.
• JB1: Is the dispute settlement system obligatory (0/1)? An RO scores 1 if the dispute 
settlement system is obligatory, that is, member states cannot opt out of the system. 
This criterion applies, as is often the case, if dispute settlement procedures are part of 
a legal document that is separate from the political RO contract.
• JB2: Is there an automatic right for third- party review of disputes concerning member 
state compliance (0/0.5/1)? An RO scores 1 if a member state can initiate litigation 
over the objections of the party litigated against (automatic right); and 0.5 if access to 
third- party dispute settlement depends on the consent of a political body.
• JB3: Is the composition of the tribunal ad hoc or standing (0/0.5/1)? An RO scores 1 if 
there is a standing tribunal; and 0.5 if there are ad hoc tribunals; no tribunal gets a 
score of 0.
• JB4: Is adjudication binding, conditionally binding, or non- binding (0/0.5/1)? The 
assessment is based on explicit language in the treaty, convention, or protocol that 
sets up the dispute settlement mechanism. Conditional bindingness is applicable 
when: (a) a state consents ex ante to bindingness; (b) a state can register a derogation 
or exception; or (c) or a decision requires post hoc approval by a political body.
• JB5: Do non- state actors have access to dispute settlement (0/0.5/1)? Non- state actors 
are understood to be third- party IOs, parliaments, trade, business or public interest 
groups, or individuals. Access means they can take a member state or a body of the 
RO to court for violation of rights that evolve from the contract. If no non- state 
actors have legal standing, an RO receives a score of 0; if only the international secre-
tariat (or other RO body) has standing, an organization scores 0.5; 1 is the score 
when the range of non- state actors with legal standing is diverse.
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• JB6: Is there a remedy for non- compliance to the ruling (0/0.5/1)? ROs score 1 if 
 rulings take direct effect, i.e. they bind domestic courts to act. They score 0.5 if the 
remedy for non- compliance is retaliatory sanctions; and 0 when no remedies exist.
• JB7: Is there a preliminary ruling system of national court referrals (0/0.5/1)? ROs 
score 1 if preliminary rulings are compulsory, i.e. domestic courts must refer cases of 
potential conflict between national and supranational law to the supranational court 
or must abide by supranational rulings; and 0.5 if preliminary rulings are optional.
JB_Institutionalization  is calculated as a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no 
institutionalization) to 7 (maximum institutionalization) and rescaled from 0 to 1.
RO_Institutionalization, the aggregate measure, sums up the four rescaled components 
and normalizes the final score again, generating a score between 0 and 1 for each year of a 
given RO’s existence.
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Summary Statistics
  Mean SD Min Max
RO institutionalization 0.229 0.159 0 0.67
Contractual open- endedness 2.128 0.738 1 3
EU engagement (active influence) 0.133 0.229 0 0.907
EU institutionalization (passive influence) 0.769 0.098 0.524 0.871
Regional diffusion 0.229 0.103 0.023 0.404
Global diffusion 0.229 0.073 0.098 0.334
Intra- RO trade 17.19 17.039 0 75.506
Power asymmetry 4.991 4.157 1 22.831
Democracy 13.09 6.109 1.333 21
Members 12.267 10.6 3 53
GDP per capita 12830.09 12955.76 410.285 73829.34
Cold War 0.420 0.494 0 1
Globalization 52.182 13.724 28.709 89.766
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APPENDIX C
Robustness Checks
Table C.1. Testing for reverse causality 
  Outcome variable: EU engagement
Contractual open- endedness –0.004 (0.097)    
RO institutionalization   0.138 (0.117) –0.021 (0.216)
* Intermediate contract     –0.208 (0.305)
* Open- ended contract     0.312 (0.327)
Regional diffusion 0.728** (0.322) 0.724** (0.319) 0.728** (0.320)
Intra- RO trade –0.003 (0.008) –0.003 (0.008) –0.003 (0.008)
Power asymmetry –0.006 (0.012) –0.007 (0.011) –0.006 (0.012)
Democracy 0.016 (0.011) 0.015 (0.011) 0.015 (0.011)
Members (log) –0.130 (0.160) –0.131 (0.160) –0.133 (0.160)
GDP per capita (log) 0.030 (0.067) 0.031 (0.067) 0.030 (0.068)
Cold War –0.051 (0.037) –0.051 (0.037) –0.051 (0.037)
Globalization –0.003 (0.005) –0.003 (0.004) –0.003 (0.004)
Constant –0.100 (0.751) –0.120 (0.704) –0.110 (0.710)
R2: within 0.368 0.369 0.370
R2: between 0.047 0.051 0.051
R2: overall 0.090 0.094 0.094
Note: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses).































Table C2. EU influence and RO institutionalization, with European ROs excluded
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Contractual open- endedness 0.124** (0.058)           0.136** (0.051)
EU engagement (active 
influence)
  0.303*** (0.061) 0.141* (0.075)     0.273*** (0.059) 0.271*** (0.057)
* Open- ended   contract     0.210** (0.078)        
EU institutionalization 
(passive influence)
      0.634*** (0.121) 0.670*** (0.143) 0.421*** (0.090) 0.453*** (0.090)
* Fixed contract         –0.453** (0.192)    
* Open- ended contract         0.231*** (0.076)    
Regional diffusion 0.187 (0.205) 0.390* (0.220) 0.311 (0.224) 0.068 (0.208) –0.070 (0.208) 0.245 (0.204) 0.146 (0.196)
Intra- RO trade –0.001 (0.004) –0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) –0.003 (0.004) –0.002 (0.003) –0.002 (0.002) –0.002 (0.002)
Power asymmetry –0.003 (0.010) 0.001 (0.007) 0.002 (0.007) –0.007 (0.009) –0.009 (0.009) –0.003 (0.006) –0.004 (0.007)
Democracy 0.010 (0.007) 0.004 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 0.007 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004)
Members (log) 0.164 (0.100) 0.200** (0.081) 0.193** (0.077) 0.156* (0.091) 0.102 (0.080) 0.171** (0.078) 0.131 (0.080)
GDP per capita (log) 0.038 (0.039) 0.019 (0.031) 0.038 (0.034) 0.014 (0.039) 0.015 (0.031) 0.004 (0.029) –0.002 (0.027)
Cold War –0.026 (0.021) –0.002 (0.018) –0.002 (0.016) 0.032* (0.019) 0.021 (0.016) 0.030* (0.016) 0.025* (0.014)
Globalization –0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) –0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) –0.000 (0.003)
Constant –0.855** (0.341) –0.514 (0.344) –0.653* (0.357) –0.795** (0.366) –0.645** (0.306) –0.582* (0.333) –0.730** (0.309)
R2: within 0.390 0.527 0.557 0.432 0.536 0.554 0.582
R2: between 0.130 0.021 0.013 0.001 0.298 0.044 0.314
R2: overall 0.213 0.131 0.135 0.078 0.301 0.198 0.377
Note: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses).































Table C3. EU influence and RO institutionalization, with EU engagement disaggregated into its three components
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contractual 
open- endedness
  0.125*** (0.041)   0.138** (0.055)   0.145*** (0.047)   0.117* (0.058)
EU contacts (active 
influence)
0.174*** (0.034) 0.145*** (0.032)            
EU funding (active 
influence)
    0.124*** (0.034) 0.109*** (0.029)        
EU agreement scope 
(active influence)




            0.183*** (0.052) 0.149*** (0.053)
EU institutionalization 
(passive influence)
  0.476*** (0.090)   0.544*** (0.089)   0.479*** (0.075)   0.485*** (0.083)
Regional diffusion 0.198 (0.172) –0.024 (0.168) 0.322 (0.191) 0.059 (0.170) 0.158 (0.198) –0.068 (0.179) 0.157 (0.208) –0.058 (0.181)
Membership 0.199*** (0.070) 0.156** (0.071) 0.160* (0.079) 0.118 (0.076) 0.211*** (0.064) 0.165** (0.066) 0.218*** (0.073) 0.173** (0.076)
GDP 0.032 (0.030) –0.002 (0.029) 0.028 (0.031) –0.011 (0.027) 0.038 (0.031) 0.002 (0.028) 0.030 (0.032) –0.004 (0.030)
Globalization 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)
Intra- RO trade 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) –0.000 (0.002) –0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Democracy 0.007 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) 0.007 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.006 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 0.008* (0.004) 0.006 (0.004)
Cold War 0.003 (0.013) 0.040*** (0.013) –0.020 (0.018) 0.027* (0.014) –0.001 (0.015) 0.037*** (0.011) –0.001 (0.016) 0.037*** (0.012)
Power 0.002 (0.007) –0.002 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) –0.003 (0.007) 0.002 (0.007) –0.002 (0.007) 0.001 (0.008) –0.002 (0.008)
Constant –0.662** (0.324) –0.843*** (0.269) –0.484 (0.351) –0.705** (0.281) –0.696** (0.330) –0.895*** (0.277) –0.675** (0.332) –0.845*** (0.282)
R2: within 0.470 0.530 0.431 0.510 0.499 0.569 0.467 0.526
R2: between 0.016 0.148 0.016 0.161 0.010 0.135 0.014 0.127
R2: overall 0.068 0.196 0.076 0.192 0.068 0.189 0.063 0.181
Note: Note that the analysis shows the two elements of cooperation agreements, policy scope and obligation, separately. All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses).































Table C4. EU influence and RO institutionalization, with RO institutionalization disaggregated into its four components


























0.090 (0.056) 0.094** (0.043) 0.000 (0.051) 0.330*** (0.101)
EU engagement 
(active influence)




0.295** (0.122) 0.221* (0.125) 0.381*** (0.113) 0.185** (0.079) 0.433*** (0.143) 0.321** (0.135) 1.287*** (0.308) 0.915*** (0.249)
Regional diffusion 0.357 (0.229) 0.241 (0.226) 0.177 (0.216) –0.063 (0.199) –0.233 (0.194) –0.150 (0.188) –0.144 (0.214) –0.308 (0.221) –0.245 (0.219) 0.841* (0.426) 0.333 (0.407) 0.377 (0.400)
Intra- RO trade –0.001 (0.002) –0.002 (0.002) –0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.005* (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) –0.003 (0.004) –0.006 (0.005) –0.003 (0.004)
Power asymmetry –0.007 (0.006) –0.009 (0.006) –0.009 (0.006) –0.003 (0.005) –0.007 (0.006) –0.004 (0.005) 0.019** (0.009) 0.015 (0.009) 0.017* (0.009) –0.001 (0.017) –0.013 (0.020) –0.008 (0.017)
Democracy 0.009*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) 0.012** (0.004) 0.006* (0.003) 0.001 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006) –0.001 (0.011) 0.007 (0.013) –0.006 (0.009)
Members (log) 0.161*** (0.050) 0.140*** (0.048) 0.136** (0.052) 0.055 (0.058) 0.019 (0.079) 0.029 (0.063) 0.099 (0.076) 0.071 (0.079) 0.086 (0.073) 0.497*** (0.172) 0.404* (0.201) 0.397** (0.176)
GDP per 
capita (log)
0.056*** (0.017) 0.048** (0.022) 0.039** (0.017) –0.004 (0.015) –0.006 (0.020) –0.018 (0.016) 0.091*** (0.026) 0.077***  (0.020) 0.073*** (0.022) –0.059 (0.092) –0.094 (0.109) –0.125 (0.091)
Cold War 0.022*** (0.007) 0.041*** (0.010) 0.038*** (0.010) 0.001 (0.013) 0.018 (0.014) 0.014 (0.013) –0.018 (0.017) 0.011 (0.017) 0.011 (0.016) 0.005 (0.042) 0.085** (0.037) 0.073** (0.033)
Globalization –0.001 (0.002) –0.001 (0.002) –0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) –0.003 (0.003) –0.002 (0.004) –0.002 (0.003) 0.008 (0.006) 0.008 (0.007) 0.007 (0.007)
Constant –0.678*** (0.179) –0.771*** (0.208) –0.803*** (0.156) –0.117 (0.215) –0.300 (0.214) –0.251 (0.225) –1.078*** (0.286) –1.199*** (0.247) –1.110*** (0.303) –0.274 (0.969) –0.693 (1.024) –0.763 (0.814)
R2: within 0.433 0.411 0.468 0.484 0.318 0.509 0.381 0.371 0.394 0.315 0.246 0.373
R2: between 0.005 0.013 0.036 0.097 0.179 0.216 0.198 0.192 0.192 0.009 0.025 0.013
R2: overall 0.022 0.015 0.121 0.200 0.270 0.260 0.230 0.239 0.232 0.002 0.000 0.033
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Table C5. EU influence and RO institutionalization, alternative measure of contractual 
open- endedness (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019)




0.132** (0.059)     0.138** (0.052)
EU engagement  
(active influence)
  0.167*** (0.054)   0.260*** (0.053)
 * Open- ended contract   0.189*** (0.065)    
EU institutionalization 
(passive influence)
    0.533*** (0.094) 0.414*** (0.074)
* Open- ended contract     0.271*** (0.085)  
Regional diffusion 0.100 (0.181) 0.192 (0.195) –0.137 (0.183) 0.022 (0.171)
Intra- RO trade 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) –0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Power asymmetry 0.000 (0.009) 0.003 (0.006) –0.003 (0.008) –0.001 (0.006)
Democracy 0.010 (0.006) 0.002 (0.004) 0.005 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003)
Members (log) 0.154* (0.089) 0.185*** (0.061) 0.111 (0.074) 0.162** (0.066)
GDP per capita (log) 0.039 (0.033) 0.034 (0.029) –0.000 (0.030) –0.009 (0.025)
Cold War –0.024 (0.016) –0.004 (0.013) 0.030** (0.012) 0.034*** (0.012)
Globalization –0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Constant –0.766** (0.326) –0.572* (0.309) –0.555* (0.305) –0.635** (0.274)
R2: within 0.393 0.554 0.513 0.582
R2: between 0.088 0.015 0.173 0.093
R2: overall 0.150 0.091 0.207 0.154
Note: This analysis uses the measure of contractual incompleteness by Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 
(2019), which is dichotomous (fixed, open- ended) rather than trichotomous. The fixed contract is the 
baseline measure. All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses).































Table C6. EU influence and RO institutionalization, including two- year lags for all independent variables
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Contractual open- endedness 0.098** (0.048)           0.107** (0.042)
EU engagement (active 
influence)
  0.277*** (0.053) 0.138** (0.064)     0.249*** (0.052) 0.248*** (0.052)
* Open- ended contract     0.197*** (0.069)        
EU institutionalization 
(passive influence)
      0.556*** (0.105) 0.253* (0.131) 0.363*** (0.079) 0.376*** (0.078)
* Intermediate contract         0.322* (0.168)    
* Open- ended contract         0.545*** (0.174)    
Regional diffusion 0.193 (0.184) 0.290 (0.195) 0.281 (0.202) –0.085 (0.184) –0.175 (0.188) 0.082 (0.191) 0.043 (0.189)
Intra- RO trade –0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) –0.001 (0.002) –0.001 (0.002) –0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Power asymmetry –0.000 (0.008) 0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006) –0.003 (0.007) –0.005 (0.007) –0.001 (0.006) –0.001 (0.006)
Democracy 0.009 (0.006) 0.003 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.008 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003)
Members (log) 0.157* (0.084) 0.200*** (0.058) 0.186*** (0.059) 0.158** (0.075) 0.101 (0.068) 0.185*** (0.058) 0.164*** (0.060)
GDP per capita (log) 0.052 (0.031) 0.033 (0.026) 0.045 (0.028) 0.019 (0.033) 0.018 (0.028) 0.011 (0.025) 0.007 (0.024)
Cold War –0.020 (0.018) 0.004 (0.015) –0.000 (0.015) 0.037** (0.015) 0.028** (0.013) 0.036** (0.014) 0.033** (0.013)
Globalization –0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) –0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Constant –0.905*** (0.296) –0.619** (0.300) –0.679** (0.313) –0.809** (0.320) –0.653** (0.280) –0.654** (0.285) –0.790*** (0.265)
R2: within 0.376 0.505 0.529 0.421 0.493 0.528 0.543
R2: between 0.114 0.012 0.018 0.003 0.219 0.009 0.115
R2: overall 0.168 0.071 0.089 0.060 0.229 0.072 0.166
Note: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses).































Table C7. EU influence and RO institutionalization, including global diffusion
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Contractual open- endedness 0.125** (0.056)           0.130** (0.051)
EU engagement (active influence)   0.295*** (0.055) 0.145* (0.072)     0.259*** (0.054) 0.256*** (0.054)
* Open- ended contract     0.208*** (0.076)        
EU institutionalization (passive 
influence)
      0.553*** (0.104) 0.256* (0.131) 0.411*** (0.073) 0.431*** (0.073)
* Intermediate contract         0.326* (0.170)    
* Open- ended contract         0.560*** (0.177)    
Global diffusion –0.207 (0.377) 0.213 (0.353) 0.167 (0.364) –0.309 (0.332) –0.532 (0.322) –0.365 (0.320) –0.485 (0.342)
Intra- RO trade 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) –0.001 (0.003) –0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Power asymmetry 0.000 (0.009) 0.002 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) –0.003 (0.008) –0.004 (0.008) –0.000 (0.006) –0.001 (0.006)
Democracy 0.010 (0.006) 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.009 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003)
Members (log) 0.153* (0.090) 0.204*** (0.065) 0.192*** (0.066) 0.165* (0.082) 0.105 (0.076) 0.186*** (0.064) 0.159** (0.067)
GDP per capita (log) 0.039 (0.033) 0.020 (0.028) 0.033 (0.030) 0.006 (0.034) 0.005 (0.029) –0.005 (0.027) –0.011 (0.025)
Cold War –0.026 (0.017) 0.003 (0.014) –0.001 (0.014) 0.032** (0.014) 0.023* (0.012) 0.037*** (0.013) 0.032** (0.012)
Globalization –0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) –0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Constant –0.846** (0.316) –0.535* (0.316) –0.598* (0.329) –0.709** (0.334) –0.550* (0.289) –0.555* (0.299) –0.712** (0.278)
R2: within 0.392 0.528 0.555 0.435 0.513 0.557 0.581
R2: between 0.149 0.016 0.017 0.002 0.222 0.013 0.134
R2: overall 0.192 0.077 0.092 0.048 0.222 0.079 0.182
Note: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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